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COMPULSORY PROCESS II 
Peter Westen* 
The [sixth] amendment to the constitution gives to the accused, 
in all criminal prosecutions, a right to ... compulsory process 
for obtaining witnesses in his favor. The right given by this 
article must be deemed sacred by the courts, and the article 
should be so construed as to be something more than a dead 
letter. 
UNITED STATES v. BuRR, 25 ,F. Cas. 30, 33 (No. 14,692d) 
(C.C.D. VA.1807) (MARSHALL, CIR. J.). 
A friend of mine who teaches constitutional law has the nasty habit of giving his students an objective exam to demonstrate how 
little they know about the actual text of the Constitution. One of his 
favorite and most successful questions lists various principles of crimi-
nal procedure (some of which are taken verbatim from the fourth, 
fifth, sixth, and eighth amendments, and some of which are pure in-
ventions) with instructions to the students to designate those princi-
ples that are not explicitly found in the Constitution. Although 
their answers range widely, they invariably agree in one respect-
that what John Marshall referred to as the defendant's "sacred" right 
of compulsory process is nowhere found in the Bill of Rights. 
This article is dedicated to those unhappy students, and to the 
memory of their clients; for the compulsory process clause is indeed 
part of the Constitution. It is one of a half-dozen principles of 
criminal procedure that make up the sixth amendment. More pre-
cisely, the compulsory process clause is a companion and counterpart 
to the more famous confrontation clause. Together, these two clauses 
constitutionalize the law of witnesses in criminal cases: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to 
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall 
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan. B.A. 1964, Harvard 
University; J.D. 1968, University of California, Berkeley. 
The author wishes to express his appreciation to Steven Silverman for his cheerful 
and tireless research efforts and to the William W. Cook Endowment Fund for its 
generous financial support. He also wishes to thank Professor John Reed for his 
careful reading of an earlier draft of this article, and Professors Vince Blasi, Jerry 
Israel, Richard Lempert, and Don Regan for many thoughtful conversations on the 
constitutional nature of the law of evidence.-Ed. 
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have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the 
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining wit-
nesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence.1 
It should not be surprising that students overlook the compulsory 
process clause: In the 160 years that followed Marshall's landmark 
opinions in the trial of Aaron Burr, the courts and the bar ignored 
Marshall's warning and permitted the clause to become a "dead 
letter." It is only during the past decade that the Supreme Court has 
begun to breathe life into the clause. In a series of opinions that 
began in 1967 and culminated in the recent decision subjecting 
President Nixon to compulsory process, 2 the Court has rejected the 
notion that the clause guarantees the accused merely the means for 
securing the attendance of witnesses at trial. It has come instead to 
recognize, explicitly or implicitly, that the compulsory process clause 
undergirds the entire presentation of a defendant's case, from the 
right to discover witnesses in his favor to the right to compel them to 
testify over claims of privilege. 3 
The significance of these decisions has been examined in an 
earlier study concerning the extent to which a defendant's right to 
produce witnesses extends beyond merely securing their presence at 
trial and includes placing their testimony into evidence. 4 This article 
addresses a series of questions, specifically reserved in the earlier 
study, concerning the process by which a defendant obtains the 
attendance of witnesses in his favor. It re-examines the bases for 
doctrinaire assertions that the compulsory process clause, having 
nothing to say about standards of competence for defense witnesses, 
has no bearing on the power of the state to impose numerical limits 
on the number of defense subpoenas, to deny subpoenas for witnesses 
whose testimony is deemed cumulative, to deny a defendant continu-
ances pending the appearance of his witnesses, and to require a 
defendant to accept substitute evidence in the place of live testimony. 
It further analyzes assertions that the clause, guaranteeing the defend-
ant nothing more than equality with the prosecution regarding the 
1. U.S. CoNsr. amend. VI (emphasis added). See also Faretta v. California, 43 
U.S.L.W. 5004, 5007-08 (U.S. June 30, 1975). 
2. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
3. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 
470 (1973); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 283 (1973) (per curiam); Cool v. 
United States, 409 U.S. 100 (1972); Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95 (1972) (per 
curiam); United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348 (1969); Washington v. Texas, 
388 U.S. 14 (1967). 
4. Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 13 MICH. L. REv. 71 (1974). 
194 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 74: 191 
issuance of subpoenas, has no additional bearing on the power of the 
state to withhold subpoenas from defendants who are unable to pay 
for them, to refuse to enforce subpoenas by attachment or arrest, and 
to refuse to produce out-of-state witnesses from beyond its territorial 
boundaries. 5 
There are no easy answers to the questions raised by these asser-
tions because the constitutional implications of the subpoena power 
remain largely unexplored. The conventional wisdom on the issu-
ance, enforcement, timing, price, number, and territorial scope of 
defense subpoenas is largely nonconstitutional in origin. The scant 
constitutional authority that does exist is a mixed bag of state court 
decisions construing local versions of the compulsory process clause 
and obsolescent federal decisions, rendered without reference to re-
cent developments in constitutional analysis. 
This Article examines the validity of the conventional wisdom. 
It draws support for its analysis from the constitutional principles of 
compulsory process, and, in their absence, from related doctrine in 
the areas of a defendant's right to confront witnesses against him and 
his right to a fair trial. Part I of the article defines the constitutional 
standard that governs the simple case of a nonindigent defendant who 
makes a timely application to produce a witness from within the 
territory of the jurisdiction. Parts II through IV, in turn, examine 
that standard in the light of complicating factors such as the defend-
ant's need for more time to secure a witness' presence, the indigency 
of the defendant, the defendant's failure to make an advance showing 
of need for the witness, the location of the witness beyond the 
territorial boundaries of the jurisdiction, and the availability of the 
defendant's evidence in a form other than live testimony. 
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD FOR THE ISSUANCE 
OF COMPULSORY PROCESS 
Our present understanding of the compulsory process clause can 
be traced to the 1967 Supreme Court decision in Washington v. 
Texas. 6 In the 170 years preceding the decision, the Court had 
mentioned the clause only five times, twice in dictum 7 and three times 
5. This "conventional" view was held by John Wigmore. See 8 J. WIGMORE, 
EVIDENCE§ 2191, at 68-70 & n.3, § 2192, at 70 n.6, § 2195a, at 85 (J. McNaughton 
rev. 1961); 9 J. WIGM0RE, EVIDENCE§ 2595, at 605 & nn.8-9 (3d ed. 1940). 
6. 388 U.S. 14 (1967). All but concurring Justice Harlan joined in the opinion 
of Chief Justice Warren. 
7. United States v. Van Duzee, 140 U.S. 169, 172 (1891) (dictum that the 
government need not issue free subpoenas to the defendant); United States v. Reid, 53 
U.S. (12 How.) 361, 363-6$ (1851), overruled in Rosen v, United States, 24S U.S. 
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in the course of explaining its reluctance to construe the clause. 8 
Indeed, with the exception of John Marshall's seminal opinions in the 
trial of Aaron Burr,9 the clause remained dormant in the federal 
courts. Then, unexpectedly, the Court in Washington rejected Jus-
tice Harlan's invitation to limit its holding to certain due process 
objections10 and rendered a sweeping construction of the compulsory 
process clause. Essential to its construction was the formulation of a 
general standard of compulsory process that serves as the basis for 
our analysis here. It is important, however, first to set forth the facts 
of Washington. 
The defendant, Jackie Washington, and a friend named Fuller 
were indicted for the murder of a young man. Fuller was tried first, 
convicted, and sentenced to fifty years in prison. The prosecution 
introduced evidence at Washington's trial to show the following facts: 
that Washington had become jealous of the victim; that on the night 
of the murder Washington gathered a group of friends, including 
Fuller, and proceeded to a house where the victim was having supper; 
that Fuller brought his shotgun along; that several boys threw bricks 
at the house to attract the victim's attention, then returned to the car; 
that Washington and Fuller were left standing alone in front of the 
house with Washington holding the shotgun; that when the victim 
appeared at the door he was fatally shot by either Washington or 
Fuller; and that, by the time Fuller and Washington returned to the 
car, Fuller was carrying the shotgun.11 
Washington took the witness stand in his own defense and testi-
fied that he took no part in the actual shooting and that Fuller acted 
alone in making the fatal decision. According to Washington, when 
he and Fuller approached the house, Fuller, who was drunk, sud-
denly grabbed the shotgun and declared that he was going to shoot 
somebody. Washington further claimed that after an unsuccessful 
effort to persuade Fuller to leave, Washington turned and ran and 
467 (1918) (dictum that compulsory process clause codifies the common law as it 
existed in 1791). 
8. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 n.1 (1966) (unnecessary to decide 
whether the trial court erred in failing to grant defendant a continuance to subpoena 
witnesses for whom he refused to make an offer of proof); Blackmer v. United States, 
284 U.S. 421, 442 (1932) (unnecessary to decide the validity of a statute that granted 
extraterritorial subpoena power solely to the prosecution and denied it to the 
defense); Er parte Harding, 120 U.S. 782 (1887) (unnecessary to decide an 
unspecified compulsory process issue). 
9. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 (No. 14,692d) (C.C.D. Va. 1807); United 
States. v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187 (No. 14,694) (C.C.D. Va. 1807). For an analysis of 
Marshall's treatment of compulsory process, see Westen, supra note 4, at 101-08. 
10. 388 U.S. at 23-25 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
11. 388 U.S. at 1$-16, 
.. 
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was running toward the car when he heard the fatal shot.12 To 
corroborate his version of the facts (to which he and Fuller were the 
only surviving witnesses), Washington called Fuller as a witness for 
the defense. However, although Fuller evidently was ready to corrob-
orate Washington's story, 13 he was declared incompetent to testify 
for the defense because of a state statutory scheme disqualifying co-
indictees from testifying for one another.14 Washington was then 
convicted and sentenced to fifty years in prison. 
Washington argued on appeal that he had been denied his consti-
tutional right to compulsory process for witnesses in his favor by the 
trial court's refusal to permit Fuller to testify for the defense. The 
Texas court, holding that the compulsory process clause had no effect 
on how a state defined the competency of witnesses, rejected the 
argument.15 The Supreme Court reversed in an opinion that, for 
analytical purposes, can be divided into three parts. First, it held 
that the compulsory process clause, like other provisions in the sixth 
amendment, is so essential to a fair trial that it must be deemed 
applicable to the states through the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment: 
The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their 
attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a 
defense, the right to present the defendant's version of the facts as 
well as the prosecution's to the jury so it may decide where the truth 
lies. Just as an accused has the right to confront the prosecution's 
witnesses for the purpose of challenging their testimony, he has the 
right to present his own witnesses to establish a defense. The right 
is a fundamental element of due process of law.16 
Second, the Court rejected the notion that the courts are com-
pletely free to regulate the testimonial competence of defense wit-
nesses. The framers of the sixth amendment did not intend to commit 
the "futile act" of securing the attendance of witnesses whom the 
courts could "arbitrarily" prohibit from testifying;17 nor did the fra-
mers intend to make the production of witnesses depend on whether 
12. 388 U.S. at 16. 
13. 388 U.S. at 16. 
14. The Texas scheme provided that "Persons charged as principals, accomplices 
or accessories . . . cannot be introduced as witnesses for one another . . .; and, if any 
one or more be acquitted, or the prosecution against them be dismissed, they may 
testify in behalf of the others." 388 U.S. at 16-17 n.4. 
15. Washington v. State, 400 S.W.2d 756, 759 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966). The 
Texas court was applying doctrines well-accepted at the time. See 8 J. WIGMORB, 
EVIDENCE § 2191, at 69 (J. McNaughton rev. 1961). 
16. 388 U.S. at 19. Justice Harlan would have preferred the Court to apply 
general due process considerations rather than apply the compulsory process clause to 
the states through the fourteenth amendment. See 388 U.S. at 23-24. 
17. 388 U.S. at 23. 
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the legislature or courts deemed them fit to testify. Rather, the 
framers intended to guarantee a defendant the right to place on the 
witness stand-and thus to produce by means of "compulsory 
process"-all persons whom they understood to be "witnesses in his 
favor." In providing the defendant these rights, they implicitly in-
tended to abolish the common-law rule of competence that had 
disqualified witnesses from testifying for the accused and replace it 
with a constitutional standard of competence: 
[T]he right to compulsory process was included in the Bill of Rights 
in reaction to ,the notorious common-law rule that in cases of treason 
or felony ,the accused was not allowed ,to introduce witnesses in his 
defense at all. Although the absolute prohibition of witnesses for 
the defense had been abolished in England by statute before 1787, 
the Framers of the Constitution felt it necessary specifically to pro-
vide that defendants in criminal cases should be provided the means 
of obtaining witnesses so that their own evidence, as well as the 
prosecution's, might be evaluated by the jury.18 
In short, the framers granted the defendant the explicit right to 
produce witnesses in his favor on the assumption that, in doing so, 
they had implicitly granted him the right to place such witnesses on 
the stand. As the Court put it, "the Sixth Amendment was designed 
in part to make the testimony of a defendant's witnesses admissible on 
his behalf in court . . . ."19 
Finally, having established that the testimonial competence of 
defense witnesses is a federal question to be resolved by federal 
standards, the Court examined the Texas incompetency statutes. The 
Texas rule appears to have assumed that co-indictees charged with 
the same crime were untrustworthy witnesses because "each would try 
to swear the other out of the crime";20 as a remedy, Texas law 
declared co-indictees incompetent to testify for one another. Without 
challenging the underlying assumption about the general trustworthi-
18. 388 U.S. 19-20. The Court relied for its history on J. SroRY, COMMENTARIES 
ON TIIB CONSTITUTION OF TIIE UNITED STATES §§ 1786-88 (1st ed. 1833). For a 
fuller supporting account of the history or compulsory process, see Westen, supra note 
4, at 75-108. For an analysis of the court's use of history in Washington, see 
Westen, supra, at 113-15. 
19. 388 U.S. at 22. Justice Harlan objected to the extension of the compulsory 
process clause beyond the issuance of subpoenas to include matters of competence. 
388 U.S. at 24. For similar criticism of Washington, see Casenote, 20 BAYLOR L. 
REV. 467,472 (1968); Casenote, 46 TEx. L. REv. 795, 797-98 (1968). Justice Harlan 
and the majority basically differed about whether the framers intended the compul-
sory process clause to govern the competence of defense witnesses. See generally au-
thorities cited in note 18 supra. If one concludes, as the majority did, that the fram-
ers were concerned with matters of competence, one can rationally conclude that the 
framers did not intend to allow the trial courts or the legislature to fashion rules of 
evidence limited only by their discretion. 
20. 388 U.S. at 21, quoting Benson v. United States, 146 U.S. 325, 335 (1892). 
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ness of co-indictees, the Court concluded that the remedy was arbi-
trary because it imposed an unnecessary burden on the defendant's 
right to present witnesses. Even if co-indictees were potentially 
unreliable defense witnesses, Texas could have adequately protected 
the integrity of its fact-finding process by permitting them to testify 
and leaving the weight and credibility of their testimony to the fact-
finder. 21 The Court concluded by defining the standard for testing 
the Texas statutes: 
We hold that the petitioner in this case was denied his right to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor because the 
State arbitrarily denied him the right to put on the stand a witness 
who was physically and mentally capable of testifying to events that 
he had personally observed and whose testimony would have been 
relevant and material to the defense.22 
This standard should not be viewed as a comprehensive test. On 
the contrary, the Court explicitly refused to decide, for example, 
whether a defendant had the right to compel a witness to testify over 
assertions of privilege.23 Nor is the standard entirely consistent 
in so far as it suggests that the defendant's right to present witnesses 
is confined to eye-witnesses (witnesses who are "capable of testifying 
to events that [they have] personally observed") and thus excludes 
expert witnesses and others whose testimony is based on opinion. 24 
Nevertheless, the standard contains the four essential elements of a 
defendant's right of compulsory process: a defendant has a right to 
subpoena witnesses who are (1) competent ("physically and mentally 
capable of testifying to events that [they] personally observed") to 
give testimony that is (2) relevant, (3) material, and (4) favorable 
to the defendant (testimony that is relevant and material "to the 
defense"). 
A. Competent Witnesses 
Because a defendant has no right to produce witnesses who are 
constitutionally incapable of testifying, his right to subpoena wit-
nesses depends on their competence to testify.25 It has been com-
21. The Court quoted Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467, 471 (1918): "'fl1he 
truth is more likely to be arrived at by hearing the testimony of all persons of 
competent understanding who may seem to have knowledge of the facts involved in a 
case, leaving the credit and weight of such testimony to be determined by the jury or 
by the court . . .' " 388 U.S. at 22. The Court then added that "[a]lthough Rosell 
v. United States rested on nonconstitutional grounds, we believe that its reasoning was 
required by the Sixth Amendment." 388 U.S. at 22. 
22. 388 U.S. at 23 (footnote omitted). 
23. 388 U.S. at 23 n.21. 
24. See text at notes 37-39 infra. 
25. See People v. Adams, 43 Cal. App. 3d 697, 117 Ca]. Rptr. 905 (1974) 
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monly assumed, moreover, that the compulsory process clause does 
no more than incorporate by reference whatever standards of compe-
tence otherwise exist in the jurisdiction. Wigmore best represents 
this view as follows: 
This history of the law securing for accused persons the right 
to compulsory process for their witnesses shows that the purpose of 
the statutes [granting such a right] was merely to cure the defect of 
the common law by giving to parties defendant in criminal cases the 
common right which was already in custom possessed both by parties 
in civil cases and by the prosecution in criminal cases. The bills of 
rights in most of the constitutions have incorporated this statutory 
right .... 
It follows that this right [ of compulsory process] does not over-
ride and abolish such exemptions and privileges as may be otherwise 
recognized by common law or statute. The right guaranteed is merely 
the general right to the compulsory process which is required for 
making practical the testimonial duty, so far as that duty otherwise 
exists.26 
The difficulty with the Wigmorean view is that it was implicitly 
rejected in Washington v. Texas as contrary to the framers' intent. In 
Washington, the Court held that by providing a defendant the right to 
subpoena witnesses in his favor, the framers intended to secure the 
right to place the testimony of such witnesses into evidence. 27 
Whether a witness is capable of testifying for the defendant, there-
fore, is not solely a matter of state law, but is ultimately a federal 
(refusal to subpoena children to testify to defendant's state of mind at time of offense 
not a violation of compulsory process rights because children were not competent to 
testify); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 457 Pa. 237, -, 324 A.2d 350, 355 (1974) 
("[W]here certain witnesses' testimony would not be admissible at trial, the Constitu-
tion does not require that a defendant be given the right to secure the attendance of 
witnesses which he has no right to use"). See also United States v. Sellers, 520 F.2d 
1281, 1285-86 (4th Cir. 1975) (no violation of compulsory process rights to deny 
defendant subpoenas for witnesses not competent to testify to facts set forth in offer 
of proof); United States v. Deaton, 468 F.2d 541, 544 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 
410 U.S. 934 (1973) (no violation of compulsory process rights to deny defendant a 
subpoena for witness whose testimony would be inadmissible as hearsay); United 
States v. Keefer, 464 F.2d 1385, 1387 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 983 (1972) 
(same). It should be noted, however, that whether hearsay evidence is competent 
evidence in the defendant's favor is itself a federal question-like the question of 
testimonial competence-to be resolved by constitutional standards. See Westen, 
supra note 4, at 149-59. 
26. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2191, at 68-69 (J. McNaughton rev. 1961) 
(footnotes omitted). For an elegant statement of this view of the Constitution, see 
In re Dillon, 7 F. Cas. 710, 712 (No. 3,914) (N.D. Cal. 1854). See also 
Commonwealth v. Jackson, 457 Pa. 237, -, 324 A.2d 350, 355 n.4 (1974) ("Al-
though a defendant has the right to have compulsory process to obtain witnesses in 
his behalf and, therefore, to have subpoena issued, the determination of whether or 
not to allow a witness to take the stand is a matter within the discretion of the trial 
judge"). 
27. See text at notes 17-19 supra. 
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question to be resolved by federal constitutional standards. Although 
the states may establish local standards of testimonial competence, 
they may not do so in a manner that arbitrarily excludes "witnesses 
in [the defendant's] favor'' within the meaning of the compulsory 
process clause. 28 
The crux of the Court's decision in Washington is the meaning of 
the term "arbitrary." Unfortunately, the Court did not define the 
term; it merely criticized the Texas incompetency rule and contrasted 
it with other rules of competence that it implied were more accepta-
ble. Nevertheless, the Court said enough to permit us to infer what it 
meant by "arbitrary." To anticipate our conclusion, by use of the 
term "arbitrary" the Court was referring to the fact that the Texas 
rule imposed an unnecessary burden on the defendant's right to 
present witnesses because the rule wholly excluded evidence that 
might have been reliable instead of permitting it to be heard, 
weighed, and judged by the fact-finder. 
Perhaps it is best to begin with a distinction the Court drew 
between the arbitrary Texas rule and nonarbitrary rules for infants 
and the insane.20 The Court found the Texas rule arbitrary because 
it disqualified an entire class of persons from testifying simply be-
cause some of them might testify falsely: 
[I]t could hardly be argued that a State would not violate the clause 
if it made all defense testimony inadmissible as a matter of pro-
cedural law. It is difficult to see how the Constitution is any less 
violated by arbitrary rules that prevent whole categories of defense 
witnesses from testifying on the basis of a priori categories that pre-
sume them unworthy of belief. ao 
At the same time, however, the Court distinguished nonarbitrary rules 
that disqualify infants and insane persons from testifying: 
Nor do we deal in this case with nonarbitrary state rules that dis-
qualify as witnesses persons who, because of mental infirmity or 
infancy, are incapable of observing events or testifying about them.31 
It might be argued that the Court was drawing a distinction between 
disqualification for mental or physical infirmity, which it found non-
arbitrary, and disqualification based on interest and bias, which it 
found arbitrary. This seems unlikely, however, because rules that 
operate to disqualify the mentally and physically infirm can apply in 
the same a priori fashion as the Texas rule. It was once the rule, for 
example, that children below the age of seven, and persons deemed 
28. 388 U.S. at 23. 
29. See 388 U.S. at 23 n.21. 
30. 388 U.S. at 22. 
31. 388 U.S. at 23 n.21. 
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insane, were categorically presumed untrustworthy, regardless of their 
individual capacity to give reliable testimony.32 If the Texas rule was 
arbitrary because of its broad sweep, then these latter rules appear 
equally arbitrary. 
It is unlikely, however, that in singling out rules for infants and 
the insane the Court was referring to categorical disqualifications of 
the kind described; for, by the time the Court decided Washington in 
1967, those categorical rules had been universally replaced by the 
more modem view that infants and mentally infirm persons should be 
disqualified only if, after individual examination, they are determined 
incapable of giving meaningful testimony in the particular case. 33 It 
is more likely, therefore, that in expressing apparent approval of rules 
for infants and the insane the Court was referring to rules reflecting 
the more modem view of competence. 
The first basic theme of the opinion that begins to emerge, then, 
is a distinction between an a priori determination (based on a wit-
ness' membership in a class) that a witness is incompetent, and an 
individual determination that a witness is incapable of giving testi-
mony in a particular case. Yet even this distinction, by itself, is in-
complete in so far as it implies that all categorical disqualifications 
are invalid. Assume, for example, that a state disqualified from testi-
fying all persons under the age of six months, all persons with an I.Q. 
of less than twenty, or all persons incapable of recollecting for peri-
ods beyond eight hours. Would the Court declare such rules invalid? 
If not, how would the Court distinguish those categorical disqualifica-
tions from the incompetency rules in Washington? Similarly, the dis-
tinction is incomplete in so far as it implies that all individualized 
disqualifications are valid regardless of the standard used in determin-
ing the disqualification. Assume, for example, that a state disquali-
fies persons who, after individual determination, appear incapable of 
expressing themselves in perfect English. Would the Court uphold 
such individualized determinations? If not, how would it distinguish 
them from the procedures for infants and the insane, which it appar-
ently approved? 
While the Court did not expressly supply the missing element, we 
can construe its language in a way that both explains the distinction 
between "a priori categories" and individualized disqualification, and 
is consistent with what will appear as the second basic theme of 
the opinion. The defect in the Texas rule was not that it disqualified 
categories of witnesses, but that the particular category of co-indictees -
32. See 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE§ 492, and§ 508, at 600 (3d ed. 1940). 
33. See id. § 488 n.2, § 501, and § 509, at 600-01. 
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was overbroad. If Texas disqualified all witnesses with an I. Q. of 
less than twenty, the category would be valid because reasonable 
people could not differ about the inability of such witnesses to give 
meaningful testimony. The difficulty with the Texas rule was that it 
disqualified all co-indictees from testifying for one another, despite 
the fact that some co-indictees might be capable of giving trustworthy 
testimony. In the Court's words, the Texas rule "presume[d] them 
unworthy of belief'34 without any showing that everyone within the 
category was necessarily unreliable. 
Having determined that the Texas rule was overbroad, the final 
question the Court faced was whether such overinclusion could be 
justified. The parties apparently agreed both that Texas had a legiti-
mate interest in protecting its judicial processes from unreliable testi-
mony and that co-indictees could be unreliable. They apparently dis-
agreed, however, about whether disqualifying all co-indictees was a 
proper means of guarding against the unreliable testimony of some 
co-indictees. Texas contended that it was justified in excluding all 
co-indictees because it could not identify the unreliable individuals in 
advance and because some co-indictees were certainly unreliable. 
The defendant contended, however, that categorical exclusion was 
unnecessary because Texas could adequately satisfy its interests by 
permitting the co-indictees to testify subject to instructions concern-
ing the weight and credibility of their testimony. The Court adopted 
the defendant's view and thus established the second basic theme 
of its opinion-that whenever a witness may seem to be competent, 
his competence must be left to the fact-finder: 
"[The Sixth Amendment reflects] the conviction of our time that 
the truth is more likely to be arrived at by hearing the testimony 
of all persons of competent understanding who may seem to have 
knowledge of the facts involved in a case, leaving the credit and 
weight of such testimony to be determined by the jury or by the 
court. ... "35 
Thus, the two separate themes of the opinion-that a priori 
categories are generally invalid and that matters of competence must 
usually be left to the fact-finder-together provide a general constitu-
tional standard for determining the competence of defense witnesses 
in criminal cases. The Texas rule was arbitrary, not because it 
disqualified witnesses by categorizing them, but because the particu-
lar category used included witnesses whose competence was reasona-
bly disputable. By the same token, the issue of competence had to go 
to the jury, not because statutory disqualification is never permissible, 
34. 388 U.S. at 22. 
35. 388 U.S. at 22, quoting Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467, 471 (1918). 
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but because the competence of co-indictees is something about which 
reasonable people can differ. This also explains the distinction be-
tween what the Court called "arbitrary" disqualifications based on a 
priori categories, and "nonarbitrary" disqualifications based on indi-
vidualized examination. The latter procedure is valid, not simply 
because the trial court individualizes its determination, but because in 
doing so, it presumably applies the strict standard of disqualifying 
only those witnesses whose competence is not reasonably disputable. 
To state the general standard, the defendant has a constitutional right 
to produce any witness whose ability to give reliable evidence is some-
thing about which reasonable people can di/fer. 36 
Having thus defined the constitutional standard of competence 
implicit in Washington, we can apply it to one final, yet apparently 
inconsistent, statement in the opinion. In its conclusion, the Court 
emphasized that a defendant has the right to produce witnesses who 
are capable of testifying "to events [they] personally observed."37 
This statement raises the negative implication that the defendant has 
no right to produce witnesses whose testimony is based on opinion. If 
this implication was intended, it contradicts the basic standard of 
competence set forth above: there are many witnesses, including 
experts, whose testimony is based on opinion, yet who are capable of 
presenting evidence upon which reasonable people would rely. In-
deed, it is scarcely conceivable that defendants could be constitution-
ally denied the opportunity to call experts to give opinion evidence 
about such matters as fingerprints, bloodstains, sanity, and other 
matters that routinely arise in criminal litigation.38 It is unlikely, 
36. The competency standard has constitutional implications for all rules-
whether rules of competence or rules of evidence-that incapacitate witnesses from 
testifying for the defense. Thus it casts doubt on the validity of the opinion rule and 
hearsay rule in so far as they would exclude evidence that may reasonably tend to 
exculpate the defendant. See Westen, supra note 4, at 149-59. See also text at notes 
426-33 infra. The standard also has constitutional implications for rules of privilege 
that permit otherwise material witnesses to refuse to testify for the defense. In so far 
as rules of privilege apply to prevent the defendant from introducing evidence in his 
favor, they too are unconstitutional. See Westen, supra, at 174-92. See also text at 
notes 59-65, 135-44 infra. 
37. 388 U.S. at 23. 
38. The constitutional question rarely arises, probably because courts invariably 
assume that the defendant in a criminal case has the right to call expert witnesses to 
give opinion evidence about certain matters. Cf. FED. R. Evm. 701, 702. Thus no 
cases can be found directly deciding the constitutional question adversely to the 
defense. At least one court has held that the defendant has a right, under the 
compulsory process clause, to compel an expert to render opinion testimony. See 
Flores v. Estell, 492 F.2d 711, 712 (5th Cir. 1974) (psychiatrist's opinion whether 
prosecution witness was intoxicated at time of crime). Cf. State v. Dorsey, 532 P.2d 
912 (N.M. Ct. App. 1975) (due process right to introduce polygraph testimony). 
The defendant's right to present opinion evidence has been assumed in other 
contexts. For example, denying the defendant time to obtain opinion evidence on the 
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therefore, that the Court intended to limit the scope of its holding to 
the production of eye-witnesses. Since the particular witness for the 
defense in Washington based his testimony on personal observation, 
the Court had no occasion to consider the authority of the courts to 
exclude opinion evidence. 
It is more likely that the Court stressed the importance of personal 
observation as one of several factors that might render it reasonable 
for the fact-finder to rely on a witness' testimony. Although personal 
observation is by far the most common means of establishing a 
witness' credibility, it is certainly not the exclusive method. Accord-
ingly, it should be sufficient if the defendant can establish any foun-
dation that would make it reasonable for a fact-finder to rely on the 
testimony of his witnesses. This standard may prove difficult to 
apply in individual cases, particularly with respect to expert wit-
nesses. 39 Yet, whether a witness possessing opinion evidence is a 
witness in the defendant's favor within the meaning of the sixth 
amendment, remains a federal question to be resolved by applying 
federal constitutional standards. 
issue of his sanity has been found to violate his right to due process, United States ex 
rel. Robinson v. Pate, 345 F.2d 691, 695 (7th Cir. 1965), affd. and remanded on 
other grounds, 383 U.S. 375 (1966), and denying an indigent defendant the right to 
call expert witnesses at state expense has been found to violate his compulsory process 
rights, People v. Watson, 36 Ill. 2d 228, 232, 221 N.E.2d 645, 648 (1966) (handwrit-
ing expert). See also Jacobs v. United States, 350 F.2d 571, 573 (4th Cir. 1965) 
(indigent defendant has due process right to appointment of psychiatrist at govern-
ment expense); Bowen v. Eyman, 324 F. Supp. 339, 340 (D. Ariz. 1970) (indigent 
defendant has due process right to call expert at state expense to render an opinion on 
blood stains); Bush v. McCollum, 231 F. Supp. 560, 564-65 (N.D. Tex. 1964), alfd., 
344 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1965) (indigent defendant has due process right to call expert 
at state expense to render an opinion on defendant's sanity). Although some courts 
have rejected the compulsozy process argument with respect to indigents, they have 
done so on the assumption that indigents have no right to call any witnesses at state 
expense, rather than on the distinction between expert witnesses and eye-witnesses. 
See, e.g., Utsler v. Erickson, 315 F. Supp. 480, 482 (D.S.D. 1970), affd., 440 F.2d 
140 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 956 (1971). For criticism of the latter view of 
indigency, see text at notes 206-75 infra. 
39. Opinion testimony, by experts and lay witnesses alike, is admissible in federal 
court under certain conditions. See FED. R. Evm. 40S(a), 608(a), 701-02. Deter-
mining the competence of experts raises special problems, however, because of the 
difficulty in establishing their qualifications, the length and complexity of their 
testimony, and the danger that they may usurp the responsibility of the jury to 
formulate opinions on the ultimate issues in the case. The last problem may explain 
the reluctance of most courts to permit the defendant to call polygraph experts to 
render an opinion concerning the defendant's truthfulness when no constitutional 
right to do so is asserted. See, e.g., United States v. Zeiger, 475 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 
1973), revg. 350 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1972); Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 
(D.C. Cir. 1923). But see United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Mich. 
1972) (polygraph testimony admissible on the defendant's behalf on nonconstitutional 
grounds). Cf. State v. Dorsey, 532 P.2d 912 (N.M. Ct. App. 1975) (defendant has 
right under due process clause to offer polygraph testimony on his behalf). 
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B. Relevant Witnesses 
A defendant has no constitutional right to produce witnesses 
whose testimony is wholly irrelevant to his defense. If a witness' 
testimony does not tend to prove the existence of facts asserted by the 
defense, then he can hardly be deemed a witness in the defendant's 
favor within the meaning of the sixth amendment.40 Thus, a defend-
ant accused of committing a burglary on the night of March 15 is not 
entitled to subpoena an "alibi" witness to testify to his whereabouts 
on March 17 because the offered testimony does not tend to establish 
any facts concerning the defendant's actions on the night of the 
crime.41 Nor is a defendant, at the guilt-determining stage of his 
trial, constitutionally entitled to introduce evidence relevant only to 
the determination of punishment, on the "sporting theory" that the 
jury might secretly (and wrongfully) disregard its instructions and 
take the evidence into consideration in determining his guilt or inno-
cence. 42 
40. See Jenkins v. Moore, 395 F. Supp. 1336, 1338 (E.D. Tenn.), affd., 513 F.2d 
631 (6th Cir. 1975) (no violation of defendant's compulsory process rights to deny 
him a subpoena for documentary evidence irrelevant to the issues in dispute); State v. 
Groppi, 41 Wis. 2d 312, 323, 164 N.W.2d 266, 271 (1969), revd. on other grounds, 
400 U.S. 505 (1971) (no violation of defendant's compulsory process rights to deny 
him a subpoena for witness whose testimony was irrelevant to the issues in dispute). 
Cf. State v. Baldwin, 276 N.C. 690, 700, 174 S.E.2d 526 (1970) (no violation of 
defendant's compulsory process rights to deny him a continuance for absent witness 
whose testimony would not have tended to prove facts at issue in the case). 
41. Chandler v. State, 272 S.2d 641, 643 (Miss. 1973) (relying on state and 
federal guarantees of compulsory process). See also People v. Stabler, 202 Cal. App. 
2d 862, 865, 21 Cal. Rptr. 120, 122 (1962) (where intoxication is not a defense, 
refusal to subpoena witness to testify to defendant's intoxication at the time of the 
offense does not violate right of compulsory process). 
42. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 90 (1963). The defendant in Brady was 
convicted of felony-murder and sentenced to death by the jury. After sentencing, it 
was discovered that the prosecutor had withheld the confession of a co-defendant that 
tended to prove that, though Brady participated in the underlying felony, the co-
defendant actually killed the victim. The Maryland court of appeals held that the 
suppression of the confession violated due process because, while the confession did 
nothing to exonerate the defendant of felony-murder, it might have persuaded the jury 
to refrain from sentencing him to death; accordingly, the court remanded for a new 
trial limited to the issue of punishment. Brady sought further relief in the United 
States Supreme Court, where he claimed that he was also entitled to a new trial on 
the issue of guilt. He argued that, even if the new evidence were relevant only to 
punishment, the jury might nevertheless disregard its instructions and consider the 
irrelevant evidence in determining guilt or innocence. The Court rejected the 
argument: 
A sporting theory of justice might assume that if the suppressed confession had 
been used at the first trial, the judge's ruling that it was not admissible on the 
issue of innocence or guilt might have been flouted by the jury just as might 
have been done if the court had first admitted a confession and then stricken 
it from the record. But we cannot raise that trial strategy to the dignity of a 
constitutional right . . . . 
373 U.S. at 90. 
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Although it is clear that the defendant has no right to produce 
and present irrelevant evidence, defining the standard to determine 
whether his evidence is relevant presents a serious problem. One 
might contend that the compulsory process clause has no bearing on 
the determination of relevance and that it merely provides the accused 
the means for producing witnesses whose testimony is otherwise 
deemed relevant by the prevailing law. That contention, however, 
runs counter to the thrust of the Supreme Court's holding in Wash-
ington v. Texas. In Washington, the Court refuted the notion that 
courts can define the probative value of the testimony of defense 
witnesses in a manner that arbitrarily excludes witnesses in the de-
fendant's favor. Although the issue in Washington was framed in 
terms of arbitrary standards of competence, the logic of the 
Court's opinion should apply with equal force in the area of relevance: 
The framers of the sixth amendment did not intend to commit the 
"futile act" of guaranteeing the defendant the presence of witnesses, 
while leaving it to the courts to prohibit them from testifying by 
employing arbitrary standards of relevance. 43 
The standard of relevance applied to the testimony of defense 
witnesses, therefore, ultimately presents a federal question to be re-
solved by federal constitutional standards. On a nonconstitutional 
level, evidence is said to be relevant if it tends to establish the 
existence of a fact at issue in a case. 44 The wording of the standard 
may differ from one jurisdiction to another, but applications of the 
various formulations do not appear to differ in substance. 45 Thus, 
most commentators would agree that evidence is relevant if it has 
"any tendency to make the existence of [a] fact . . . more probable 
or less probable than it would be without the evidence."46 Because 
the relevance of evidence depends upon first identifying the issues to 
be proved, state legislatures (and Congress) can set the basic frame-
work for relevance by defining the elements constituting crimes and 
defenses. However, beyond this initial delineation of the substantive 
issues, the legislature has limited control. It can establish local stan-
dards of relevance, but only to the extent that such standards do not 
define the relevance of the defendant's evidence so narrowly that they 
43. Cf. text at notes 18-23 supra. 
44. Although an examination of relevance may sometimes involve only a consid-
eration whether the evidence tends to establish a proposition, the test contemplated 
here involves an additional consideration whether that proposition is at issue in the 
case. See McCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVJDENCE, § 185, at 434-35 (2d 
ed. E. Cleary 1972) [hereinafter McCORMICK]. See also FED. R. EVJD. 401. 
45. McCORMICK, supra note 44, § 185, at 436-37. 
46. FED. R. Evm. 401. 
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exclude witnesses in his favor within the meaning of the compulsory 
process clause. 
By applying the test of arbitrariness developed by the Court in 
Washington, we can establish a constitutional standard of relevance 
and then use it to measure the prevailing nonconstitutional standard. 
While courts have a legitimate interest in being able to detect and 
screen irrelevant evidence, they may not do so by arbitrary means. 
Resorting to the outright exclusion of potentially relevant evidence is 
arbitrary if less drastic alternatives exist for screening irrelevant evi-
dence; accordingly, if the relevance of evidence is something about 
which reasonable people may differ, instructing the fact-finder to 
screen the evidence is a less drastic alternative than outright exclu-
sion. In sum, the defendant has a constitutional right to present any 
evidence that may reasonably be deemed to establish the existence of 
facts in his favor. The prevailing standard of relevance, which 
defines relevant evidence as evidence that has any tendency to make 
the existence of a fact at issue more probable or less probable, would 
thus appear to satisfy constitutional requirements. 
While the prevailing standard of relevance seems broad enough to 
satisfy the constitutional test, it is invariably accompanied by excep-
tions and by grants of discretion that raise more serious problems. 
Thus, in most jurisdictions the trial judge may exclude relevant 
evidence if he concludes that its probative value is out-weighed by its 
prejudicial effect or by its tendency to cause confusion or undue 
delay.47 The judgment of the court in weighing such factors is 
entitled to considerable deference and is reviewable only for manifest 
abuse of discretion. 48 In addition, most jurisdictions have made the 
policy decision that certain kinds of relevant evidence should always 
be excluded, such as evidence of the defendant's bad character for the 
purpose of showing that he acted in conformity therewith, or evidence 
that the defendant offered to plead guilty for the purpose of showing 
that he is guilty.49 The categorical exclusion of such evidence is 
based upon the legal determination that its probative value is always 
47. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if 
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay 
[or] waste of time ... "). 
48. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 127 (1974); McCORMICK, supra 
note 44, § 185, at 440 n.35. Cf. United States v. Nobles, 43 U.S.L.W. 4815, 4820-21 
n.16 (U.S. June 23, 1975) (decisions concerning the impact of expert testimony are 
"committed to the trial court's discretion," and will not be reviewed when not 
properly before the Court "[i]n the absence of a strong suggestion of an abuse of 
discretion"). 
49. See McCORMICK, supra note 44, § 18·8, and § 274, at 665-66. See, e.g., FED. 
R. Evm. 404,410. 
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outweighed by the danger of prejudice or by other independent 
policies. 
A good illustration of the constitutional problems presented by 
such exceptions is found in the rules governing the relevance of a 
victim's prior sexual conduct to prosecutions for rape. The approach 
taken by the Michigan sexual assult law50 is representative of the rule 
used in a majority of states. 51 Its adoption was due in part to efforts 
by women to make the criminal process more congenial to reporting 
and prosecuting rape by removing some of the evidentiary rules that 
previously deterred victims from reporting assaults. 02 The Michigan 
law excludes what may be relevant evidence in two ways. First, the 
law prohibits the defendant from introducing any evidence of the 
victim's sexual conduct except for the limited purpose of showing 
either the victim's prior sexual conduct with the defendant himself, or 
the origin of semen, pregnancy, or disease found in the victim. 
Second, the law grants the trial judge discretion to exclude such 
evidence, even for the latter enumerated purposes, if he finds that its 
"inflammatory or prejudicial" nature outweighs its probative value. 03 
The statute presents two separate problems-one stemming from 
its across-the-board exclusion of possibly relevant evidence and one 
stemming from its grant of discretion to the trial court. First, by 
declaring most sexual-conduct evidence to be legally irrelevant, the 
statute categorically excludes evidence that might reasonably be 
deemed to favor the defendant's case. A defendant customarily 
offers such evidence for at least two purposes: to impeach the victim's 
credibility by proving her "bad" character and to raise the inference 
that she consented to the sexual act in question by proving that she 
consented to similar acts in the past. Although sexual-conduct evi-
dence tends to prove little, if anything, about a witness' capacity to 
tell the truth, 54 it may tend to establish the probability of the victim's 
consent. For example, the defendant may try to show that the victim 
is an experienced prostitute whose real grievance is that the defendant 
refused to pay for her services, or that the victim has made previous 
50. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.520a-.5201 (Supp. 1975). 
51. In most jurisdictions, as in Michigan, evidence of specific instances of the 
victim's prior sexual conduct with persons other than his or her spouse is inadmissible 
either to establish the affirmative defense of consent or to impeach the victim's 
credibility. See Casenote, 8 GA. L. REV. 973, 974-75 & n.24 (1974). 
52. See generally Note, Michigan's Criminal Sexual Assault Law, 8 U. MICH, J. L. 
REF. 217, 218, 228 (1974). 
53. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 750.520j (Supp. 1975). 
54. See McCORMICK, supra note 44, § 42, at 82-83. Cf. FED. R. Evro. 608(b) 
("Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or 
supporting his credibility, other than conviction of a crime as provided in rule 609, 
may not be proved by extrinsic evidence"). 
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false claims about conduct that was actually consensual, or that the 
victim's conduct with the defendant was part of an existing and 
distinctive pattern of seduction. Furthermore, if it is rational to 
assume that a person who has consented to sexual intercourse in the 
past is more likely to consent to sexual intercourse than a virgin, then 
the defendant may wish to offer sexual-conduct evidence because it 
tends to make the existence of consent more probable than it would 
be without such evidence. 55 In each case, if reasonable people could 
differ about the probative value of such evidence, then, as a matter of 
law, it is constitutionally relevant to the defendant's case. 56 
The Michigan legislature, in response, would probably not deny 
that sexual-conduct evidence can be relevant; rather, it would assert 
that the probative value of such evidence is generally slight and is 
usually outweighed by its deterrent effect on the victim's willingness 
to prosecute. There are several problems with that position. First, 
even though sexual-conduct evidence may have slight probative value 
in some cases, the statute categorically excludes it in almost all cases, 
including those in which it has substantial value. Second, in a 
proceeding in which the prosecution must prove all essential elements 
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt (including lack of con-
55. Although some commentators believe that a person's past sexual conduct bears 
no reasonable relationship to his willingness to engage in future sexual activity, see S. 
BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL 371 (1975), the courts remain unanimous in 
finding that persons who have refrained from sexual activity in the past are less likely 
to consent in any given instance than persons who have often engaged in such activity 
in the past. See Washburn, Rape Law: The Need for Reform, 5 N.M. L. REV. 279, 
294 n.95 (1975). See also Annot., 140 A.L.R. 364, 380 (1,942). The Federal Rules 
of Evidence apparently recognize the relevance of such evidence. See FED. R. Evro. 
404(a)(2) ("Evidence of a person's character or a trait of his character is not 
admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a 
particular occasion, except: Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of 
the crime offered by an accused .•• "). 
56. To be sure, evidence of prior sexual conduct carries the least amount of 
weight when offered solely to support the inference that a person who has consented 
to sexual intercourse in the past is more likely to consent again than a person who 
was a virgin. For this reason, some jurisdictions wholly preclude the defendant from 
offering such evidence for that pUrPOse. See CAL. PEN. CODE § 1103(2)(a) (West 
Supp. 1975). See also note 64 infra. The difficulty with such outright exclusion, 
however, is that it may preclude the defendant from offering evidence that, in the 
recent judgment of courts and commentators alike, has some relevance to the issue of 
consent. See Commonwealth v. Manning, - Mass. -, -, 328 N.E.2d 496, 501 
(1975); Wynne v. Commonwealth, - Va. -, 218 S.E.2d 445 (1975); Note, 
Limitations on the Right To Introduce Evidence Pertaining To the Prior Sexual 
History of the Complaining Witness in Cases of Forcible Rape: Reflections of 
Reality or Denial of Due Process?, 3 HOFSTRA L. REv. 403, 408-19 (1975). Nor can 
the evidence be constitutionally excluded by simply asserting that its probative value 
is outweighed by its inflammatory effect. It is up to the jury to decide how much 
weight, if any, the evidence carries, unless the court concludes that the evidence is so 
inherently inflammatory that even a properly instructed jury cannot be expected to 
evaluate it rationally. See text at notes 65-70 infra. 
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sent), 57 even evidence with only slight probative value may prove 
sufficient to introduce doubt into a juror's mind. 58 The real ques-
tion, then, is whether the state has the constitutional authority to 
exclude evidence that may make the difference between guilt and 
innocence in order to make the criminal process more congenial to 
those who seek to use it. 
The answer to this question can be found in two separate lines of 
cases-those concerning a defendant's right to produce government 
informers and those concerning his right to examine prosecution 
witnesses over claims of privilege. The state's interest in preserving 
the anonymity of its informers is very similar to its interest in 
excluding sexual-conduct evidence. In each case, the state encour-
ages individuals to come forward with evidence of criminal violations 
by guaranteeing them a modicum of confidentiality; in each case, the 
state fears that open disclosure of certain facts at trial will dry up its 
sources of information.59 Nevertheless, the state's authority to sup-
press information about informers is limited by "the fundamental 
requirements of fairness."60 In a decision that can be understood to 
be implicitly based on the compulsory process clause, the Supreme 
Court held that the state's efforts to preserve the confidence of its 
sources must "give way" whenever disclosure "may be relevant and 
helpful to the accused's defense."61 
In a case dealing with the defendant's right of confrontation, the 
Court reached a similar result. The prosecution in Davis v. Alaska62 
relied on the identification testimony of a seventeen-year-old witness 
who was on probation for a prior juvenile offense. When the defend-
ant tried to impeach the witness for bias by questioning him about his 
self-interest in pleasing the prosecution, the trial judge barred the 
questions on the basis of a statute designed to protect the juvenile 
51. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 43 U.S.L.W. 4695, 4696 (U.S. June 9, 1975), 
58. The focus here is on the simple relevance, and not on the probative weight, of 
the exculpatory evidence. Thus, although sexual-conduct evidence may not be 
sufficient by itself to prove consent, it may be sufficient, when linked with additional 
evidence of consent, to introduce doubt into the minds of enough jurors to avoid a 
conviction. Cf. United States v. Miller, 411 F.2d 825, 832 (2d Cir. 1969) (defendant 
has constitutional right to produce evidence if there is "a significant chance that this 
added item .•. could have induced a reasonable doubt in the minds of enough jurors 
to avoid a conviction"). See also text at notes 71-144 infra. 
59. See generally McCORMICK, supra note 44, § 111. 
60. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60 (1957). 
61. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 62 (1957). For a discussion of the 
constitutional reasoning implicit in Roviaro, see Westen, supra note 4, at 165-66 & 
n.462. 
62. 415 U.S. 308 (1974). For an excellent analysis of Davis, see Note, Conslilu-
tional Restraints on the Exclusion of Evidence in the Defendant's Favor: The Impli-
cations of Davis v. Alaska, 73 MrcH. L. R.Ev. 1465 (1975). 
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from the embarrassment of exposing his record. The Supreme Court 
reversed, holding that the state's interest in permitting the juvenile to 
testify "free from embarrassment and with his reputation unblem-
ished" was outweighed by "the right of the petitioner to seek out the 
-truth in -the process of defending himself."63 This statement of the 
paramount importance of the defendant's right to present exculpatory 
evidence should apply with equal force to the case of the rape 
victim. 64 Indeed, if the state's desire to spare a witness embarrass-
ment is subordinate to the defendant's right of confrontation, it is also 
subordinate to his right of compulsory process, for the two clauses are 
simply different ways of defining the government's obligation to 
produce witnesses for the benefit of the defendant. 65 
63. 415 U.S. at 320. 
64. Indeed, at the time Davis was decided the California legislature was consider-
ing the adoption of legislation to prohibit evidence of the victim's prior sexual conduct 
from being introduced for any purpose whatsoever. In response to Davis, however, 
the legislature amended the bill to permit the defendant to introduce such evidence 
for the purpose of attacking the victim's credibility on the assumption that to do 
otherwise would violate the defendant's right of confrontation. See Note, California 
Rape Evidence Reform: An Analysis of Senate Bill 1678, 26 HAsT. L.J. 1551, 1570-
71. The Davis exception to the California legislation may be so broad that it 
completely undercuts the effect of the remaining sections of the legislation, which 
purport to prohibit the use of sexual conduct evidence. See id. at 1567-68. 
65. The confrontation and compulsory process clauses of the sixth amendment 
impose a constitutional obligation on the states to produce witnesses in criminal 
proceedings to enable the defendant to defend himself effectively. See California v. 
Green, 399 U.S. 149, 176 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). The language of the 
clauses distinguishes between those witnesses whose testimony the prosecution relies 
upon to prove its case and those witnesses whose testimony the defendant relies upon 
to defeat the state's case. This distinction has no bearing on the scope or importance 
of the underlying duty to produce witnesses, which remains the same whichever party 
calls the witness at trial. Rather, the purpose of the distinction is to allocate the 
burden of invoking the state's underlying duty to produce. While the state has no 
duty to produce the defendant's witnesses unless he identifies and requests their 
production, once he makes a proper request, the state has the same duty to produce 
them as to produce the witnesses upon whose testimony the prosecution relies. 
Thus, the sixth amendment enables the defendant to establish facts both by cross-
examining the prosecution's witnesses and by examining his own witnesses. In a rape 
case, evidence of the victim's prior sexual conduct can be produced either as the result 
of the defendant's right of confrontation or as the result of his right of compulsory 
process. If, in response to his direct questions, the witness admits the facts the 
defendant wishes to establish, then the defendant has produced the evidence in the 
course of cross-examination through the exercise of his confrontation rights. On the 
other hand, if on cross-examination the witness denies the truth of the· facts the 
defendant wishes to establish, then the defendant must introduce the evidence by 
calling independent witnesses as part of his affirmative case through the exercise of 
his compulsory process rights. For an example of the impeachment of a prosecution 
witness arising not on cross-examination (as in Davis), but in the context of the 
defendant's affirmative case, see State v. Cox, 42 Ohio St. 2d 200, 327 N.E.2d 639 
(1975). Regardless whether the issue arises as a matter of confrontation or compul-
sory process, however, the constitutional analysis-the weighing of the defendant's 
right to produce evidence against the interests protected by the testimonial privilege-
is the same. 
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The second defect in the Michigan statute (which is also shared 
by most rules of relevance) is that, after recognizing the probative 
value of particular kinds of sexual-conduct evidence, it allows the trial 
judge the discretion to exclude such evidence. The statute recognizes 
two limited exceptions to the ban on sexual-conduct evidence: evi-
dence of the victim's prior sexual conduct with the defendant and 
evidence of the victim's sexual conduct with others that reveals the 
origin of semen, pregnancy, or disease. 66 Although, as noted above, 
the exceptions do not cover all instances in which sexual-conduct 
evidence may be constitutionally relevant, they are rational in them-
selves. They permit the defendant to prove that he had a prior 
personal relationship with the victim (which may tend to establish 
consent), and, where identity is at issue, to disprove that he was the 
source of semen, disease, or pregnancy. Nevertheless, having recog-
nized the relevance of such evidence, the statute authorizes the trial 
court to exclude it whenever it concludes that its probative value is 
outweighed by its "inflammatory or prejudicial nature."67 
Allowing the judge discretion to balance the probative value of 
evidence against the danger that it will improperly influence the jury 
raises several problems. To begin with, it implies that, in counteract-
ing the dangers of prejudice, the judge is free to exclude probative 
evidence rather than admit it under cautionary instructions. Yet 
Washington teaches that it is unconstitutional for a court to resort to 
exclusion when the less drastic alternative of sending the evidence to 
the jury under cautionary instructions is available. Furthermore, the 
jury is constitutionally presumed to be able to follow its instructions 
in all but the most extraordinary cases. 68 Ordinarily, therefore, the 
compulsory process clause denies the judge any discretion to exclude 
relevant evidence. In some cases, of course, the judge may conclude 
66. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§§ 750.520j(l)(a), (b) (Supp. 1975). 
67. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 750.520j(l) (Supp, 1975). 
68. Only twice has the Supreme Court held that the assumption that the jury can 
follow its instructions may violate constitutional rights. In Jackson v. Denno, 378 
U.S. 368, 388-89 (1964), the jury was found incapable of disregarding a defendant's 
involuntary confession, and in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 128-37 (1968), 
it was found similarly incapable of disregarding statements in a co-defendant's 
confession that powerfully incriminated the defendant. 
As the Court pointed out in Bruton, 391 U.S. at 135, the jury is ordinarily 
presumed capable of following its instructions. See, e.g., Frazier v. Culp, 394 U.S. 
731, 733 (1969) (instructions to disregard prosecutor's opening statement concerning 
statements by a co-defendant incriminating defendant); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 
554, 562-63 (1967) (instructions to consider evidence of defendant's prior crimes 
only to determine sentence). Furthermore, to the extent that the Court in Bruton 
and Jackson doubted the jury's ability because of the Court's concern for the rights 
of the defendant, it should trust the jury here where it is the defendant who asserts 
a right to bring the evidence before the jury. 
December 1975] Compulsory Process II 213 
that the evidence is so inflammatory or prejudicial as to induce the 
fact-finder to disregard its instructions and decide the case on irra-
tional grounds. In these rare cases, which may include cases involv-
ing the victim's prior sexual conduct, the judge may exclude the 
evidence on the ground that, because of its inflammatory effect, he 
can no longer say that it rationally tends to favor the defendant's case. 
In the absence of such circumstances, however, the defendant has a 
constitutional right to demand that the fact-finder, rather than the 
judge, determine the probative value and weight of his evidence. 
Another problem with a relevance rule that grants discretion to 
the trial courts is that it implies that appellate courts should defer to 
the trial court's determination of relevance and should reverse only 
for the most apparent abuse.69 Yet, whatever the standard of review 
for nonconstitutional issues, the federal courts should not defer to 
determinations of relevance that raise "grave constitutional over-
tones."70 Indeed, it is particularly appropriate that an appellate court 
scrutinize the exclusion of prejudicial or inflammatory evidence be-
cause of the limited nature of the inquiry: The appellate court does 
not have to balance the probativeness of the evidence against the 
dangers of improper influence, nor does it have to re-weigh factors 
that may be better understood by the trial court. Rather, it must only 
decide whether the case presents the rare kind of evidence that is too 
inflammatory or too prejudicial for a properly instructed fact-finder 
to consider rationally. Absent such a finding, the appellate court 
must reverse the trial court for imposing an arbitrary burden on the 
defendant's right to produce witnesses in his favor. 
C. Material Witnesses 
The defendant has no constitutional right to subpoena witnesses 
whose testimony is immaterial to his defense. 71 Although commenta-
tors differ on the proper use of the term "material,"72 the Supreme 
69. See note 48 supra. 
70. Cf. United States v. Hale, 43 U.S.L.W. 4806, 4808 n.7 (U.S. June 24, 1975); 
Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 423-34 (1957). 
71. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23 (1967); State v. Eller, 84 Wash. 2d 
90, 95-97, 524 P.2d 242, 246 (1974), revg. 8 Wash. App. 697, -, 508 P.2d 1045, 
1048-49 (1973). Cf. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 598 (1974) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting) ("Of course even in a criminal trial the right to present one's own 
witnesses may be limited by the trial judge's finding that the evidence offered is 
irrelevant ... or needlessly repetitious"). 
72. Some courts use "relevance" to refer to the tendency of evidence to prove a 
fact, regardless whether the fact is at issue in the case, and use "materiality" to refer 
to the relationship between the fact that the evidence tends to prove and the issues in 
the case. Thus, if a fact is at issue, but evidence does not tend to prove that fact, the 
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Court has used the term in reference to the prejudicial effect of 
denying the defendant the benefit of relevant and favorable evi-
dence. 73 Accordingly, though evidence may be favorable and rele-
vant to a defendant's case, he has no right to produce it if the impact 
of its exclusion will be too insignificant in the context of the other 
evidence presented at trial to have any material bearing on the 
outcome. 
The issue of materiality, the conventional wisdom notwithstand-
ing, 74 ultimately presents a question to be resolved by federal consti-
tutional standards. First, the constitutional implications of materiality 
are implicit in the logic of Washington: The framers of the sixth 
amendment did not intend to commit the futile act of guaranteeing 
the defendant the presence of witnesses, while leaving it to the courts 
to prohibit them from testifying by imposing arbitrary standards of 
materiality. And, second, the federal nature of materiality is implicit 
in the Supreme Court's treatment of the concept of prejudicial error. 
If, as the Supreme Court has held, the prejudicial effect of comment-
ing on the defendant's silence is a federal question, 75 then the material 
effect of denying the defendant the right to produce witnesses in his 
favor must also present a federal question. For to say that evidence 
is material to the defendant's case is simply another way of saying that 
its exclusion would be prejudicial by federal standards; conversely, to 
evidence would be excluded as "irrelevant"; conversely, if evidence tends to prove a 
fact, but the fact itself is not at issue, the evidence would be excluded as "immaterial." 
For a discussion of the above distinction, see McCORMICK, supra note 44, § 185, at 
434-35. Here, in contrast, both of the usages referred to above are treated as 
questions of relevance. See note 44 supra. Materiality, on the other hand, is used to 
refer to the probative weight of evidence that is assumed to be relevant. 
73. In Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 798 (1972), the Supreme Court concluded 
that the suppressed evidence, which tended to impeach one of the prosecution's five 
identification witnesses by showing that his identification was confused, was not 
material, 408 U.S. at 797, because the evidence, even if produced, would not have left 
the witness' identification "significantly, if at all, impeached," 408 U.S. at 796. 
Justice Marshall, dissenting, did not agree: "It is evident from the foregoing that the 
statements were not merely material to the defense, they were absolutely critical." 408 
U.S. at 806. 
74. Wigmore believed that the compulsory process clause did nothing more than 
guarantee the defendant the same rights with respect to the issuance of subpoenas as 
are enjoyed by the prosecution. Therefore, he felt that local law alone governs the 
number of witnesses who are permitted to testify in criminal cases. 8 J. W!GMORE, 
EVIDENCE§ 2191, at 69 n.3 (J. McNaughton rev. 1961). 
75. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21 (1967) (the prejudicial effect of 
commenting on the defendant's decision to assert his privilege against self-incrimina-
tion is a federal question reviewable by the Supreme Court). Cf. Harrington v. 
California, 395 U.S. 250, 252 (1969) (the prejudicial effect of admitting hearsay 
evidence against the defendant is a federal question reviewable by the Supreme 
Court). 
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say that evidence is immaterial is another way of saying that its 
exclusion would be harmless by federal standards. 76 
The more difficult task-after recognizing the federal nature of 
the issue-is to define the term "material" with sufficient precision to 
determine whether courts are applying the proper standard. Most 
jurisdictions have fashioned nonconstitutional rules of practice that 
have a direct effect on whether the defendant is afforded all material 
witnesses in his favor. For example, in some jurisdictions, rules have 
been adopted that limit the number of witnesses a defendant may 
subpoena in a single case77 or the number of witnesses who may 
testify to any single issue. 78 Limits have also been placed on the 
number of character witnesses, 79 expert witnesses, so and witnesses 
who may testify to collateral issues. 81 Those jurisdictions that do not 
76. Since "prejudicial effect" and "materiality," when used in this fashion, are 
synonymous, it is superfluous to speak of "prejudicial error" (or its converse, 
"harmless error") with respect to a constitutional right like compulsory process that 
has already been formulated to require a showing of materiality. If the defendant's 
right of compulsory process were formulated without reference to materiality-as it 
certainly could be and as his right of confrontation is usually formulated-then courts 
would find it useful to apply a prejudicial error test to decide whether violations 
justified reversal, just as they now apply the test of materiality. 
77. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 43-2001, 43-2002 (1964) (indigent defendants 
limited to 6 witnesses in misdemeanor and 12 witnesses in felony trials, except upon 
order of the court); LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 734, 738 (West 1967) (indigent 
defendants limited to 6 witnesses in misdemeanor, and 12 witnesses in felony trials, 
except on special application); MONT. RBv. CODES ANN. § 95-1801(b) (1947) 
(indigent defendants limited to 6 witnesses except upon order of the court); NEB. 
REV. STAT. § 29-1903 (1943) (defendants limited to 15 witnesses at state expense); 
ORE. REV. STAT. § 136.567 (1974) (indigent defendants limited to 10 witnesses except 
upon order of the court). 
78. See, e.g., Chapa v. United States, 261 F. 775 (5th Cir. 1919), cert. denied, 
252 U.S. 583 (1920) (defendant limited to 13 out of 150 possible witnesses to testify 
that he "cured" them of illness); O'Hara v. United States, 129 F. 551, 555-56 (6th 
Cir. 1904) (no violation of the compulsory process clause to limit an indigent 
defendant to 4 witnesses on each contested issue); McMillan v. State, 229 Ark. 249, 
255-57, 314 S.W.2d 483, 487-88 (1958) (defendant limited to 5 witnesses on question 
of his physical condition); People v. Cavanaugh, 69 Cal. 2d 262, 270-72, 444 P.2d 
110, 115-16, 70 Cal. Rptr. 438, 443-44 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 981 (1969) 
(defendant limited in advance to 2 alibi witnesses from out-of-state); State v. Mucci, 
25 N.J.423, 433-34, 136 A.2d 761, 766 (1957) (defendant can be limited to a certain 
number of witnesses on any issue in the case, regardless whether a "collateral" or 
"main" issue is in dispute). 
79. See, e.g., cases cited in note 151 infra. 
80. See United States v. West Coast News Co., 357 F.2d 855, 859 (6th Cir. 
1966), revd. on other grounds sub nom. Aday v. United States, 388 U.S. 447 (1967) 
(defendant limited in advance to three expert witnesses); Burgman v. United States, 
188 F.2d 637, 641 (D. C. Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 838 (1951) (defendant limited 
to two expert witnesses without cost). See also 6 J. WrGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1908, at 
580 (3d ed. 1940) ("This result may be said to be universally accepted; the trial court 
in its discretion may limit the number of expert witnesses"). 
81. See, e.g., People v. Arnold, 248 Ill. 169, 178, 93 N.E. 786, 789 (1910) 
("[W]hile a court has no power to limit the number of witnesses to be heard as to a 
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impose numerical limits in advance invariably leave it to the trial 
judge to deny subpoenas for witnesses whose testimony is cumula-
tive82-a determination that will not be reviewed unless arbitrary. 83 
There is no constitutional difference between a rule that permits 
the judge to impose a numerical limit on the defendant's witnesses 
and a rule that permits the judge to exclude cumulative witnesses for 
the defense. Both rules may be applied to deny the defendant 
material witnesses within the meaning of the compulsory process 
clause. Thus, the constitutionality of a rule that limits the defendant 
to a certain number of witnesses for a particular issue depends upon 
whether it has the effect in that case of excluding material witnesses 
for the defense.84 Similarly, the constitutionality of a judge's ruling 
that denies the defendant subpoenas for cumulative witnesses depends 
upon whether the local definition of "cumulative" is coextensive with 
the constitutional meaning of "immaterial."85 In each case, the 
controlling fact . . . it is not error to fix a reasonable limit concerning collateral 
matters •.. "). See also Annot., 5 A.L.R.3d 238, 242 (1966). 
82. See, e.g., United States v. Plemons, 455 F.2d 243, 246 (10th Cir. 1972) (no 
error to deny the defendant subpoenas for witnesses whose testimony would have been 
cumulative); United States v. Chapman, 455 F.2d 746, 748 (5th Cir. 1972) (same). 
Cf. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 127 (1974) (''The District Court retains 
considerable latitude even with admittedly relevant evidence in rejecting that which is 
cumulative ... "). 
83. See, e.g., Cate v. State, 80 Neb. 611, 616, 114 N.W. 942, 944 (1908); 
Borschewski v. State, 13 Ohio App. 362, 31 Ohio Ct. App. 597 (1920). See also 
United States v. Squella-Avendano, 478 F.2d 433, 438 (5th Cir. 1973) (reviewable 
only on a "clear showing of prejudicial abuse of discretion"); State v. Thompson, 65 
N.J. Super. 189, 194, 167 A.2d 410, 413 (App. Div. 1961) (reviewable for "abuse of 
discretion"). 
84. Compare Leverett v. State, 18 Ala. App. 578, 582, 93 S. 347, 350-51 (1922) 
(violation of the state compulsory process clause to limit the defendant to six 
character witnesses where character was "main" issue in case), with Malinauskas v. 
United States, 505 F.2d 649, 655-56 (5th Cir. 1974) (no error to limit defendant to 
one of five witnesses to testify that he was drugged at time he plead guilty, where the 
one witness who testified was totally incredible, and where the fact-finder had 
independent knowledge of the facts because he presided over the entry of plea). See 
also State v. Thompson, 65 N.J. Super. 189, 194, 167 A.2d 410, 413 (App. Div. 1961) 
(denial of a fair trial to limit defendant to two witnesses on a crucial issue, where 
further witnesses may have been more credible). Cf. United States v. Escamilla, 467 
F.2d 341, 349 (4th Cir. 1972) (error to limit defendant to one character witness); 
Commonwealth v. Streuber, 185 Pa. Super. 369, 373, 137 A.2d 825, 827 (1958) 
( error to limit defendant to one character witness where "character testimony is 
substantial and positive evidence which may, of itself, create a reasonable doubt to 
produce an acquittal''); Cope v. State, 23 Okla. Crim. 161, 213 P. 753, 755 (1923) 
(error to limit defendant in advance to four character witnesses, "where, as in this 
case, the conviction rests wholly upon the testimony of the witness sought to be 
impeached [by the character evidence], and no conviction could be sustained without 
his testimony"). But see Owens v. State, 169 Miss. 141, 152 S. 651 (1934) (no error 
to limit the defendant to 100 of 500 potential witnesses in support of his motion for 
change of venue). 
85. See Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1975) (no violation of 
compulsory process clause to exclude as cumulative a second impeaching witness); 
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validity of the rule depends initially upon defining the federal stan-
dard of materiality. 
The Supreme Court, unfortunately, has not formulated a federal 
standard of materiality. The Court was able to avoid the issue of 
materiality in Washington because the parties agreed that Fuller was 
an important eye-witness to the crime. 86 In the absence of guidance 
from the Court, the lower courts have divided with respect to the 
governing standard. The Eighth Circuit has held that it is within the 
discretion of the trial court to exclude evidence as immaterial and that 
appellate courts will not reverse except for abuse of discretion. 87 The 
Fifth Circuit, on the other hand, has required the government to show 
beyond a reasonable doubt that there was already sufficient evidence 
in the record to prove the point for which the excluded evidence was 
offered. 88 Neither of these standards is very useful in identifying the 
specific elements that bear on materiality or in providing a meaning-
ful measure of their .effect in individual cases. It is possible, however, 
to derive a more meaningful standard of materiality by examining the 
Supreme Court's analysis in two related lines of cases-those cases 
defining the "prejudicial effect" of denying the defendant the benefit 
of other constitutional rights, and those cases defining the "material 
effect" of denying the defendant the right to discover exculpatory 
evidence in the government's possession. 
As previously noted in the context of compulsory process rights, 89 
a finding of prejudicial error is equivalent to a finding of materiality. 
United States v. McGrady, 508 F.2d 13, 18-19 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 
979 (1975) (no violation of compulsory process clause to deny subpoena for 
cumulative evidence that would not have affected the outcome). For a discussion of 
the extent to which the definition of "cumulative evidence" in Missouri fails to 
conform to the constitutional standard, see Note, The Cumulative Evidence Rule and 
Harmless Error, 40 Mo. L. REV. 79 (1975). 
86. 488 U.S. at 16. 
The most direct reference to a "materiality" standard for the compulsory process 
clause is found in a later dissenting opinion that discussed the implications of the 
decision in Cool v. United States, 409 U.S. 100 (1972) (per curiam). In Cool, the 
Supreme Court reversed a conviction on the ground that the trial court's instruction 
on the credibility of a defense witness violated both the defendant's right of compul-
sory process and his right to demand that the prosecution prove its case beyond a 
reasonable doubt. In a later dissenting opinion, three members of the Court derived 
from Cool the proposition that the defendant is entitled to a new trial whenever a 
possibility exists that exculpatory evidence, wrongfully excluded, "would have created 
a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jurors." Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 
152-53 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting). This standard is entirely consistent with 
the standard the Court has adopted in related areas, and with the standard proposed 
here. See text at notes 90-106 infra. 
87. United States v. McGrady, 508 F.2d 13, 18 (8th Cir. 1974), cert.-denied, 420 
U.S. 979- (1975). 
88. Flores v. Estelle, 492 F.2d 711, 713 (5th Cir. 1974). 
89. See notes 75-76 supra and accompanying text. 
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In either case, the court must determine whether the constitutional 
error was sufficient to justify a new trial. Realistically, of course, a 
court can never be certain whether the original trial would have 
reached the same result if the error had not been committed; the only 
way to be absolutely safe is to reverse the conviction outright or 
reverse and remand for an error-free trial. Yet, rather than requiring 
absolute certainty, the Supreme Court has tended to place the prejudi-
cial error cases into three separate categories: (1) cases in which the 
consequences of the error are so difficult to isolate and measure that 
the Court will automatically reverse on the presumption that there 
was prejudice;90 (2) cases in which the error is the product of such 
deliberate misconduct by the prosecution that the Court will automat-
ically reverse, without requiring prejudice, in order to punish the state 
for its wrongdoing;91 and (3) cases in which the error concerns the 
admission, in violation of constitutional rights, of specific items of 
evidence, where the Court will reverse only if persuaded that the error 
could have reasonably influenced the result. 92 
90. For examples of such cases, see Chapman v. CaJifornia, 386 U.S. 18, 23 n,8 
(1967), and United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 n.5 (1972). See generally 
Note, Harmless Constitutional Error: A Reappraisal, 83 HARV. L. REV. 814, 820-24 
(1970). 
91. See Nash v. Illinois, 389 U.S. 906, 907 (1967) (Fortas, J., dissenting), 
denying cert. to 36 rn. 2d 275, 222 N.E.2d 473 (1966) ("[I]t is by no means clear 
that petitioner must show that the prosecutor's knowing acquiescence in a material 
falsehood prejudiced him. There is no place in our system of criminal justice for 
prosecutorial misconduct"). 
In cases of deJiberate prosecutorial misconduct, the courts are concerned with 
more than protecting a particular defendant from prejudice; they are also concerned 
with maintaining the integrity of the system for future defendants, Thus, if the 
defendant can show that the prosecutor deJiberately suppressed exculpatory evidence, 
he need not show that he was prejudiced by the suppression. See United States v. 
McCord, 509 F.2d 334, 349-50 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en bane), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 
930 (1975); Levin v. Clark, 408 F.2d 1209, 1211 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Levin v. 
Katzenbach, 363 F.2d 265, 294 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (Burger, J., dissenting). As Judge 
Friendly put it, in cases of deliberate misconduct the court is willing to depart from 
its usual rule and reverse without a showing of prejudice because 
the pans contain weights and counterweights other than the interest in a 
perfect trial. Sometimes only a small showing of prejudice, or none, is de-
manded because that interest is reinforced by the necessity that ''The adminis-
tration of justice must not only be above reproach, it must also be beyond the 
suspicion of reproach," . •. . and by the teaching of experience that mere ad-
monitions are insufficient to prevent repetition of abuse. 
Kyle v. United States, 297 F.2d 507, 514 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 909 
(1964). See also United States v. Kahn, 472 F.2d 272, 287 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
411 U.S. 982 (1973). 
92. See Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 231 (1973) (admission of co-
defendant's confession implicating the defendant in violation of his right of confronta• 
tion); Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 377-78 (1972) (admission of an illegally 
obtained confession); Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 432 (1972) (admission of 
co-defendant's confession implicating the defendant in violation of his right of 
confrontation); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 53 (1969) (admission of illegally 
seized evidence); Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254 (1969) (admission of a 
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We are not greatly concerned here with the first two categories. 
The consequences of denying the defendant witnesses in his favor can 
usually be evaluated with a fair degree of accuracy because the 
appellate court can adequately reconstruct what the evidence in an 
error-free trial would have looked like. Similarly, while rare cases 
may arise in which the defendant's witnesses are excluded in bad 
faith, 93 most exclusions result from the good faith application of 
subpoena rules and rules of evidence. The important cases for our 
purposes, therefore, fall into the third category where the Court will 
reverse only if persuaded that the error could have reasonably influ-
enced the result. Those cases have invariably involved the illegal 
admission of tainted evidence against the accused. 04 In deciding 
whether such errors are harmless, the Court has applied the following 
standard: The error of introducing tainted evidence is harmless if, 
putting it aside, one can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
remaining evidence of guilt is so overwhelming that a reasonable jury 
co-defendant's confession implicating the defendant in violation of his right of 
confrontation); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (comment on the 
defendant's refusal to testify in violation of his right against self-incrimination). See 
also note 95 infra. 
One commentator has argued that in order to preserve the defendant's constitu-
tional right not to be found guilty unless proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the 
same constitutional standard should be applied to every evidentiary error at trial, re-
gardless whether the error independently violates the Constitution. See Saltzburg, 
The Harm of Harmless Error, 59 VA. L. REV. 988 (1973). Yet the argument ap-
pears to be fundamentally misconceived. It is true that in reviewing all criminal pro-
ceedings, state and federal, the courts must ensure (presumably beyond a reasonable 
doubt) that the evidence in the record is sufficient to permit a rational jury to find 
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 
(1970). However, as far as Winship is concerned, it makes no difference how the 
evidence gets into the record. The fact that some or all of the evidence may have 
been admitted in violation of state or federal rules of evidence does not itself present 
a constitutional question under Winship. The only question under Winship is 
whether there was sufficient evidence before the jury to survive a directed verdict for 
the defendant. Thus, unless the admission or exclusion of evidence independently 
violates the Constitution and, hence, is itself a constitutional error, the court need not 
concern itself with the specific effect of the error. 
93. Most violations of compulsory process are deliberate in the sense that they 
involve conscious decisions in response to a defendant's request for evidence. A 
reviewing court, however, will not require a showing of prejudice only when it is 
persuaded that the violation was not simply deliberate, but deliberately abusive. For 
instance, in Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95 (1972) (per curiam), the Court reversed the 
defendant's conviction because of the trial judge's abusive and threatening remarks to 
his witness, although, as Justice Blackmun's dissent points out, only bare allegations 
of prejudice were made, 409 U.S. at 99. For other examples of deliberate misconduct 
that violated the defendant's right of compulsory process, see Bray v. Peyton, 429 
F.2d 500 (4th Cir. 1970) (prosecutor arrested and incarcerated a defense witness to 
deter him and other witnesses from testifying for the defendant); People v. Pena, 383 
Mich. 402, 175 N.W.2d 767 (1970) (prosecutor threatened defense witnesses); State 
v. Kearney, 11 Wash. App. 394, 523 P.2d 443 (1974) (prosecutor tampered with the 
defendant's witnesses). 
94. See cases cited in note 92 supra. 
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would have had to reach the same result on the basis of the untainted 
evidence alone. 95 
A court might be tempted to apply the tainted-evidence standard 
in cases raising compulsory process challenges to exclusions of excul-
patory evidence. Thus, if the testimony of a relevant and competent 
defense witness is excluded on the ground that it is cumulative, 
the appellate court might put aside the exculpatory testimony and try 
to decide beyond a reasonable doubt whether the remaining evidence 
of guilt is so overwhelming that a reasonable jury would have had 
to reach the same result without regard to the exculpatory evidence. If 
the remaining evidence of guilt is overwhelming, then the excluded 
testimony would be immaterial and its exclusion would be harmless 
error; however, if the remaining evidence did not meet this test then 
the excluded testimony would be material and its exclusion prejudi-
cial error. The obvious problem with applying the tainted-evidence 
test in this fashion, however, is that it causes the appellate court to 
retrace the same erroneous path as the fact-finder. Because the test 
forces the court to disregard the exculpatory evidence, the defendant 
is once again deprived of the benefit of having the favorable testi-
mony affirmatively considered. 
Although the tainted-evidence standard cannot be mechanically 
applied to problems of exculpatory evidence, it can be used in a 
modified form. The purpose of the test is to reconstruct the evidence 
as if the error had not occurred in order to decide, beyond a reasona-
ble doubt, whether an error-free trial would have had to reach the 
same result. Because the error in tainted-evidence cases consists of 
admitting evidence that should have been excluded, the court recon-
structs an error-free trial by disregarding the tainted evidence and 
evaluating the weight of the valid evidence that remains. 96 In com-
95. Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 231 (1973); Milton v. Wainwright, 407 
U.S. 371, 377 (1972); Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254 (1969). It is 
important to understand that the Court's test of harmless error does not represent an 
attempt to determine the actual effect of an error on the jury below, for it could only 
do that by opening up jury deliberations for inspection. Indeed, if the Court were to 
reverse for every error that might have actually influenced the jury, then it would 
have to reverse automatically in every case. See Note, supra note 90, at 819. Rather 
the Court's test represents an effort to determine the effect of the error on a 
reasonable (and thus hypothetical) jury by reconstructing the evidence on an error-
free basis. Thus, instead of trying to determine whether erroneously admitted 
evidence may have actually influenced the jury, the Court puts aside the evidence, and 
proceeds to determine (beyond a reasonable doubt) whether a reasonable person, 
considering the evidence on an error-free basis, would have had to reach the same 
result. See note 96 infra. 
96. Justice Brennan (together with Chief Justice Warren and Justice Marshall) 
criticized the Supreme Court for adopting a harmless-error test that consciously puts 
the tainted evidence aside and focuses on the amount of untainted evidence remaining. 
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pulsory process cases, on the other hand, the error consists of pre-
cisely the opposite behavior-the exclusion of evidence that should 
have been admitted. Accordingly, to reconstruct an error-free trial, 
the court should consciously study the exculpatory evidence and then 
reverse, unless it determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
exculpatory evidence, if admitted, could not have reasonably affected 
the jury. To restate the same test in affirmative terms, the court 
should reverse if there is any "reasonable likelihood"97 that the excul-
patory evidence could have reasonably affected the jury. 
Significantly, the Supreme Court has adopted this very test in the 
second line of cases to be considered-those, beginning with Brady v. 
Maryland, 98 involving the defendant's constitutional right to discover 
material evidence in his favor. The defendant's right to discover 
evidence under the due process clause contains substantially the same 
elements as his right to produce witnesses under the compulsory 
process clause. In either case, he must show that (a) he has made a 
formal request to the government (b) to exercise its powers to 
produce evidence (c) that is favorable and (d) material to his 
defense. 99 Whether or not the two formulations should be viewed as 
stating precisely the same principle, 100 the standard of materiality can 
be presumed to be identical in each case. 
Although the Court found it unnecessary to define the term 
"material" in Brady (and for several years thereafter101), it addressed 
See Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 256 (1969) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(''The focus of appellate inquiry should be on the character and quality of the tainted 
evidence ... and not just on the amount of untainted evidence"). 
97. To say that an error is harmless "beyond a reasonable doubt" is simply the 
converse of saying that there is no "reasonable possibility" that the error was 
prejudicial. See Saltzburg, supra note 92, at 1014 n.88. 
98. 373 U.S. 83 ( 1963). 
99. See Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 794-95 (1972); Brady v. Maryland, 373 
U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
100. For the view that the defendant's right of discovery under Brady and his 
right of compulsory process are identical, see note 145 infra. See also Westen, supra 
note 4, at 123-24. 
101. In Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 73-74 (1967), the Court specifically 
refrained from defining the standard of materiality by which to evaluate the suppres-
sion of exculpatory evidence. As a result, the lower courts felt obliged to apply the 
materiality standard without knowing what the Supreme Court meant by it. The 
District of Columbia circuit required a new trial whenever the exculpatory evidence 
"might have led the jury to entertain a reasonable doubt about appellant's guilt." 
United States v. Lemonakis, 485 F.2d 941, 964 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 989 
(1974); Levin v. Katzenbach, 363 F.2d 287, 291 (1966), aftd., 408 F.2d 1209 
(1967). The Second Circuit required a new trial whenever there was a "significant 
chance that this added item [of exculpatory evidence], developed by skilled counsel 
. . . could have induced a reasonable doubt in the minds of enough jurors to avoid a 
conviction." United States v. Miller, 411 F.2d 825, 832 (1969). The Fourth Circuit 
required a new trial only where there was a "substantial likelihood" that the 
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the problem directly in Giglio v. United States.102 The defendant in 
Giglio was convicted of forgery, largely on the testimony of a single 
co-conspirator named Taliento. At trial, both Taliento and the 
prosecutor denied that Taliento had been promised immunity from 
prosecution in return for his testimony.103 Later, when evidence was 
discovered that made it appear that Taliento had, in fact, been 
promised immunity, the lower court, finding the suppressed evidence 
immaterial, refused to order a new trial. The Supreme Court re-
versed on the iss1,1e of materiality. Although agreeing that a defend-
ant cannot demand a new trial whenever he is denied evidence that 
may be " 'possibly useful to the defense but not likely to have 
changed the verdict,' "104 the Court held that he makes a sufficient 
showing of materiality if the suppressed evidence " 'could . . . in any 
reasonable likelihood have affected the judgment of the jury.' "105 
The Court then found that the suppressed evidence in Giglio was 
material because the evidence could have reasonably persuaded the 
jury to suspect the credibility of the prosecution's principal witness.106 
The Giglio standard for the materiality of defense witnesses is 
entirely consistent with the constitutional logic of Washington. If it 
is "arbitrary" to prohibit the defendant from calling a witness whom 
the jury might reasonably find to be competent, it is equally "arbi-
exculpatory evidence would have changed the result. Ingram v. Peyton, 367 F.2d 933, 
936 (4th Cir. 1966). The Tenth Circuit did not require a new trial unless the 
original trial was found to be "unacceptably unfair." United States v. Harris, 462 
F.2d 1033, 1035 (1972). The Fifth Circuit required that the defendant show that the 
new evidence was "crucial, critical, [and] highly significant." Luna v. Beto, 395 F.2d 
35, 41 (1968) (en bane), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 966 (1969). 
102. 405 U.S. 150 (1972). Chief Justice Burger wrote the opinion for a 
unanimous Court. 
103. 405 U.S. at 151-52. 
104. 405 U.S. at 154, quoting United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138, 148 (2d Cir. 
1968) (Friendly, J.). 
105. 405 U.S. at 154, quoting Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 271 (1959) 
(emphasis added). 
106. 405 U.S. at 154-55. Again it is important to understand that the test of 
materiality represents an attempt to determine, not what effect the exculpatory 
evidence would actually have had on the original jury, but rather what effect it could 
have reasonably bad. See note 95 supra. 
Where the defendant seeks to introduce evidence to impeach the credibility of a 
prosecution witness, the issue of materiality involves two steps: the court must first 
decide whether there is any reasonable likelihood that the excluded evidence could 
have reasonably affected the jury's judgment of the witness' credibility; if so, then 
the court must put aside the impeachable (and, therefore, tainted) testimony and de-
termine beyond a reasonable doubt whether a reasonable jury would have had to 
reach the same result on the basis of the remaining "untainted" evidence. For the 
development of this standard in the context of the defendant's constitutional right, 
under the confrontation clause, to elicit impeaching evidence by means of cross-exam-
ination, see Note, supra note 62, at 1471-73. 
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trary" to prohibit him from calling a witness whom the jury might 
reasonably find to be material. In each case, the evidentiary ruling 
imposes an unnecessary burden on the defendant's right to produce 
witnesses by excluding testimony that the jury might reasonably find 
to be exculpatory. Indeed, if a court were required to fashion a sixth 
amendment standard of materiality without the guidance of Giglio, it 
could conclude, solely by reasoning from Washing ton, that the de-
fendant has a right to produce any witness whose testimony could 
have reasonably affected the judgment of the jury. 
The Giglio standard has important constitutional implications for 
local rules regarding materiality. It casts doubt, for example, on the 
validity of rules that set limits on the number of witnesses a defendant 
may produce, or that give the trial court discretion to deny subpoenas 
for cumulative witnesses. Although such rules may be constitutional 
on their face, 107 under the standard they cannot be applied to deny 
the defendant the presence of witnesses whose testimony could in any 
reasonable likelihood have affected the judgment of the jury; if they 
are so applied, the appellate courts must reverse. In such cases, the 
appellate court owes no deference to the trial court; rather, it must 
determine to its own satisfaction that the trial court has applied the 
proper standard.108 
107. The rules are constitutional on their face because they are capable of being 
validly applied according to their terms in at least some cases. Thus, a rule that 
limits a defendant to a maximum of two expert witnesses can be validly applied in 
any case in which the defendant does not wish to produce more than two experts. Cf. 
Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184, 219 (5th Cir. 1975). On the other hand, while 
constitutional on their face, the rules are also capable of being unconstitutionally 
applied to exclude testimony that is material. See Riser v. Teets, 253 F.2d 844, 847 
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 944 (1958) (Pope, J., dissenting). 
108. Ironically, a good example of the proper standard of judicial review can be 
found in appellate opinions adopting the language of "harmless error" to review 
questions of compulsory process. As previously noted, it is redundant to ask whether 
the wrongful exclusion of a material witness is prejudicial. See note 76 supra. To 
say that a witness is "material" is simply another way of saying that his wrongful 
exclusion is prejudicial. We have analyzed the problems of compulsory process here 
in terms of materiality not because it is any better than an analysis in terms of 
prejudice, but because the Supreme Court has chosen to frame the issue in those 
terms. Once it has done so, the most one can say about the harmless-error analysis 
is, not that it is wrong, but that it is superfluous. 
Nevertheless, by proceeding to engage in the superfluous, some courts have 
conveniently illustrated the strict level of appellate review required in compulsory 
process cases. It should be enough in such cases that the appellate court decide for 
itself whether there is any reasonable likelihood that the alleged error below could 
have reasonably affected the judgment of the jury-a question that requires the 
painstaking analysis. See, e.g., United States v. Rosner, 516 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1975). 
Some courts, instead, ask the same question in other terms, namely whether the 
alleged error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., United States v. 
McGrady, 508 F.2d 13, 18 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 979 (1975); 
Wisconsin ex rel. Monsoor v. Gagnon, 497 F.2d 1126, 1130 (7th Cir. 1974); Flores 
v. &telle, 492 F.2d 711, 713 (5th Cir. 1974). In doing so, they merely illustrate 
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The Giglio standard of materiality also casts doubt on the validity 
of rules that determine the weight of evidence by its form, such as 
rules that attribute less than full weight to credibility evidence, 100 
corroborative evidence, 110 or character evidence.111 It should be clear 
that testimony can be material whether offered to support an affirma-
tive defense,112 to rebut the prosecution's case,113 to corroborate the 
defendant's testimony, 114 to impeach a witness for the prosecution, llll 
or to support the defendant's good character.116 Whether the testi-
what should be self-evident-that is, that the very same standard of appellate review 
applicable in the "harmless error" cases, see Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 
(1967), also applies in cases of compulsory process. See note 97 supra. 
109. See, e.g., State v. Cotton, 103 Ariz. 408, 409, 443 P.2d 404, 405 (1968) 
("We have ruled that it is not an abuse of discretion to deny [the defendant] a 
continuance where the testimony sought is to be used for impeachment"); Machin v. 
State, 213 S.2d 499, 500 (Fla. Dist. App.), cert. denied, 221 S. 2d 747 (Fla. 1968) 
("Generally, a continuance is properly refused when the testimony which would be 
later produced would only tend to impeach a witness"); State v. McKeever, 339 Mo. 
1066, 1076, 101 S.W.2d 22, 26 (1936) (same). 
11'0. See, e.g., United States v. Moriarty, 497 F.2d 486, 489-90 (5th Cir. 1974) 
(defendant denied a continuance to obtain an absent witness on ground that the 
witness could do nothing more than corroborate the defendant's own testimony); 
Galloway v. Burke, 297 F. Supp. 624, 628 (E.D. Wis. 1969) (same); Keller v. State, 
128 Ga. App. 129, 195 S.E.2d 767 (1973) (same); State v. Durden, 212 S.E.2d 587, 
590 (S.C. 1975) (no error to deny defendant a short recess to produce a witness 
whose testimony would have merely "fortif[ied] the appellant's own evidence, and 
was at most corroborative"). 
111. See cases cited in note 151 infra. 
112. See, e.g., Welsh v. United States, 404 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1968) (violation of 
compulsory process rights to deny the defendant a subpoena for psychiatrist who 
would have testified on the issue of insanity). 
113. See, e.g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973) (violation of 
due process to deny defendant critical evidence that tended to show he was innocent 
and the crime was committed by another person). 
114. See, e.g., Cool v. United States, 409 U.S. 100 (1972) (violation of compulso-
ry process rights to deny defendant full benefit of evidence that corroborated his 
testimony); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967). 
115. See, e.g., Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (violation of due 
process to fail to reveal evidence that tended to show key witness' motive for 
testifying for prosecution); Johnson v. Brewer, 521 F.2d 556 (8th Cir. 1975) 
(extrinsic evidence that impeaches key prosecution witness is material in constitution-
al sense even though deemed collateral under state rules of evidence); Flanagan v. 
Henderson, 496 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1974) (evidence that complaining witness signed 
an affidavit originally charging another person with the crime was material to her 
identification of defendant); United States v. Tashman, 478 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1973) 
( evidence that defendant-turned-witness engaged in plea bargaining with prosecutor 
was material evidence of bias); In re Ouimette, - R.I. -, 342 A.2d 250, 255 n.4 
(1975) ("LT]he duty to disclose not only embraces evidence that is directly related to 
the innocence of the accused such as mistaken identity by an eye-witness . • . but it 
may also embrace indirect evidence such as impeachment testimony . . • which can 
affect the weight or credibility of the evidence that is being used against the 
accused"). See also United States v. Miller, 411 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1969) (evidence 
that a principal witness for prosecution had been subjected to hypnosis by prosecutor 
before trial was material). 
116. See cases cited in note 84 supra, 
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mony is material depends upon its particular relationship to other ev-
idence at trial rather than upon its general form. Accordingly, the 
controlling factors in determining materiality are the relative impor-
tance of the issue in the context of the trial,117 the extent to which the 
issue is in dispute, 118 the number of other witnesses who have testified 
to the issue, 119 and the credibility of the witness in relation to the 
other witnesses.120 Thus, a person remains a material witness, even 
117. Although every issue in a criminal case is potentially controlling in that it 
could lead to an acquittal, most cases are litigated under a theory that emphasizes one 
or more central issues upon which most of the testimony centers. See, e.g., Teague v. 
United States, 499 F.2d 1381, 1385 (7th Cir. 1974) (error to exclude evidence that 
would have impeached one of five identification witnesses where impeachable witness 
was "key" witness for the prosecution); United States v. Badalamente, 507 F.2d 12, 
18 (2d Cir. 1974) (impeachable witness' credibility was "crucial"); United States v. 
Moudy, 462 F.2d 694, 698 (5th Cir. 1972) (error to deny defendant a witness on the 
issue of his sanity where sanity was ''the only factual question really in issue"); 
United States v. Julian, 469 F.2d 371, 374-75 (10th Cir. 1972) (abuse of discretion, 
in view of compulsory process clause, to deny defendant a psychiatrist to rebut the 
state's psychiatrist); State v. Scott, 117 Kan. 303, 322, 235 P. 380, 390 (1925) (error 
to limit defendant to five impeaching witnesses where impeachable witness was "the 
key to all the evidence of any consequence on the {question of the defendant's] 
motive); State v. Thompson, 65 N.J. Super. 189, 193, 167 A.2d 410, 413 (App. Div. 
1961) (error to deny defendant witnesses to testify to involuntary nature of his 
confession where "the defendant's signed admission of guilt was more or less the 
keystone of the State's case and any evidence in derogation of it occupied an equally 
important status"). 
118. This kind of distinction has been made under the conventional approach. 
Compare People v. Dersa, 42 Mich. App. 522, 202 N.W.2d 334 (1972) (no error to 
deny defendant a continuance for witness who would have testified that defendant had 
a beard at the time of the offense where six other witnesses had already testified to 
that readily observable fact), with State v. Randall, 143 Minn. 203, 206-07, 173 N.W. 
425, 428 (1919) (error to limit defendant in a seditious libel case to twelve out of 
twenty-seven possible witnesses on question of what words he had spoken at public 
meeting where difficulties of accurate observation and recollection were considera-
ble). See also State v. Demaree, 362 S.W.2d 500, 505-06 (Mo. 1962) (no error to. 
limit defendant to three character witnesses where defendant's good character was not 
disputed); Bowlin v. State, 93 Tex. Crim. App. 452, 248 S.W. 396 (1922) (no error 
to exclude defendant's character witnesses where prosecution conceded that his 
character was good). 
119. The number of witnesses to testify on a certain issue may have a bearing on 
the weight of their evidence even for constitutional purposes. In Washington v. 
Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967), for example, the defendant was found to have a 
constitutional right to call his co-indictee to testify to the same facts to which the 
defendant had already testified, presumably because the additional testimony, even by 
a witness of doubtful credibility, might add to the weight of the defendant's evidence. 
See also Cool v. United States, 409 U.S. 100 (1972). On the other hand, "[a] party 
does not have 'an absolute right to force upon any unwilling tribunal an unending and 
superfluous mass of testimony limited only by his own judgment or whim.' " State v. 
Mucci, 25 N.J. 423, 433, 136 A.2d 761, 766 (1957). See also People v. Arnold, 248 
III. 169, 93 N.E. 786 (1910) (no error to limit defendant to 25 out of 400 named 
character witnesses); United States v. Zuideveld, 316 F.2d 873, 881 (7th Cir. 1963) 
(no error to deny defendant's request that 420 witnesses located throughout the states 
and in Mexico, Costa Rica, South Africa, and Ethiopia be presented at government 
expense). 
120. Again, this distinction has been made adequately in cases in which no 
constitutional challenge was made. Compare United States v. Coppola, 479 F.2d 
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when other witnesses have testified to the same facts, if the jury could 
reasonably conclude either that his testimony is more credible, 121 or 
that the mere accumulation of testimony adds to its weight.122 In-
deed, a witness should not be deemed cumulative in a constitutional 
sense unless the number or credibility of the witnesses who have 
preceded him is such that his testimony cannot reasonably be 
deemed to add either substance or weight to the existing evidence.123 
The Giglio standard of materiality also bears on the several other 
exceptions to the general rule that the defendant may subpoena 
witnesses in his favor. It is common practice to permit a witness both 
to quash a subpoena ad testificandum on grounds of personal hard-
ship and to quash a subpoena duces tecum on the ground that it is 
unreasonable or oppressive.124 Both exceptions assume that the 
witness possesses material evidence, yet excuse him from appearing. 
The question, then, is whether these exceptions are valid when ap-
plied to excuse material witnesses from testifying for the accused. 
1153, 1163-64 (10th Cir. 1973) (court may refuse to subpoena witness if his 
proffered testimony appears to be "grossly incredible"), with United States v. 
Escamilla, 467 F.2d 341, 348-49 (4th Cir. 1972) (error to limit defendant, without 
advance warning, to first of several character witnesses when he might otherwise have 
called a more credible witness first). 
121. Such a consideration was sometimes made in the conventional reviews of 
discretion. See, e.g., State v. Sharp, 175 Ark. 1083, 1086, 3 S.W.2d 23, 25 (1928) 
( error to exclude fifth witness on certain issue as cumulative if, because of his 
standing in the community, he was more credible than the other four); People v. 
Smith, 151 Cal. 619, 628-29, 91 P. 511, 515 (1907) (error to exclude physician as 
witness to testify to defendant's physical condition where physician was more credible 
than defendant). 
122. As recognized in pre-Washington cases, the very fact that the defendant can 
accumulate corroborating testimony by multiple witnesses sometimes adds to the 
weight of his evidence. See State v. Mucci, 25 N.J. 423, 433, 136 A.2d 761, 766 
(1957); State v. Lyle, 125 S.C. 406,439, 118 S.E. 803, 815 (1923); Burns v. State, 
110 Tex. Crim. App. 84, 86, 8 S.W.2d 157, 158 (1928). 
123. Some post-Washington cases reached this conclusion. See, e.g., United 
States v. Spoonhunter, 476 F.2d 1050, 1055 (10th Cir. 1973) (no error to deny 
defendant a continuance for three additional witnesses without some showing that 
their testimony ''would have lent any greater weight to the credibility of the alibi 
defense testified to at length by seven or eight other defense witnesses"); Loux v. 
United States, 389 F.2d 911, 917 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 867 (1968) ("We 
are not convinced that the testimony of ten prisoners would have been significantly 
more persuru.ive than the testimony of five"). 
124. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 698 (1974) ("A subpoena 
for documents may be quashed if their production would be 'unreasonable or 
oppressive,' but not otherwise"); United States v. Mitchell, 385 F. Supp. 1190 
(D.D.C. 1974) (quashing a subpoena ad testificandum to ex-President Nixon because 
of the witness' illness); FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c) (''The court on motion made 
promptly may quash or modify the subpoena [duces tecum] if compliance would be 
unreasonable or oppressive"). Section 2 of the Uniform Act To Secure the Attend-
ance of Witnesses from Without the State in Criminal Proceedings (Uniform Act To 
Secure Witnesses) also authorizes a court to compel a witness to appear in a sister 
state if it determines "that it will not cause undue hardship to the witness to be 
compelled t~ attend and testify • . . in the other state." 
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The validity of the hardship exemption depends on how broadly it 
is defined. If an individual is physically incapable of testifying, or if 
testifying might critically endanger his life, then he is "simply 
unavailable" as a witness within the meaning of the sixth amend-
ment.125 In such circumstances the government cannot be faulted for 
failing to produce the witness. The compulsory process clause does 
not guarantee that the government will succeed in producing the 
defendant's witnesses, it merely guarantees that a good-faith effort 
will be made to produce them:126 The government has no obligation 
to produce a witness who has become unavailable due to death, 
disappearance, or illness, 127 as long as the government itself is not 
responsible for the witness' absence.128 Thus, while in extreme cases 
125. See United States v. Mitchell, 385 F. Supp. 1190, 1191 (D.D.C. 1974) (''The 
members of the medical panel appointed by the Court to appraise the state of Mr. 
Nixon's health reported as their unanimous opinion that he could not appear and 
testify before February 1975, and that he would not be well enough to give a 
deposition until at least January 6, 1975. This fact in and of itself should answer the 
defendants' motions. The witness is simply unavailable to be deposecf' (emphasis 
added)). 
126. Maguire v. United States, 396 F.2d 327, 330 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 
393 U.S. 1099 (1969); Johnson v. Walker, 199 F. Supp. 86, 95 (E.D. La. 1961), 
affd., 317 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1963 ). 
127. See United States v. Rhodes, 398 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 
U.S. 962 (1969) (government has no obligation to produce witness who has died); 
United States v. Deegan, 279 F. Supp. 53, 59 n.13 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), affd., 389 F.2d 
1002 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1034 (1968) (same); Taylor v. Minnesota, 466 
F.2d 1119, 1122 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 956 (1973) (government has 
no obligation to produce witness who cannot be found); Moore v. Beto, 320 F. Supp. 
469, 472 (S.D. Tex. 1970) (same); United States er rel. Parson v. Anderson, 354 F. 
Supp. 1060, 1073-74 (D. Del. 1972), affd., 481 F.2d 94 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 
U.S. 1072 (1973) (dictum) (government has no obligation to produce witness who 
cannot testify because of amnesia). 
Under the conventional wisdom, some courts have also held that the government 
has no obligation to produce witnesses who are beyond the territorial reach of the 
court's subpoena power, see United States v. Greco, 298 F.2d 247, 251 (2d Cir. 
1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 820 (1962), or witnesses who assert lawful privileges, 
see Myers v. Frye, 401 F.2d 18 (7th Cir. 1968); United States v. Erlichman, 389 F. 
Supp. 95, 97 (D.D.C. 1974). But, for the assertion that no privilege can validly be 
applied to deny a defendant his right to produce witnesses, see Westen, supra note 4, 
at 159-77. And; for a discussion of the extent to which the state has a constitutional 
obligation to make a "good faith effort" to produce witnesses from without its 
territorial boundaries, see the text at notes 345-406 infra. 
128. If the government is responsible for the witness' absence, a defendant's right 
of compulsory process is violated when he is precluded from producing the witness in 
court. See United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348, 356 (1969) (dictum) 
(destruction of prior statements of prosecution witnesses could, in some cases, amount 
to a violation of compulsory process rights); United States v. Tsutagawa, 500 F.2d 
420 (9th Cir. 1974) (violation of compulsory process rights for government to deport 
potential defense witness to frustrate defendant's later request that he be produced); 
White v. State, 517 S.W.2d 543, 548 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (same); Application of 
Newbern, 175 Cal. App. 2d 862, 864-65, 1 Cal. Rptr. 80, 82 (1959), affd., 55 Cal. 2d 
508, 360 P.2d 47, 11 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1961) (violation of compulsory process rights to 
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the defendant may be able to argue that the unavailability of a witness 
denies him a fair trial under the due process clause, 129 he cannot 
complain of being denied the benefits of compulsory process. 
The exemption raises more serious problems, however, if broadly 
defined to include witnesses for whom testifying would be a physical 
hardship, but who are, nevertheless, physically capable of testifying 
for the defense. A witness who is pregnant, for example, may fall 
into this category.130 The first problem with the creation of a 
testimonial exemption (or "privilege") for physical hardship is that it 
flies in the face of the common-law tradition. The law assumes that 
"the public . . . has a right to every man's evidence"181 in criminal 
refuse to permit defendant charged with intoxication to consult with physician for 
purpose of taking blood test before any alcohol in his system dissipates). 
129. See United States v. Walton, 411 F.2d 283, 288 (9th Cir. 1969) ("And since 
the ultimate inquiry is whether defendant had a fair trial, the controlling considera-
tion is whether there is a reasonable possibility that, if :[the unavailable witness] had 
been available to testify, defendant would not have been convicted"). Cf. Carlson, 
False or Suppressed Evidence: Why a Need for the Prosecutorial Tie?, 1969 DUKE 
L.J. 1171, 1183-87 (suggesting that it may deny a defendant a fair trial under the 
due process clause to try him without the benefit of certain kinds of exculpatory 
evidence, even if the goverment has done its very best to produce the evidence and is 
not responsible for its absence). 
The due process and compulsory process clauses are both designed to afford a 
defendant a fair trial. Nevertheless, they differ in their focus. The compulsory 
process clause is a specific guarantee designed to protect a defendant against the 
particular unfairness of being tried without the means for compelling the presence of 
witnesses in his favor; the due process clause is a general guarantee designed to 
protect a defendant against the residual kinds of unfairness not otherwise enumerated 
in the more specific provisions of the Bill of Rights. See Westen, supra note 4, at 
126-33. Thus, while it may be unfair in a general sense to try a defendant at a time 
when his exculpatory witnesses have become unavailable and can no longer be pro-
duced by judicial process, that is not the particular kind of unfairness the compulsory 
process clause is designed to prevent. 
130. It is important to distinguish the case of simple hardship for the pregnant 
witness from the case in which the burden of testifying would actually jeopardize her 
life. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Kent, 355 Pa. 146, 152, 49 A.2d 388, 391 (1946) 
(defendant denied a subpoena for pregnant witness who was expected to give birth a 
week following the trial, and for whom two physicians stated that "it would be 
dangerous to her life and well being to compel her attendance at the trial under the 
circumstances"). If the woman is not reasonably expected to survive court appear-
ance, then, like any critically ill witness, she must be deemed unavailable. Given the 
nature of pregnancy, however, it is unnecessary to face the harshness of that result, 
because the needs of the defendant can be accommodated with the interests of the 
mother and unborn child by continuing the case until a certain date in the reasonably 
near future (which could never exceed the period of gestation) when the woman can 
reasonably be expected to appear. See Peterson v. United States, 344 F.2d 419, 425 
(5th Cir. 1965). See generally text at notes 162-201 infra. Similarly, if a witness' 
life is in danger not because of illness, but because of external threats by third 
persons, then the solution is not to excuse the witness, but to protect him against the 
external threat See Commonwealth v. Johnson, - Mass.-,-, 313 N.E.2d 571, 
577-79 (1974) (dictum). 
131. United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950), quoting 8 WIGMORE, 
EVIDENCE § 2192, at 64-68 (3d ed. 1940). Accord, Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 
273, 281 (1919). 
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cases, even if this means depriving the witness of his dignity and 
personal freedom.132 In recent years, the Supreme Court has af-
firmed that tradition by refusing to create testimonial privileges for 
newsmen133 and for presidential advisers.134 More importantly, how-
ever, the creation of a broad hardship exemption for witnesses other 
than those who are critically ill would abridge the defendant's consti-
tutional right to produce witnesses in his favor. Although this is not 
the place to analyze the validity of testimonial privileges, 135 it suffices 
to say that the Supreme Court has never permitted a privilege to be 
asserted in such a manner as to deny the defendant material evidence 
in his favor. The Court has either avoided the constitutional question 
by narrowly construing the privilege in question, 136 or, where a 
conflict was unavoidable, has declared the privilege invalid.137 In 
direct conflicts between the privileges of witnesses and the rights of 
the accused, the rights of the accused are "paramount."138 If the 
state upholds the use of testimonial privileges in such circumstances, 
it must accept the constitutional consequences that inevitably result 
from deliberately suppressing evidence in the defendant's favor.139 
132. Witnesses can be arrested and detained for long periods of time, simply for 
the purpose of guaranteeing that they will be available to testify at trial. See FED. R. 
Cru:M. P. 46(b) (a material witness may be required to post an appearance bond and, 
if unable to post it, may be detained until the trial). Cf. Hurtado v. United States, 
410 U.S. 518 (1973). See generally Ash, On Witnesses: A Radical Critique of 
Criminal Court Procedures, 48 NoTRE. DAME LAW. 386 (1972); Carlson, Jailing the 
Innocent: The Plight of the Material Witness, 55 IowA L. REV. 1 (1969). Witnesses 
can also be expected to bear the economic burden of testifying in criminal cases. See 
Florida v. Axelson, 80 Misc. 2d 419,420, 363 N.Y.S.2d 200,202 (1974). 
133. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707-08 (1972) (newsmen have no 
privilege to maintain the confidentiality of their sources, unless they can show 
themselves to be the object of "official harassment • . . undertaken not for purposes 
of law enforcement but to disrupt a reporter's relationship with his news sources"). 
134. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705-13 (1974) (the constitutional 
privilege to maintain the confidentiality of communications between the President and 
his advisers does not apply in criminal proceedings). 
135. For a more complete consideration of the interaction of testimonial privi-
leges and compulsory process rights, see Westen, supra note 4, at 159--77. 
136. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709, 711 (1974) (privilege for 
presidential communications does not apply where it would conflict with principle 
that "compulsory process be available for the production of evidence needed . . . by 
the defense"); Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 666-72 (1957) (privilege to 
maintain confidentiality of prior statements of government witnesses does not apply 
where it would conflict with defendant's need to impeach witnesses with "evidence 
relevant and material to his defense"). 
137. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974) (privilege to maintain confiden-
tiality of juvenile court records is unconstitutional in so far as it conflicts with sixth 
amendment right to examine witnesses against defendant). 
138. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 319 (1974). 
139. The consequences vary, depending on the nature of the suppressed evidence. 
If the evidence is material to the impeachment of a government witness, the 
government is precluded from calling the witness; and if the witness has already 
testified, the court must either strike his testimony from the record or, if the 
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The validity of the exception for unreasonable or oppressive 
subpoenas also depends upon how broadly it is construed. The 
fourth amendment ban on "unreasonable searches and seizures" was 
once thought to cover "seizures" by subpoena and to prohibit a court 
from issuing burdensome subpoenas duces tecum, regardless of the 
need for the evidence. 140 It is now understood that a subpoena is not 
a "seizure" within the meaning of the fourth amendment and that, 
in so far as the fourth amendment applies at all to subpoenas, it does 
not protect a witness from the burden of responding to appropriate 
requests for documents. At most, the fourth amendment prohibits a 
court from issuing subpoenas that are excessively broad in relation to 
the underlying inquiry.141 Thus, as long as the subpoena is narrowly 
drafted with respect to the relevant evidence, the witness must re-
spond even if compliance is "exceedingly burdensome."142 
To the extent that the unreasonable-or-oppressive exception is 
narrowly construed in accord with the fourth amendment, it does not 
preclude the defendant from producing material evidence in his case; 
instead, it merely requires that he formulate his requests as precisely 
as possible under the circumstances. On the other hand, if the 
exception is construed more broadly than is constitutionally required 
to protect a witness from the burdens of responding to appropriate 
requests for evidence, it abridges the defendant's right of compulsory 
process.143 The state cannot vindicate its concern for the witness at 
testimony is too prejudicial for the jury to disregard, must declare a mistrial. See 
Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184, 232 (5th Cir. 1975) (Bell, J., dissenting). Cf. 18 
U.S.C. § 3500(d) (1970). If, on the other hand, the suppressed evidence is material 
to establishing the existence or nonexistence of an element of the offense, then the 
court must dismiss the prosecution altogether. See Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 
53, 60-61 (1957); Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 670-72 (1957), See also 
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 12 (1953) ("Respondents [refer to] cases in 
the criminal field, where it has been held that the Government can invoke its 
evidentiary privileges only at the price of letting the defendant go free. The rationale 
of the criminal cases is that, since the Government which prosecutes an accused also 
has the duty to see that justice is done, it is unconscionable to allow it to undertake 
prosecution and then invoke its governmental privileges to deprive the accused of 
anything which might be material to his defense"). 
140. See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906). For the contrary suggestion 
that the fourth amendment gives witnesses no protection from subpoenas duces tecum, 
see In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 75-80 (2d Cir. 1973 ), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867 
(1973). 
141. See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 9, 11-12 (1973); United States v. 
Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652-53 (1950); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co, v. 
Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208-09 (1946). 
142. In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 78 (2d Cir. 1973). 
143. Cf. United States v. Seeger, 180 F. Supp. 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (defendant 
had constitutional right to subpoena Congressman to testify on his behalf despite 
latter's claim that appearing would be "unreasonable and oppressive"), But cf. 
Kaufman v. United States, 268 F. Supp. 484, 489 (E.D. Mo. 1967), revd, on other 
grounds, 394 U.S. 217 (1969) (defendant has no right to produce witness whoso 
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the expense of the defendant's constitutional rights. In so far as the 
state chooses to protect a witness from the burden of complying with 
appropriate requests for evidence, it thereby suppresses evidence and 
must accept the consequences of its choice.144 
D. Favorable Witnesses 
The final element of a defendant's right of compulsory process-
that the testimony of the defendant's witnesses tend to "favor" his 
case-while nowhere explicitly identified in Washington, is neverthe-
less implicit in its reasoning. By its very terms the compulsory 
process clause limits the defendant to the production of favorable 
witnesses ("the right . . . to compulsory process for obtaining wit-
nesses in his favor''). Moreover, by its juxtaposition to the confron-
tation clause, the defendant's right to produce favorable witnesses is 
distinguished from his companion right to demand that the govern-
ment separately produce witnesses "against him." Thus, if a witness' 
testimony is adverse to or of no value to the defendant's case, the 
witness cannot be said to "favor" the defendant (and thus the defend-
ant has no compulsory process right to have the witness produced), 
even though the witness' testimony is competent, relevant, and ma-
terial. 
The requirement that the defendant's witnesses tend to favor his 
case rarely has been examined in terms of the compulsory process 
claims. However, this requirement has been examined in cases deal-
ing with the defendant's analogous right, under the due process 
clause, to produce favorable evidence in the government's possession: 
The heart of the holding in [Brady v. Maryland] is the prosecution's 
suppression of evidence, in the face of a defense production request, 
where the evidence is favorable to the accused and is material either 
to guilt or to punishment. Important, then, are (a) suppression by 
the prosecution after a request by the defense, (b) the evidence's 
favorable character for the defense, and ( c) the materiality of the 
evidence.145 
appearance would be burdensome if there are other readily available witnesses whose 
appearance would not be burdensome and whose testimony would not materially 
differ from former witness' testimony). 
144. See note 127 supra. The government cannot expect the defendant to pay the 
consequences of its decision to create a testimonial privilege for the witness' benefit: 
See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 320 (1974) (''The State's policy interest in 
protecting the confidentiality of a juvenile offender's record cannot require yielding of 
so vital a constitutional right as the effective cross-examination for bias of an adverse 
witness. The State could have protected [the witness] from exposure of his juvenile 
adjudication in these circumstances by refraining from using him to make out its case; 
the State cannot, consistent with the right of confrontation, require the petitioner to 
bear the full burden of vindicating the State's interest in the secrecy of juvenile 
criminal records" ( emphasis added)). 
145. Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 194-95 (1972) (emphasis added). See also 
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Although the other elements of the Supreme Court's test may 
present difficult proof problems, "[t]he burden of demonstrating that 
the evidence was of a favorable nature is . . . a very slight one."148 It 
is sufficient for the defendant to show that the evidence he seeks is 
"potentially useful"147 to his case. The requirement that the defend-
ant's witnesses favor his case has rarely been tested-few defendants 
ever deliberately set about to produce witnesses whose testimony is 
not even potentially useful. If that should happen, however, or if a 
defendant should seek to produce a witness whom he expects to be 
favorable but whose testimony would be of no value, a denial of a 
subpoena will not deny the defendant's constitutional right to produce 
witnesses in his favor .148 
Although a defendant has no constitutional right to procure 
testimony that will in no way help his case, it is within his constitu-
tional prerogative to subpoena a witness who is hostile by disposition. 
By its very terms, the compulsory process clause assumes that a 
defendant may wish to call witnesses who will appear on his behalf 
only if compelled by the court. Accordingly, a defendant has a right 
to produce any witness, whether friendly or not, who may respond 
favorably to proper questions.140 Similarly, the defendant's right of 
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) ("We now hold that the suppression by 
the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process 
where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment ... " (emphasis 
added)). 
I have contended elsewhere that the defendant's sixth amendment right to produce 
witnesses in his favor and his fifth amendment right to discover favorable evidence 
held by the government are conceptually one and the same, and that the line of cases 
under the due process clause should be viewed as a reflection of rights more 
specifically guaranteed by the compulsory process clause. See Westen, supra note 4, 
at 121-31. In addition, at least one court has recognized that a defendant's right to 
discover evidence under the due process clause and his right to produce evidence 
under the compulsory process clause overlap. See Johnson v. Johnson, 375 F. Supp. 
872, 875 (W.D. Mich. 1974). It seems clear in any event that the common 
requirement that the evidence be favorable carries the same meaning under both lines 
of cases. Accordingly, the following discussion treats the two lines of cases as 
interchangeable for the purpose of defining the meaning of that requirement. 
146. Evans v. Janing, 489 F.2d 470,476 (8th Cir. 1973). 
147. Evans v. Janing, 489 F.2d 470, 476 (8th Cir. 1973). Cf. United States v. 
Kahn, 472 F.2d 272,287 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 982 (1973). 
148. See United States v. Deutsch, 475 F.2d 55, 58 (5th Cir. 1973) (defendant 
not entitled to new trial if suppressed evidence would not have been "useful"); United 
States v. Julian, 450 F.2d 575, 577-78 (10th Cir. 1971) (defendant not entitled to 
continuance to obtain witness who would not have been "helpful" to his case), 
149. The Supreme Court, in Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 283, 291-92, 295-
98 (1973), held that the defendant had a constitutional right to examine a hostile and 
uncooperative witness of his own by means of leading questions. Although the Court 
based its decision on the defendant's due process right to a fair trial and, by 
implication, on his right to confront witnesses "against him," the decision is better 
viewed as a reflection of his right to present and examine witnesses "in his favor," 
since the witness was called, not by the government as part of its case, but by the 
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compulsory process is not limited by the fact that a witness' testimony 
is not entirely favorable. A defendant is entitled to seek favorable 
evidence where he can find it, even if it means separating the good 
from the bad and urging that a portion of the testimony be believed 
and a portion disbelieved.150 
In determining whether a defendant's witnesses are favorable, 
some courts appear to be influenced by the character of the testimony 
that a witness will offer. Thus, some courts impose numerical limits on 
the number of character witnesses a defendant may call, apparently 
on the assumption that their testimony is less exculpatory than 
other evidence.151 Similarly, at least one court has gone further and 
has held that the defendant's constitutional right to the disclosure of 
favorable evidence held by the prosecution included the production of 
rebuttal evidence and evidence to support affirmative defenses but did 
not include impeachment evidence that went solely to the credibility 
of the witnesses against him.152 
defendant as an effort to rebut the. case against him. See also Clingan v. United 
States, 400 F.2d 848, 851 (5th Cir. 1968) (defendant denied "fair and impartial trial" 
by trial court's refusal to permit him to call hostile, uncooperative witness and 
examine him by means of leading questions). Most courts hold, on nonconstitutional 
grounds, that a defendant may call hostile witnesses and examine them by means of 
leading questions. See 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 774-78 (3d ed. 1940). See also 
FED. R. Evm. 611(c) ("When a party calls a hostile witness ... interrogation may 
be by leading questions"). 
150. In Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 283 (1973), the Court held that, after 
calling a hostile witness and eliciting adverse testimony, the defendant had a constitu-
tional right both to urge the witness, by means of impeaching questions; to change his 
testimony, 410 U.S. at 295-98, and to introduce the witness' prior contradictory 
statements in order to show that he was lying in court and that his out-of-court 
statements were true, 410 U.S. at 298-302. In other words, the defendant had a 
constitutional right to try to persuade the jury (both by putting direct questions to the 
witness and by calling independent witnesses) to reject the witness' in-court testimony 
and instead accept his out-of-court statements. As the court put it, "in modern 
criminal trials, defendants are rarely able to select their own witnesses: they must 
take them where they find them." 410 U.S. at 296. Taking into account this same 
concern, many courts permit a defendant to impeach his own witnesses. See J. 
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 905 (3d ed. 1940). See also FED. R. Evm. 607 ("The 
credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, including the party calling 
him"). 
151. See, e.g., United States v. Gray, 507 F.2d 1013, 1015-16 (5th Cir. 1975) 
(defendant limited to three character witnesses); United States v. Jacobs, 451 F.2d 
530, 542 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972) (defendant limited to 
three character witnesses); Brady v. United States, 41 F.2d 449, 451 (7th Cir. 1930) 
(defendant limited to five character witnesses); Dobbs v. State, 237 Ind. 119, 121-23, 
143 N.E.2d 99, 100-01 (1957) (defendant limited to eight character witnesses); 
Summerlin v. State, 256 Ind. 652, 655-57, 271 N.E.2d 411, 412-13 (1971) (defendant 
limited to five character witnesses). Cf. State v. Lassiter, 16 N.C. App. 377, -, 192 
S.E.2d 21, 22-23 (1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 875 (1973) (defendant not entitled to 
continuance to obtain character witnesses). See generally 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE§ 
1908 n.2 (3d ed. 1940); Annot., 17 A.L.R.3d 327 (1968). 
152. See Simos v. State, 53 Wis. 2d 493, 496-98, 192 N.W.2d 877, 879 (1972). 
Contra Simos v. Gray, 356 F. Supp. 265 (E.D. Wis. 1973). Cf. Galloway v. Burke, 
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The requirement that a witness "favor'' the defendant should not 
be made to tum upon the character of the witness' testimony. Al-
though courts are entitled to consider the nature of the defendant's 
evidence in determining whether it is material (for the form evidence 
takes may have a bearing on its impact in a particular case11l3), a 
witness favors the defendant if his testimony tends to defeat an 
element of the state's case, whether this is accomplished by testifying 
directly to the underlying events at issue or by testifying indirectly to 
the reliability of the state's witnesses.154 Thus, from the trial of 
Aaron Burr to the most recent pronouncements on compulsory 
process, it has been assumed -that to the extent that a witness im-
peaches the prosecution he favors the accused.1G5 The Supreme 
Court has reached the same conclusion in construing the defendant's 
associated right to discover favorable evidence from ·the govem-
ment.15a 
II. TIME, PrucE, AND MANNER OF COMPULSORY PROCESS 
We have now defined the constitutional standard that governs the 
timely request of a nonindigent defendant to subpoena available 
witnesses from within the jurisdiction. It is the right to produce, and 
thus implicitly to present, any witness who is capable of giving 
testimony that could reasonably tend to persuade a jury to return a 
297 F. Supp. 624, 628 (E.D. Wis. 1969) (''This court is not prepared to say that, as a 
matter of constitutional law, a defendant is entitled to a continuance at any time prior 
to trial to procure the attendance of witnesses who may affect his credibility. The 
question would be different if it were claimed that a missing witness would establish a 
defense to the crime charged • •. " (emphasis added)). 
153. Although character evidence may be vital in some cases, see cases cited in 
note 84 supra, in many cases it is peripheral to the main issues in dispute, see 6 J. 
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1908, at 580 (3d ed. 1940). Hence, if the defendant's good 
character is not controverted by the prosecution and he has already called six 
witnesses to testify to his character, the remaining fourteen witnesses, though favora-
ble, may not have a material bearing on the verdict. Fugler v. State, 192 Miss. 775, 
779, 7 S.2d 873, 874 (1942). See also Shaw v. United States, 41 F.2d 26, 27 (5th Cir. 
1939); Hamil v. United States, 298 F. 369, 372 (5th Cir. 1924); Carr v. State, 208 
S.2d 886, 888-89 (Miss. 1968). 
154. See United States v. Quinn, 364 F. Supp. 432, 441 (N.D. Ga. 1973) 
(government must produce any evidence that is "arguably favorable, either as direct 
or impeaching evidence"); Simos v. Gray, 356 F. Supp. 265, 269 (E.D. Wis. 1973). 
155. See United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348, 356 (1969) (defendants may 
have a right, under the compulsory process clause, to produce prior statements of 
government witnesses for use as impeachment evidence); United States v. Burr, 25 F. 
Cas. 30, 36 (No. 14,692d) (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (defendant had a right, under the 
compulsory process clause, to subpoena prior statements of government witness for 
possible use as impeachment evidence). 
156. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (denial of due process to 
withhold from defendant evidence that tended to impeach prosecution witness for 
motive). 
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verdict in the defendant's favor. The standard is strict. The right to 
produce witnesses is as absolute as any principle known in the law 
and cannot be overcome by any demonstrable interest, including the 
state's interest in preserving its utmost secrets.157 
We now turn to the factors that tend to complicate the analysis 
and weaken the standard. Thus, while the defendant has an absolute 
right to subpoena witnesses, the trial court is said to have discretion 
both to deny him a continuance if his witnesses fail to appear, and to 
deny him subpoenas if he is unable to pay the accompanying costs. 
Similarly, the defendant is deemed to waive his right to produce 
witnesses if he fails to make a precise showing of the nature of their 
testimony. The question here is whether such supplemental rules are 
constitutionally valid and, if so, whether they can be reconciled with 
the absolute nature of the general standard. 
A. The Timing of Subpoenas 
The two most common questions involving the timing of subpoe-
nas are whether a defendant has a right to issue subpoenas returnable 
before trial and whether he has a right to postpone the trial when 
witnesses fail to make timely appearances. 
The first question can be viewed essentially as a problem of 
discovery, namely, whether a defendant has the right to produce 
evidence in advance of trial in order to prepare his defense. Al-
though a few courts have dealt with the compulsory process aspects of 
this problem, 158 it has more commonly been discussed as a question 
157. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 12 (1953) (dictum). Cf. text at 
notes 135-44 supra. More precisely, the defendant's interest in disclosure is great 
enough to force the government to choose between preserving its interest in secrecy or 
its interest in prosecution. If the government proceeds with the prosecution, the 
defendant has an absolute right to present any evidence that he can show to be 
available and exculpatory. The Supreme Court has only once allowed the defendant's 
sixth amendment right to present witnesses to be outweighed by a competing 
governmental interest, and there only as a judicial sanction for the defendant's failure 
to disclose the witness' prior statements for possible use in impeachment. In United 
States v. Nobles, 43 U.S.L.W. 4815, 4820 (U.S. June 23, 1975), the Court implicitly 
held that the state's interest in using preclusion as a sanction for enforcing valid rules 
of disclosure outweighed the defendant's interest in. presenting witnesses. It is 
significant, however, that the defendant in Nobles at all times retained the option of 
presenting his witness simply by disclosing the witness' prior notes. By refusing to 
disclose the notes, the defendant made a voluntary decision that his case was better 
served by keeping the witness off the stand than by presenting the witness and 
permitting him to be impeached with the prior statements. Nobles, therefore, has no 
bearing on cases in which the government, rather than the defendant, controls the 
exculpatory witness. For an analysis of the extent to which testimonial privileges 
are also outweighed by the defendant's constitutional right, under the confrontation 
clause, to develop evidence by means of cross-examination, see Note, supra note 62, 
at 1478-85. 
158. See Westen, supra note 4, at 129 & n.281. 
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of the defendant's due process right to obtain exculpatory evidence 
held by the government. Thus, at least one court has denied pretrial 
discovery on the ground that the right to produce exculpatory evi-
dence is part of the right to a fair trial and cannot be ascertained in 
advance of trial.159 Other courts have granted pretrial discovery on 
the ground that the right to have exculpatory evidence produced 
impliedly includes the right to have the evidence produced in time to 
use it.100 
We need not pause, however, to compare the defendant's right of 
discovery under the due process clause with his right to have witnesses 
produced under the compulsory· process clause, for whether the 
defendant has a right to subpoena witnesses in advance of trial 
ultimately depends upon the same considerations that determine 
whether he has a right to postpone his trial because of the absence of 
such witnesses. The two issues are different aspects of the same 
essential question.161 
Suppose, for example, that a defendant seeks documentary evi-
dence that is too voluminous to review in the heat of trial, or seeks 
information from an uncooperative witness that may lead to the 
discovery of other witnesses in his favor. It makes little difference to 
the defendant whether he receives pretrial subpoenas returnable in 
advance of the trial or trial subpoenas plus a postponement of the 
trial: under both procedures he receives the time necessary to marshal 
the evidence in his favor. Whether he is entitled to either procedure, 
however, depends on whether the right to produce "witnesses in his 
favor'' includes the right to demand sufficient time to benefit from 
their testimony. We shall first discuss the question in the context of 
requests to postpone the trial, where it arises most frequently, and 
then apply our conclusions to the issue of pretrial subpoenas. 
The Supreme Court has not yet commented upon the compulsory 
process implications of requests for continuances; indeed, in one case 
that presented the issue directly, the Court specifically refused to 
decide it.162 In the absence of guidance from the Court, the lower 
159. See State v. Gillespie, 227 S.2d 550 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969). 
160. See United States v. Anderson, 481 F.2d 685, 690 n.2 (4th Cir. 1973); 
United States v. Eley, 335 F. Supp. 353 (N.D. Ga. 1972). 
161. See United States ex rel. Lucas v. Regan, 503 F.2d 1, 3 n.1 (2d Cir. 1974). 
Cf. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 85-86 (1970) (no constitutional difference 
between pretrial discovery and discovery at trial with a continuance). I have argued 
elsewhere that the defendant's constitutional right to request the government to use 
its coercive authority to discover evidence in his favor is better viewed as a principle 
of compulsory process than of due process. See Westen, supra not 4, at 121-31. 
162. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 n.1 (1966), affg. 345 F.2d 691 (7th 
Cir. 1965). The Court has held (when no constitutional challenge was made) that 
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courts have divided on the issue. Some courts-beginning with John 
Marshall's decision in the trial of Aaron Burr168-have held that the 
right to produce witnesses implicitly entails the right to postpone, or, 
if necessary, adjourn the trial.164 Other courts have taken the view, 
best expressed by Wigmore, that the compulsory process clause guar-
antees the defendant nothing more than equality with the prosecution 
in the issuance of subpoenas, and leaves to local law the determina-
tion of the propriety of granting continuances: 
The constitutional provision for compulsory process, as the history 
. of that right shows, was designed merely to give equally to the ac-
cused (beyond the power of legislative change) the aid of the 
State's subpoena . . . . But the constitutional provision does not 
have anything to say about the time of holding trial; which is the only 
question here involved.165 
The difficulty with Wigmore's reading of history is that the 
Supreme Court, in Washington v. Texas, rejected the view that the 
compulsory process clause concerns only the defendant's right to 
subpoena witnesses and says nothing about his right to place them on 
the witness stand. The framers did not intend to commit the futile 
act of granting a defendant the right to subpoena witnesses, while 
leaving it to the courts to deny him the benefit of their testimony by 
arbitrarily denying him sufficient time to render the subpoenas effec-
tive. To the contrary, they guaranteed a defendant the explicit right 
to subpoena witnesses in order to safeguard his implicit right to 
produce and present such witnesses to the trier of fact.166 Conse-
the granting of a continuance is within the discretion of the trial court. See Isaacs v. 
United States, 159 U.S. 487 (1895). 
163. During his trial for the misdemeanor of plotting to attack Spain in Mexico, 
Burr subpoenaed the United States attorney to produce a letter written by General 
Wilkinson to President Thomas Jefferson. When the United States attorney refused 
to produce the letter on grounds of privilege, Burr moved for an indefinite continu-
ance until the letter was produced. Marshall agreed that Burr was entitled to the 
letter under the compulsory process clause and granted the continuance. United 
States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 191-92 (No. 14,694) (C.C.D. Va. 1807). For a fuller 
account of the Burr case, see Westen, supra note 4, at 106-08. 
164. See McKinney v. Wainwright, 488 F.2d 28, 29 (5th Cir. 1974) (due process 
clause); Paoni v. United States, 281 F. 801, 803 (3d Cir. 1922); Johnson v. Johnson, 
375 F. Supp. 872, 876 (W.D. Mich. 1974); Gibbs v. State, 18 Md. App. 230, 244-46, 
306 A.2d 587, 595 (1973); People v. Foy, 32 N.Y.2d 473, 299 N:E.2d 664, 346 
N.Y.S.2d 245 (1973); State v. Patriarca, 112 R. I. 14, -, 308 A.2d 300,315 (1973); 
State v. Watson, 69 Wash. 2d 645, 650-51, 419 P.2d 789, 792 (1966); Elam v. State, 
50 Wis. 2d 383, 388-92, 184 N.W.2d 176, 180-81 (1971). 
165. 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2595, at 605-06 (3d ed. 1940). See Gibbs v. 
State, 18 Md. App. 230, 245, 306 A.2d 587, 595 (1973). See also MacKenna v. Ellis, 
380 F.2d 592, 604 (5th Cir.), modified on rehearing en bane, 289 F.2d 928 (1960), 
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 877 (1961). 
166. See text at notes 10-14 supra. Cf. Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184, 230 
(5th Cir. 1975) (Bell, J., dissenting) (defendant's constitutional right under due 
process clause to discover exculpatory evidence presently under government control 
not limited to evidence under the prosecutor's control). 
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quently, whether a defendant has received sufficient time to produce 
witnesses in his favor is itself a federal question.167 
The defendant's sixth amendment right to produce witnesses can 
be compared in this resp~ct with his sixth amendment right to coun-
sel. Although the right-to-counsel clause does not contain an explicit 
provision for continuances, the Supreme Court has held that to deny a 
defendant a continuance to enable his attorney to render effective 
assistance is to deny a defendant his right to counsel: "[T]he denial 
of opportunity for appointed counsel to confer, to consult with the 
accused, and to prepare his defense, could convert the appointment of 
counsel into a sham."168 By analogy, to deny a defendant the time to 
request subpoenas, to serve them on his witnesses, and to allow his 
witnesses to respond, is effectively to deny him compulsory process.100 
After recognizing that a constitutional issue is involved, the more 
difficult problem is to define the standard that governs the granting of 
continuances. A defendant is certainly not entitled to a continuance 
whenever, and however often, he expresses a desire for one; nor, on 
the other hand, can a defendant be arbitrarily denied a continuance at 
the whim of the court. Absent an explicit standard under the com-
pulsory process clause, the courts have tended to adopt the standard 
that governs in the area of the right to counsel. In that area, the 
Supreme Court has expressly held that whether a continuance should 
be granted for the purpose of securing the assistance of counsel is a 
decision that should be left to the discretion of the trial judge and 
should be reviewed only when arbitrarily made: 
The matter of continuance is traditionally within the discretion of 
the trial judge, and it is not every denial of a request for more time 
that violates due process even if the party fails to offer evidence or 
is compelled to defend without counsel ..•. There are no mechani-
cal tests for deciding when a denial of a continuance is so arbitrary 
as to violate due process. The answer must be found in the circum-
stances present in every case, particularly in the reasons presented to 
the trial judge at the time the request is denied.170 
167. The debates preceding the adopting of the sixth amendment also support the 
conclusion that the framers of the compulsory process clause were specifically 
concerned with matters of timing. The clause was discussed only once during the 
debates, when a member of the House of Representatives moved that it be amended to 
guarantee the accused the explicit right to a continuance if his subpoenas were not 
served in a timely fashion. The motion was defeated on the ground that it was 
superfluous because the courts could be trusted to construe the clause generously to 
fulfill its purposes. 2 B. SCHWAR1Z, 'IilE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 
1114 (1971). 
168. Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940). See Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 
U.S. 575, 589 (1964); Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3, 10 (1954). 
169. See Paoni v. United States, 281 F. 801, 802-03 (3d Cir. 1922). 
170. Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 (1964). The Court has since refused 
December 1975] Compulsory Process II 239 
The lower courts have applied this standard to continuances for the 
purpose of securing the presence of witnesses and thus have left the 
matter to the discretion of the trial judge, and have exercised review 
only upon a "clear showing of abuse resulting in manifest injus-
tice."111 
"Discretion" is always a problematic standard. It neither pro-
vides the trial court with guidance as to what factors should be 
considered in reaching a judgment, nor furnishes a scale by which to 
evaluate such factors once they have been identified. Furthermore, 
while a grant of discretion to the trial courts does not permit the 
appellate courts to abdicate their responsibilities altogether, it gives 
them no guidance for reviewing "abuses" of the standard. 
More importantly, however, a grant of discretion is particularly 
troublesome when applied to constitutional rights. Constitutional 
rights are not ordinarily made to depend upon the exercise of discre-
tion; nor, indeed, have we applied this standard to the right of 
compulsory process in other contexts. Thus, under the constitutional 
standard for compulsory process that this article has developed, a trial 
judge is not given the "discretion" to decide whether a witness is 
competent, or relevant, or material, in issuing subpoenas to the 
defendant. Rather, we have required that the judge issue subpoenas 
unless he can make a decision beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
witness could not reasonably be considered a witness in the· defend-
ant's favor. The question we must now examine, then, is whether we 
can justify the broad and relatively unreviewable authority given the 
trial judge to pass on requests for continuances. 
We can begin by identifying the factors that affect the grant of a 
continuance and then determine whether they justify the use of the 
standard of discretion. A principal difference between the grant of a 
subpoena and the grant of a continuance lies in the effect each 
procedure has upon the prosecution. If a subpoena is issued for a 
witness who cannot be produced, or for a witness who possesses no 
material evidence, little harm is done. The defendant may suffer 
some unnecessary expense but, after all, he made the decision to 
subpoena the witness. The court, in turn, may be forced to hear 
some unnecessary testimony, but this problem can be controlled at 
trial: If the defendant should subpoena a large number of immaterial 
to lay down any fixed time periods that must always be allowed between the 
appointment of counsel and trial. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 54 
(1970). 
171. United States v. Spoonhunter, 476 F.2d 1050, 1056 (10th Cir. 1973). See 
McKinney v. Wainwright, 488 F.2d 28, 29 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 973 
(1974); Walker v. State, 117 Ala. 85, 88, 23 S. 670, 671 (1898). 
240 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 74:191 
witnesses to delay and disrupt the proceedings, the court can easily 
detect the maneuver and either screen the testimony of such witnesses 
in advance, or bar the defendant from presenting them at trial be-
cause he abused his privilege.172 On the other hand, if continuances 
are improvidently granted, the state's effort to prosecute the accused 
can be impaired or entirely frustrated. 
Continuances may be improvidently granted in two ways. First, 
a defendant may try to manipulate the timing of trial by requesting 
continuances in bad faith. If continuances were freely granted upon 
request, or upon a colorable showing of need for an absent witness, a 
defendant could delay the trial indefinitely by requesting continu-
ances for witnesses whom he had deliberately concealed or whom he 
knew to be nonexistent. Short of indefinite postponement, a defend-
ant could use such tactics to interrupt and repeatedly delay the trial 
for short periods of time in order to impair the prosecution's case. 
Because the state has the difficult burden of proving all elements of 
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, as well as the burden of 
confronting the defendant with the witnesses against him, even minor 
delays may tilt the balance in the defendant's favor by causing the 
state's evidence to become stale in the jury's mind or by making it 
more difficult for the state to preserve its case. 
Second, even if a defendant acts in good faith, he may request 
continuances to obtain witnesses who will never appear because they 
have died, disappeared, suffer from prolonged illness, or lie beyond 
the territorial reach of the state's process. If continuances were freely 
granted in an attempt to obtain such witnesses, prosecutions would 
never end, nor would the interests of compulsory process be served. 
The clause does not guarantee that witnesses will eventually appear; 
it merely guarantees that an effort will be made to produce them.173 
Accordingly, some limit must be placed on the granting of continu-
ances to prevent the right of compulsory process from being either 
deliberately abused or called upon to deliver more than it promises. 
Wigmore has summed up the two problems nicely: "The Constitution 
cannot raise witnesses from the dead, nor spirit them from beds of 
illness, or kennels of concealment. To interpret the Constitution into 
any such pledge is to invent (as experience has shown) a guarantee 
172. Just as the defendant can be deemed to have implicitly waived his right to be 
present at trial by abusive conduct, see Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970), so, too, 
can he be deemed to have implicitly waived his right to present witnesses by willful 
conduct, cf. United States v. Nobles, 43 U.S.L.W. 4815, 4820 (U.S. June 23, 1975) 
(defendant deemed to have waived his sixth amendment right to present witness by 
his failure to produce witness' prior notes). 
173. See notes 126-29 supra and accompanying text. 
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that no determined offender shall be tried for his crime until he 
himself pleases."174 
Now that we have identified the two principal factors affecting the 
grant of continuances-the danger of manipulation and the inherent 
limitations on the state's subpoena power--we are in a position to 
decide whether they justify using the standard of discretion. A grant 
of discretion is useful in situations in which an appellate court inten-
tionally seeks to minimize its reviewing function, in which fact-
finding calls for the unique perspective of the trial court, or in which 
judgments are too complex to be governed by a simple formula; 
however, none of these features is present in the case of continuances. 
Appellate courts do not customarily defer to the lower courts in 
interpreting constitutional rights, and the fact-finding necessary to 
the determination whether a continuance is warranted does not usually 
depend upon such factors as demeanor and state of mind. Most 
importantly, having pinpointed the particular factors that should 
influence the exercise of discretion, we no longer need an indefinite 
standard. In place of the amorphous rule of discretion, we should be 
able to construct a more precise standard that will accommodate the 
special problems of continuances without unduly restricting the exer-
cise of judicial judgment. 
We can begin with the basic requirements: A defendant is not 
entitled to a continuance (nor, for that matter, a subpoena) for 
absent witnesses unless he can offer proof that their testimony will be 
competent,175 relevant,176 material,177 and favorable to his defense.178 
174. 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE§ 2595, at 605-06 (3d ed. 1940). 
115. See United States v. Keefer, 464 F.2d 1385, 1387 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 
409 U.S. 983 (1972) (no error to deny a continuance for witness whose testimony 
would have been inadmissible as hearsay). It should be recalled, however, that 
whether hearsay evidence is sufficiently reliable to be admitted as evidence in the 
defendant's favor is itself a federal question to be resolved by federal standards. See 
Westen, supra note 4, at 149-59. 
176. See State v. Baldwin, 276 N.C. 690, 174 S.E.2d 526 (1970) (no violation of 
compulsory process rights to deny a continuance for witness whose testimony would 
have been irrelevant). See also United States v. McPhatter, 473 F.2d 1356, 1358 
(5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Izzi, 427 F.2d 293, 296 (2d Cir. 1970); Warden v. 
United States, 391 F.2d 747 (10th Cir. 1968); People v. Arndt, 50 111. 2d 390, 394, 
280 N.E.2d 230, 233 (1972). 
177. A materiality requirement has been properly identified in cases involving 
nonconstitutional requests for a continuance. See, e.g., Mead v. State, 445 P.2d 229, 
233 (Alas. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 855 (1969); People v. Dersa, 42 Mich. App. 
522, 533, 202 N.W.2d 334, 340 (1972); Pitts v. State, 431 P.2d 449, 451-52 (Okla. 
Crim. App. 1966). Some courts, however, appear to require a greater showing of 
materiality for the purpose of granting a continuance than for issuing a subpoena or 
permitting an attending witness to testify. Compare Dearinger v. United States, 468 
F.2d 1032, 1034-35 (9th Cir. 1972) ("When it is claimed that an error was made in 
denying a continuance to find such witnesses, the crucial question is whether the 
defendant was denied a fair trial because, had the witness testified, the defendant 
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In addition, because of the dangers of manipulation, he can also be 
required to demonstrate his good faith. Thus, if a defendant has 
been less than diligent in producing his witnesses (for example, by 
failing to make timely requests for subpoenas170), if he has made 
repeated requests for continuances,180 or if he has failed to examine 
other available witnesses for the evidence he now seeks from absent 
witnesses, 181 then the court may be justified in concluding that he 
seeks the continuances for illegitimate reasons. 
In addition to good faith, a defendant can also be required to 
demonstrate that there is some likelihood that the absent witness will 
appear and testify at some time in the reasonably near future. Thus, if 
the defendant cannot indicate when the witness might be expected to 
would not have been convicted"), with Jennings v. Superior Ct., 66 Cal. 2d 867, 
876, 428 P.2d 304, 310, 59 Cal. Rptr. 440, 446 (1967) (the absent witness need not 
be "vital," if he can be shown to be "material"). There is no reason, however, why 
the same standard of materiality should not govern both procedures. The only 
difference between a request for a subpoena and a request for a continuance is that 
the latter may impose a burden on the prosecution if the defendant is acting in bad 
faith or if the witness cannot be produced on time. Since the dangers of bad faith 
and lack of production can be avoided by requiring separate showings of good faith 
and likelihood of production, there is no reason to vary the standard of materiality. 
178. Again, courts considering nonconstitutional requests for continances have 
identified this requirement. See, e.g., United States v. Woodring, 464 F.2d 1248, 
1252 (10th Cir. 1972); United States v. Pigford, 461 F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1972); 
United States v. Julian, 450 F.2d 575, 577-78 (10th Cir. 1971). 
179. This tactic is not unknown to defendants. See, e.g., United States v. Posey, 
501 F.2d 998 (6th Cir. 1974) (defendant waited until one day before trial to seek 
subpoena); United States v. Jones, 487 F.2d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 1973) (defendant 
waited until final day of trial to seek subpoena even though he learned of witness 
before first day of trial); United States v. Pomeroy, 485 F.2d 272, 274 (9th Cir. 
1973) (defendant who had retained counsel for two months waited until one week 
before trial to give him list of witnesses); Blackwell v. United States, 405 F.2d 625, 
627 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 962 (1969) (defendant waited until day of trial 
to request continuance); United States ex rel. Snyder v. Mack, 372 F. Supp. 1077, 
1080 (E.D. Pa. 1974) ("This petitioner's voluntary delay in informing his counsel of 
possible alibi witnesses . • . and the stage of the proceedings at which he raised the 
issue of an alibi for a first time [justify denial]"). See also United States v. Costa, 
425 F.2d 950, 953 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 938 (1970) (defendant's 
failure to produce requested witness during trial or after verdict suggests that witness' 
testimony was not material). 
180. In cases not involving constitutional requests, many judges have been willing 
to deny continuances on the ground that nothing but further delay was sought. See, 
e.g., United States v. Tortora, 464 F.2d 1202, 1207 (2d Cir. 1972); Mcconney v. 
United States, 421 F.2d 248, 250 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 821 (1970); 
Clark v. State, -Ala. App.-, 307 S.2d 28 (1975). 
181. Whether the defendant has examined other witnesses has often been used to 
measure his good faith. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Lucas v. Regan, 503 F.2d 1, 3 
(2d Cir. 1974) (defendant failed to examine other witnesses and introduce demon-
strative evidence to establish facts he now claims he wanted to prove through absent 
witness); State v. Chavers, - La. -, 294 S.2d 489 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 
1111 (1975) (same); People v. Stabler, 202 Cal. App. 2d 862, 865, 21 Cal. Rptr. 120, 
122 (1962). 
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appear, 182 if the defendant cannot locate the witness even after the 
state has conducted a serious search, 183 if the witness is seriously ill 
with no prospects for recovery in the definite future, 184 if the witness 
lies beyond the territorial reach of compulsory process, 185 or if the 
witness can be expected to assert a testimonial privilege to remain 
silent, 186 then the court may conclude that the defendant has failed to 
show that it is "reasonably certain that the [ witness] can be procured 
at the time to which the trial would be postponed."187 For even 
182. Requests for such predictions are not uncommon. See, e.g., United States v. 
Lewis, 472 F.2d 252,255 (3d Cir. 1973); State v. Jackson, 250 La. 1100, 1103, 202 
S.2d 264, 265 (1967) ('".[t]here was no showing by the defendant to where this 
witness had gone, when he had left or when he was coming back, if ever. If this case 
were to be continued until such time as this witness would voluntarily return . . . , it 
is very possible that it would never be tried'"). 
183. For instance, in United States v. Snyder, 505 F.2d 595 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. 
denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3515 (U.S. March 17, 1975), the witness, King, was a fugitive 
from justice. The court considered it "highly doubtful that King, who was taking 
pains to avoid invitations from the FBI to appear at the trial, would have favored 
Snyder with his presence" and felt that it bordered "on frivolity to assert error in the 
court's refusal to grant a defendant's motion for continuance so that he may call a 
fugitive co-indictee to appear on his behalf." 505 F.2d at 598. See also United 
States v. Cawley, 481 F.2d 702, 705 (5th Cir. 1973). 
184. For examples of the situations in which illness of the defendant's witnesses 
has not warranted delay in his trial, see Blackwell v. United States, 405 F.2d 625, 627 
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 962 (1969); United States v. Mitchell, 385 F. Supp. 
1190, 1192 (D.D.C. 1974): 
185. See, e.g., McDonald v. Arkansas, 501 F.2d 385, 388 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 
419 U.S. 1004 (1974) (no error to deny a continuance for witness located in 
Germany); Powell v. United States, 420 F.2d 799, 801 (9th Cir. 1969) (no error to 
deny a continuance for witnesses in Europe and Mexico without a showing that they 
would be willing to return and testify); Burton v. State, 43 Ala. App. 249, 251, 187 
S.2d 808, 810 (1966) (no error to deny a continuance for witnesses located in 
Florida). For a discussion of the extent to which the state's obligation under the 
compulsory process clause extends beyond the witnesses it has the coercive power to 
produce and includes those who may be induced to return voluntarily as well as those 
whom other governments may cooperate to produce, see text at notes 345-406 infra. 
186. See, e.g., United States v. Gloria, 494 F.2d 477, 480 (5th Cir. 1974) (no 
violation of compulsory process to deny a continuance for witness who might have 
invoked privilege against self-incrimination). Cf. Myers v. Frye, 401 F.2d 18 (7th 
Cir. 1968) (no violation of defendant's right of compulsory process to deny him a 
subpoena for witness who would have invoked lawyer-client privilege). But see 
United States v. Gomez-Rojas, 507 F.2d 1213, 1220 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. 
Sanchez, 459 F.2d 100, 103 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 864 (1972) (since 
witnesses frequently insist before trial that they will refuse to testify but change their 
minds under oath, the only way to test their true intentions, as well as the legitimacy 
of their claims of privilege, is to produce them in person and examine them under 
oath); Smiloff v. State, 439 P.2d 772, 776 (Alas. 1968). 
Note that it has been argued elsewhere that no testimonial privilege, including the 
witness' privilege against self-incrimination, is sufficient to override the defendant's 
right to produce witnesses in his favor. See Westen, supra note 4, at 159-77. See 
also note 197 infra. On that reasoning, no privilege would be sufficient to override 
the defendant's right to obtain a continuance for the purpose of producing witnesses 
in his favor. 
187. State v. Patriarca, 112 R.I. 14, -, 308 A.2d 300, 315 (1973). 
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though a defendant cannot reasonably be expected to guarantee that a 
witness will appear,188 he can be required to show that there is "some 
reasonable expectation"189 of securing the presence of the witness on 
time. 
It follows that if a defendant can show these three factors-that 
is, (1) that the witness' testimony will be competent, relevant, mate-
rial, and favorable, (2) that he acted in good faith, and (3) that the 
witness will appear and testify at the time to which the trial is to be 
postponed-then he is entitled to more time. Furthermore, if the 
defendant makes such a showing, he is entitled to a continuance not 
as a matter of discretion, but as a matter of right.100 Thus, if the 
defendant first discovers on the eve of trial the identity or where-
abouts of a witness that he would ordinarily be entitled to subpoena, 
he is entitled to a continuance if he can show that his belated discov-
ery is not due to a lack of diligence.191 Similarly, if a diligent defend-
ant learns of a witness after the trial has begun, or discovers that a 
subpoenaed witness has not appeared, he is entitled to a short ad-
journment if he can show that the witness can be produced at the time 
the trial recommences.192 
188. But see Baeza v. State, 453 P.2d 271, 273 (Okla. Crim. App. 1969). For a 
discussion of how much a defendant can be required to show as a condition for 
producing witnesses in his favor, see text at notes 302-23 infra, where it is contended 
that a defendant cannot constitutionally be required to show more than he reasonably 
can be expected to know. 
189. Dudonis v. State, 9 Md. App. 245,252, 263 A.2d 624, 628 (1970). 
190. See Keller v. State, 128 Ga. App. 129, 131, 195 S.E.2d 767, 768 (1973) 
(Evans, J., concurring). See also United States v. Harris, 441 F.2d 1333, 1336 (10th 
Cir. 1971); People v. Foy, 32 N.Y.2d 473, 478, 299 N.E.2d 664, 667, 346 N.Y.S.2d 
245, 249-50 (1973); State v. Patriarca, 112 R.I. 14, -, 308 A.2d 300, 315 (1973); 
LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 709 (1967). 
191. See State v. Eller, 8 Wash. App. 697, 508 P.2d 1045 (1973), revd. on other 
grounds, 84 Wash. 2d 90, 524 P.2d 242 (1974) (violation of compulsory process 
rights to deny a continuance requested one day before trial for witness who, despite 
defendant's diligence, was not discovered until one day before trial). See also People 
v. Crable, 33 Mich. App. 254, 257, 189 N.W.2d 740, 742 (1971) (error to deny 
defendant a continuance requested one day before trial when he reasonably believed 
until then that prosecution would produce witness as part of its case); Foster v. State, 
497 S.W.2d 291, 292-93 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (error to deny a continuance 
requested on Monday, the day of trial, for witness whom defendant, despite his 
diligence, did not discover until preceding weekend). 
192. See Johnson v. Johnson, 375 F. Supp. 872, 876 (W.D. Mich. 1974) (viola-
tion of compulsory process rights to deny a continuance to allow additional alibi 
witnesses to testify); State v. Watson, 69 Wash. 2d 246, 258, 419 P.2d 789, 791-92 
(1966) (violation of compulsory process rights to deny a continuance to attach a 
witness who was known and who had been served with process, but who was reluctant 
to appear voluntarily); State v. Edwards, 68 Wash. 2d 246, 258, 412 P.2d 747, 754 
(1966) (violation of compulsory process rights to deny a continuance for witness who 
could have been produced in less than an hour's time). See also, e.g., State v. 
McGill, 101 Ariz. 320, 322, 419 P.2d 498, 501 (1966) (error to deny a continuance 
for witness who was temporarily taken ill during middle of trial); People v. Foy, 32 
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A harder case is presented if, after the trial has commenced, a 
diligent defendant learns of a witness who cannot be produced in a 
short period of time, whether because of temporary illness, extended 
distances, or other complications. In this case, the trial court can no 
longer resolve the problem with a short adjournment; accordingly, it 
must either deny the defendant the benefit of the expected testimony 
or abort the proceedings and reschedule the trial for a future date.193 
Although this case presents a more difficult set of alternatives, a 
defendant should be entitled to adjourn the trial for a reasonable 
period of time (or, if necessary, have the trial rescheduled), if he can 
show that he has acted in good faith and that the witness can 
probably be produced at the time when the trial recommences. While 
it is commonly said that once the trial has begun a defendant is 
limited to "short" adjournments, 194 that view probably reflects the 
natural assumption that witnesses who are likely to appear at a date in 
the reasonably near future are those witnesses who are readily availa-
ble and therefore able to appear within a short period of time. It 
may also reflect the assumption that since most defendants know in 
advance whether their witnesses will require additional time to ap-
pear, the defendant who waits until trial to request a continuance has 
been less than diligent. 
Nevertheless, if a defendant can show that he has acted in good 
faith and that his witness is likely to appear at a certain date in the 
reasonably near future, he should not be denied the opportunity to 
call the witness because the witness needs more than a short period of 
N.Y.2d 473, 478, 299 N.E.2d 664, 666-67, 346 N.Y.S.2d 245, 249-50 (1973) 
(violation of defendant's "fundamental right to present witnesses in his defense" to 
deny a continuance for witness who was "identified to the court, and is to be found 
within the jurisdiction," and who had already appeared under subpoena on a preced-
ing day of trial). 
193. The court may -take the precautionary measure of preserving the testimony of 
the state's witnesses in the meantime, in case they become unavailable to testify at a 
later trial. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 15. If it proceeds with -the trial and the witness 
does not appear after trial as predicted, then the error in denying the continuance will 
be deemed harmless. See United States v. Costa, 425 F.2d 950, 953 (2d Cir. 1969). 
But, if the witness does appear after trial and does possess material testimony in the 
defendant's favor-in accord with the information presented to the court at the 
time of the request-then the court must set aside the verdict and grant the defendant 
a new trial. Cf. United States v. Anderson, 509 F.2d 312, 324 n.84 (D.C. Cir. 
1974), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3515 (U.S. March 17, 1975) (defendant's right to a 
continuance must be determined in light of information known to trial judge at time 
of request); Foster v. State, 497 S.W.2d 291 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (defendant 
entitled to new trial if he can show after trial that his witness would have appeared 
and testified as represented in motion for continuance). 
194. See People v. Foy, 32 N.Y.2d 473, 478, 299 N.E.2d 664, 667, 346 N.Y.S.2d 
245, 249 (1973); State v. Grant, 10 Wash. App. 468, -, 519 P.2d 261, 265 (1974). 
See also Dearinger v. United States, 468 F.2d 1032, 1034-35 (9th Cir. 1,972). 
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time to make his appearance. As long as the defendant was not 
responsible for having the trial commenced in the witness' absence, he 
should not be penalized for the point in time at which he learned of 
the witness. Thus, if the defendant would have been entitled to a 
reasonable continuance before trial to enable him to secure the wit-
ness' presence, he should receive a comparable adjournment of the 
trial (including a mistrial, if necessary) if he learns of the witness 
after the trial has begun. 
The hardest case is presented if a defendant cannot show that the 
witness is likely to appear on a certain date in the reasonably near 
future, or if he can show only that the witness is likely to appear in 
the very distant future. In this situation, the court is forced to 
consider carefully how far the right to produce witnesses ultimately 
extends and whether the right eventually yields to other interests: If 
the court grants an indefinite continuance or adjournment, the de-
fendant may never be prosecuted, or, by the time he is prosecuted, 
the state's case may have been weakened irreparably. In either case, 
it is possible that the defendant's witness in fact possesses no material 
evidence. On the other hand, if the court proceeds with the trial, it 
may effectively deny the defendant the benefit of evidence that would 
eventually prove him innocent. 
The choice is not easy. It is possible, of course, to fashion an 
argument that the defendant is entitled to an indefinite continuance. 
Although the compulsory process clause does not guarantee that 
witnesses will be produced, it does guarantee the defendant the 
opportunity to attempt to have them produced. Therefore, unless a 
witness is wholly and forever unavailable, the state cannot deny the 
defendant the opportunity to produce him. Although the state has 
an interest in criminal prosecution, this interest must yield whenever 
the state suppresses exculpatory evidence.105 Accordingly, if the 
state chooses to deny the defendant the benefit of an exculpatory 
witness by denying him a continuance, it must accept the conse-
quences of its choice by dismissing the prosecution.196 
Although this argument is not untenable, it seems inconceivable 
that the courts would accept it. The question, therefore, is whether 
the ordinary decision to suppress evidence can be meaningfully distin-
guished from the denial of a continuance. Furthermore, if a mean-
ingful distinction does exist, we can examine what effect it·has on the 
scope of compulsory process. 
195. For discussion of the exculpatory evidence cases, see notes 138-39, 144, 157 
supra and accompanying text. 
196. Cf. note 139 supra, 
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One obvious difference between the denial of a continuance and 
the suppression of evidence is that the suppression cases involve a 
meaningful choice between suppression and prosecution. Where the 
state has physical control over the evidence, or the authority to 
recognize a testimonial privilege, it retains control of the prosecution: 
Although the state cannot simultaneously keep the evidence secret 
and prosecute the accused, it retains the option of being able to 
prosecute whenever it surrenders the evidence.197 In the case of 
absent witnesses, on the other hand, the state does not control the 
evidence. The most it can do (aside from dismissing the prosecution 
immediately), if the above argument is correct, is to suspend the 
prosecution indefinitely in the hope that it may be able to prosecute at 
some time in the distant future. Thus, the suppression cases do not 
reach as far as our argument. They do not stand for the proposition 
that the defendant's interest in producing exculpatory evidence out-
weighs every state interest, including its interest in criminal prosecu-
tion; rather, they stand for the proposition that the defendant's inter-
est in disclosure outweighs either the state's interest in secrecy or its 
interest in prosecution, whichever it chooses to forgo. 
Yet, the above distinction alone is probably insufficient to dispose 
of the argument that the defendant has a right to an indefinite post-
ponement. The fact remains that the defendant's interest in 
producing witnesses is sufficiently compelling to force the state to 
choose between preserving its testimonial privileges (including its 
197. See note 157 supra. The choice exists, regardless whether the evidence is 
suppressed by virtue of a so-called "government privilege" (a privilege entitling the 
prosecution or some other branch of government to suppress evidence in order to 
protect the operations of government), or by virtue of a "private privilege" (a 
privilege entitling private persons to suppress evidence in order to protect an interest 
or relationship personal to themselves). In each case, the privilege exists because the 
state has chosen to create it, and, in each case, the privilege could be abolished if the 
state chose to repeal it. See Westen, supra note 4, at 177. 
The analysis of constitutional privileges, in contrast, proceeds somewhat different-
ly. For there it is the Constitution itself that creates both the defendant's right to 
produce witnesses and the witness' privilege-such as the private privilege of persons 
against self-incrimination and the government privilege of the executive branch to 
protect its policy-making processes-to suppress the evidence. In the event of 
conflict between the defendant's right to produce a witness and the witness' constitu-
tional privilege to suppress evidence, the state is not free to repeal the privilege and 
produce the evidence. Yet, even here, the state retains ultimate control over the 
evidence. For the only constitutional privileges the courts have clearly identified to 
date are certain government privileges and the private privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. With respect to the former, the state retains control of the evidence by virtue of 
its authority to waive its privilege; with respect to the latter, the state can control the 
evidence without abridging the privilege by granting the witness testimonial immunity. 
See Westen, supra note 4, at 166-70. Thus, the state appears to retain ultimate 
control over the evidence in every criminal case unless it can be shown that 
constitutional privileges exist on behalf of private persons that cannot be satisfied by 
official grants of testimonial immunity. 
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own privilege for state secrets) and proceeding with the prosecution. 
If the defendant's interest will always outweigh one of these two 
concerns, then perhaps it is also sufficient, if not to terminate the 
prosecution, at least to postpone it until an uncertain date in the 
future when it can be permitted to proceed. 
A second, and more persuasive distinction between the suppres-
sion of evidence and the denial of a continuance is that, in the case of 
a continuance, the defendant's interest may be perceived as less 
important. When the defendant requests the production of privileged 
evidence or evidence in the prosecutor's possession, the court can 
readily determine the value of such evidence by examining it in 
camera. If the court concludes that the evidence tends to exculpate 
the defendant, it can make the evidence available at trial; if the 
evidence is not exculpatory, the court can withhold it without having 
substantially abridged the interests protected by the privilege.198 In 
the case of a continuance, on the other hand, the value of the evidence 
is necessarily speculative. A court cannot determine whether an 
absent witness really possesses material evidence; even if such deter-
minations could be made, the court would still be unable to ascertain 
whether the witness would ever be available to testify. In reality, of 
course, the absent witness may indeed possess exculpatory evidence, 
and it may some day become certain that, if the defendant had been 
198. Since most privileges are asserted against the whole world, they are necessar-
ily compromised to some extent even by restricted disclosure to a single judge in 
camera; accordingly, the defendant is not even entitled to an in camera i11spection of 
allegedly privileged information unless he can make some showing that he may be 
entitled to produce the evidence at trial. By the same token, however, since most 
privileges are also principally designed to protect against disclosure to the public at 
large, or disclosure to particular third persons, they are not substantially affected by a 
restricted disclosure in camera. Accordingly, once the defendant has shown that he 
may be entitled to produce the evidence at trial, the courts order an in camera 
inspection to determine whether the privilege has been properly asserted. See United 
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 715-16 (1974); Taglianetti v. United States, 394 U.S. 
316 (1969); Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 354 (1959). At some point, 
moreover, depending on the sufficiency of the showing and the nature of the privilege 
and the issue to be determined, the defendant has · a right to participate in the 
determination on an adversary basis, rather than relying on the court's ex parte 
determination. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 182 (1969); Dennis v. 
United States, 384 U.S. 855, 874-75 (1966). 
The only privilege that may be abridged as much by an in camera inspection as by 
public disclosure is the privilege against self-incrimination. On the one hand, one 
might argue that since the privilege protects the accused from being prosecuted on the 
basis of coerced statements, it remains intact even after the court forces the witness to 
testify in camera as long as the court is able to keep the evidence from the prosecutor. 
On the other hand, given the difficulty of convincing witnesses to trust the security of 
an in camera proceeding, we may conclude that the only way to ensure the witness' 
privilege is to guarantee him immunity in advance for anything he discloses and then 
examine him in open court. In that event, since the court is forced to grant immunity 
before knowing whether the information is truly exculpatory, the defendant may be 
required to make a greater showing of need to justify the complete disclosure. 
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granted a continuance, the witness would have appeared and testified 
in the defendant's favor. Nevertheless, at the time the court must 
decide if a continuance is merited, the defendant's interest is merely 
speculative. 
If, in fact, the courts have no constitutional obligation to grant the 
defendant an indefinite continuance because of an absent witness, or 
even a definite continuance to a date in the very distant future, it must 
be because there is a constitutional concept of "fairness" that permits 
us to resolve a defendant's rights with finality as long as the decision 
has been made rationally on the basis of the facts known. at the time. 
If we did not have this concept, we would grant the defendant an 
indefinite continuance, or, at the very least, we would set aside any 
verdict against the defendant if his witness later appeared and were 
shown to possess material evidence in his favor.199 If we are unwill-
ing to go this far, it must be because we consider it constitutionally 
fair to convict a person who may later be revealed to be innocent as 
long as we acted reasonably at the time of trial on the basis of what 
was known at that time. 200 
In summary, a defendant has a clear and nondiscretionary right to 
a continuance if he can show that he is otherwise entitled to produce 
the witness, that he has acted in good faith, and that the witness is 
reasonably likely to appear at the time to which the trial is postponed. 
199. As a nonconstitutional rule of practice, a defendant in some jurisdictions 
may obtain a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence. For example, FED. 
R. CRIM. P. 33 permits a defendant to demand a new trial within two years of his 
conviction if he can show that, through no lack of diligence on his part, he discovered 
new evidence after the trial that would "probably produce an acquittal." 2 C. 
WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 557, at 515 (1969). However, as far as 
the Constitution is concerned, a defendant has no right to demand a new trial on the 
basis of newly discovered evidence unless he can show that the prosecutor is 
responsible for the delayed discovery. See Burks v. Egeler, 512 F.2d 221, 224-30 
(6th Cir. 1975) (defendant has no constitutional right to demand new trial on basis 
of newly discovered evidence unless prosecution was responsible for failure of 
evidence to come to light earlier); SA J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 33.06[2] (2d 
ed. 1975). As one court has stated, "[l]f a new trial could be predicated as of right 
upon a codefendant's [or any witness'] change of heart after failure to take the stand 
-[at the defendant's original trial], there could always be a second chance for 
everyone." Dirring v. United States, 353 F.2d 519, 520 (1st Cir. 1965). · 
200. See cases cited in notes 115-16 supra. A similar attitude is reflected in the 
reluctance of courts to give the defendant the benefit of exculpatory evidence when it 
has been lost. See generally Comment, Judicial Response to Governmental Loss or 
Destruction of Evidence, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 542 (1972). Unless the prosecutor can 
be shown to have acted negligently or in bad faith, see note 128 supra, the defendant 
has the difficult burden of justifying dismissal on the basis of evidence the value of 
which is only speculative. In the lost-evidence situations, as with requests for 
continuances, we are willing to resolve the defendant's rights on the basis of evidence 
as it appears at the time of trial despite the possibility that the defendant might have 
been acquitted if the evidence had been preserved. See United States ex rel. Parson v. 
Anderson, 354 F. Supp. 1060, 1073-74 (D. Del. 1972), af/d., 481 F.2d 94 (3d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1072 (1973). 
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In setting a future date, moreover, while the defendant cannot de-
mand an indefinite continuance or a continuance to the very distant 
future, he is entitled to postpone the trial (and to adjourn or recom-
mence the trial if it has already commenced) to a date that will pro-
vide him with a reasonable amount of time in which to produce wit-
nesses in his favor.201 
Having defined the standard that governs the granting of continu-
ances, we can return to the question whether the defendant has a right 
to demand pretrial subpoenas returnable before trial. It should be 
clear that if, during trial, a diligent defendant discovers either the 
existence of a favorable witness or that he does not have the time 
necessary to examine subpoenaed documents, he can demand a con-
tinuance to gather the evidence together. To avoid such interrup-
tions, some courts permit the defendant to subpoena documents202 
and to depose witnesses before trial in order to compel the disclosure 
of favorable information that the defendant cannot obtain in other 
ways. 203 In effect, these pretrial procedures give the defendant the 
time before trial that he would otherwise be constitutionally entitled 
to demand in the midst of trial. 204 
201. See Shirley v. North Carolina, - F.2d - (4th Cir., Oct. 6, 1975) (defend-
ant has constitutional right to obtain a continuance for a reasonable period of time, 
including several months, if necessary to produce material witness on his behalf). Cf. 
Peterson v. United States, 344 F.2d 419, 425 (5th Cir. 1965) (defendant was 
constitutionally entitled to a continuance of several months to permit government to 
produce in person an adverse witness who was physically unable to testify at trial 
because of pregnancy, but was reasonably certain to be able to appear and testify at a 
certain date in the future following birth of the child). 
202. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 699 (1974) ("[l]n order to 
require production prior to trial [under rule 17(b)J, the moving party must show ••• 
that the party cannot properly prepare for trial without such production and inspec-
tion in advance of trial and that the failure to obtain such inspection may tend 
unreasonably to delay the trial"). 
203. See, e.g., FLA. R. CRIM. P. l.220(f); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2945.50 
(1975); TEX. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 39.04-.06 (1966), .02-.03, .07 (Supp. 1973); VT. R. 
CRIM. P. 15. The Organized Crime Control Act of 197.0, 18 U.S.C. § 3503 (1970), 
while limited to "organized crime cases," is broad enough to permit the defendant to 
take pretrial discovery depositions. See United States v. Podell, 369 F. Supp. 151 
(S.D.N.Y. 1971), modified, 493 F.2d 704, 708 (2d Cir. 1974). 
204. See cases cited in note 160 supra. The practice under the Jencks Act, 18 
U.S.C. § 3500 (1970), illustrates the trade-off between granting the defendant 
production before trial and granting a continuance during trial. The Act, which 
entitles a defendant to demand that the prosecution disclose the prior statements of its 
witnesses for his use in cross-examining them, has been interpreted to entitle a 
defendant to receive the statements in sufficient time to make effective use of them. 
See Sendejas v. United States, 428 F.2d 1040, 1046 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 
879 (1970). Yet, the Act prohibits the courts from ordering disclosure until the 
government witnesses have taken the stand and thus leaves the courts with no 
alternative for granting the defendant the time to which he is entitled except to grant 
a continuance at trial. See United States v. Leeds, 457 F.2d 857, 859 (2d Cir. 1972). 
In order to avoid the inevitable delays caused by such continuances, at least one court 
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The fact that some courts choose to allow the defendant time 
before trial to gather his evidence, however, does not mean they are 
required to do so. The defendant may have a constitutional right to 
take pretrial depositions in the rare case in which he seeks to preserve 
favorable evidence that might otherwise become unavailable for 
trial.205 In most cases, however, his right to demand sufficient time 
to marshal evidence at trial can be satisfied either by granting him 
time before trial or by granting him a trial continuance. For the time 
being, courts tend to prefer the latter alternative (particularly in 
contrast to pretrial depositions), perhaps in the belief that some of the 
defendant's evidentiary problems will wash out before trial, or per-
haps on the assumption that criminal cases can better be expedited by 
granting continuances. In any event, as long as the courts are 
willing to allow a defendant the time he needs at trial by granting him 
a continuance (or, if necessary, a mistrial), a defendant has no 
constitutional right to insist on the pretrial alternative. 
B. The Price of Subpoenas 
Every jurisdiction appears to produce at least some witnesses free 
of charge for defendants too poor to pay for them. In federal court, 
for example, the government pays the costs of serving subpoenas and 
paying witnesses for defendants who are "financially unable to pay 
the fees."206 Yet existing practices still impose a substantial burden 
on indigent defendants: some courts place an absolute ceiling on the 
number of witnesses they will produce free of charge;207 some refuse 
to produce free witnesses in the case of certain minor offenses;208 
has gone so far as to "encourage" the prosecutor to disclose the statements "voluntari-
ly" before trial. See United States v. Goldberg, 336 F. Supp. 1, 3 (E.D. Pa. 1971). 
205. See, e.g., FED. R. CruM. P. 15 (permitting the defendant to take pretrial 
depositions to preserve testimony that might otherwise become unavailable at trial). 
Furthermore, the holding in 'Evans v. Superior Ct., 11 Cal. 3d 617, 114 Cal. Rptr. 
121, 522 P.2d 681 (1974), that the defendant had a right to a line-up shortly after the 
crime where the witness' identification testimony might be tainted by subsequent 
viewings, suggests that a defendant also has a constitutional right to demand that the 
government use its coercive authority before trial to preserve evidence that might 
otherwise disappear. 
206. FED. R. CruM. P. 17(b). 
201. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1903 (1964) (limiting indigent defendants to 
fifteen witnesses). See also ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2001 (1964) (limiting indigent 
defendants to six character witnesses). 
208. See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-15-15 (1972) (providing free witnesses only 
for felonies and for misdemeanor prosecutions punishable by more than 90 days 
in jail); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1903 (1964) (providing free witnesses only for 
felony prosecutions). See also State ex rel. Morgan, 31 Utah -, 529 P.2d 800 
(1974) (juveniles charged with traffic offenses have no statutory right to produce out-
of-state witnesses free of charge). Massachusetts denied free witnesses to all 
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some refuse to produce out-of-state witnesses free of charge;200 some 
give the trial court largely unreviewable discretion to decide how 
many, if any, witnesses to produce free of charge;210 and some courts, 
while producing the witnesses at trial, require the defendant to reim-
burse the state for its costs, even if this means sending him to prison 
for failing to pay. 211 
In addition, courts use different standards of "indigency" to 
determine which defendants are too poor to pay the costs of produc-
ing witnesses: some courts produce witnesses free of charge for 
defendants too poor to retain counsel;212 some waive witness fees and 
costs for defendants who cannot pay them "without undue hard-
ship" ;213 some leave the standard of indigency undefined;214 and 
defendants except those tried for offenses punishable by death or life imprisonment 
until the practice was found to violate the compulsory process clause. Blazo v. 
Superior Ct., - Mass.-, 315 N.E.2d 857 (1974). 
209. See, e.g., State v. Mance, 7 Ariz. App. 269, -, 438 P.2d 338, 340 (1968) 
(indigent defendants have no statutory right to produce out-of-state witnesses free of 
charge); State v. Blount, 200 Ore. 35, 48-53, 264 P.2d 419, 426-27 (1953) (same); 
Annot., 44 A.L.R.2d 737, 738-39 (1955) (discussing the Uniform Act To Secure 
Witnesses, which does not provide for the production of out-of-state witnesses at 
public expense). 
210. See, e.g., United States v. Goldsby, 160 U.S. 70, 73 (1895); Crumpton v. 
United States, 138 U.S. 361 (1891); United States v. Rigdon, 459 F.2d 379, 380 (6th 
Cir. 1972); Reistroffer v. United States, 258 F.2d 379, 396 (8th Cir. 1958), cert. 
denied, 358 U.S. 927 (1959); Burgman v. United States, 188 F.2d 637, 641 (D.C. 
Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 838 (1951); People v. Cavanaugh, 69 Cal. 2d 262, 266-
67, 444 P.2d 110, 113, 70 Cal. Rptr. 438-41 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 981 
(1969); People v. Morris, 12 Mich. App. 411, 163 N.W.2d 16 (1968); State v. Smith, 
1 Ore. App. 153, -, 458 P.2d 687, 689-90 (1969). 
211. New Jersey, for example, provides for the imprisonment of indigents who are 
unable to reimburse the state for the costs of an unsuccessful defense, including the 
costs of producing witnesses. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 22A:3-4, :3-6 (1969), as amended, 
(Supp. 1975). See Casenote, 2 SETON HALL L. REV. 504, 520-23 (1971). It is 
questionable, however, whether the New Jersey practice is constitutional if it denies 
defendants (as public debtors) the exemptions they would otherwise enjoy as private 
debtors. See James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972). Compare Fuller v. Oregon, 
417 U.S. 40 (1974) (upholding a reimbursement statute that does not discriminate 
between public and private debtors, and that requires reimbursement, including 
imprisonment, from those able to pay without "manifest hardship"). It is also 
questionable whether the state may imprison a defendant for failing to repay the costs 
of his defense if he is unable to pay a lump sum but can pay in installments. Cf. 
Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971). 
212. See, e.g., Aus. R. CRIM. P. 17(b), 39(b); Miss. CoDE ANN. § 99-15-15 
(1972). Some jurisdictions produce a certain number of witnesses free of charge for 
all defendants regardless of their ability to pay. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2001 
(1964) (providing six free witnesses for all misdemeanor defendants and twelve free 
witnesses for all felony defendants); LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 738 (West 1966) 
(same). 
213. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 41-22-2 (1953). 
214. See, e.g., ALA. CooE tit. 15, § 318(1)-318(11) (Supp. 1973) ("indigency"): 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 914.11 (1973) (''unable to pay"); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 453.190 
(1973) ("poor person"). FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(b), which formerly required a 
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some courts produce witnesses free of charge only for defendants who 
have no property worth more than $50 or other property beyond their 
wearing apparel. 215 
Standards also vary with respect to the showing a defendant must 
make in order to have witnesses produced free of charge: some courts 
produce some witnesses free of charge without requiring the defend-
ant to show any need for them;216 other courts require the defendant 
to demonstrate that the witnesses are "material and necessary for the 
defense,"217 or that "such facts [for which he seeks the witnesses] 
cannot be adequately established by the witnesses for whom he has 
had subpoenas issued";218 some courts go still further and require the 
defendant to show that he "cannot safely go to trial without the 
witness. "219 
The constitutional problems in this area are threefold: first, to 
determine whether the compulsory process clause bears on the issue 
of the production of witnesses free of charge; second, if the clause 
does apply to this issue, to define the constitutional standard that 
determines whether witnesses must be produced free of charge; and, 
third, to apply this standard to the practices enumerated above in 
order to determine their validity. 
The Supreme Court has never directly decided whether the com-
pulsory process clause entitles a defendant to have witnesses produced 
defendant to show that he was "indigent," was amended in 1966 to permit a defendant 
to show that he is "financially unable to pay the fees of witnesses." 
215. See, e.g., Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 546.860, 551.020 (1953) ('The property, real 
and personal, of any person charged with a criminal offense [wearing apparel for 
himself and family excepted], shall be bound from the time of his final conviction of 
such offense, for payment of all fines and costs which he may be adjudged to pay"); 
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 23-23, -24 (1965) ($50); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1292 (1964) 
("insolvent"). Cf. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 180-6 (1973) ("no estate wherewith to 
pay such ..• costs"). The validity of these provisions may have to be re-examined 
in light of James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972). 
216. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 43-2001, -2002 (1964) (automatically provid-
ing six free witnesses for misdemeanor defendants and twelve free witnesses for 
felony defendants, with additional free witnesses to be justified by a showing of 
need); LA. CoDECRIM. P. arts. 738-39 (West 1966) (same). 
217. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN.§ 781.2 (Supp. 1975). See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 
17 (b) ("The court shall order at any time that a subpoena be issued . . • upon • . . a 
satisfactory showing • • • that the presence of the witness is necessary to an adequate 
defense"). Until 1966, rule 17(b), 18 U.S.C. app. (1964), required a defendant to 
show that "the evidence of the witness is material to the defense [and] that the de-
fendant cannot safely go to trial without the witness." The rule was amended in 
1966 to facilitate the defendant's showing of materiality. See 1 C. WRIGHT, supra 
note 199, § 272, at 540-41; Note, Compulsory Process in Federal Courts Under Rule 
17, 13 How. L.J. 155 (1967). 
218. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2002 (1964). 
219. See, e.g., CoLO. R. CRIM. P. 17(b). This was the original standard under 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(b) until it was amended in 1966. See note 217 supra. 
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free of charge. However, the Court did once express the view (in 
dictum) that the sixth amendment merely secured those rights that 
the ancient common law had denied the defendant and created no 
obligation that such rights be secured at the government's expense. 220 
Accordingly, some courts have held that the compulsory process 
clause does not place any specific obligation on the government to 
pay the costs of producing witnesses. 221 The conventional wisdom, as 
expressed by Wigmore, supports the same conclusion: If the compul-
sory process clause merely extends to the accused the benefits of 
process already granted by law to the prosecutor and to parties in civil 
cases, then the defendant is entitled to obtain witnesses free of charge 
only if such other parties can obtain them at no charge. 222 
The trouble with these views is that they both depart from the 
treatment of indigents in other areas of the law, 223 and rest upon 
assumptions that were repudiated in Washington v. Texas. By invali-
dating a rule of competency that was well-established in 1791, the 
Court in Washington rejected the historical view of the compulsory 
process clause. Rather than assuming that the framers intended to 
codify the common law of witnesses in all its specific detail, the Court 
implicitly held that the compulsory process clause (like other clauses 
of the sixth amendment) was designed to embody a fundamental 
principle: the defendant must be allowed to defend himself through 
the production of witnesses. In construing the clause, therefore, we 
must put aside the historical reports and analyze the particular issue 
in light of the framers' general intent to guarantee a defendant the 
right to produce and present witnesses in his favor.224 
220. United States v. Van Duzee, 140 U.S. 169, 173 (1891) ("The object of the 
constitutional provision was merely to secure those rights which by the ancient rules 
of the common law had been denied to [defendants]; but it was not contemplated that 
this should be done at the expense of the government"). 
221. See Brewer v. Hunter, 163 F.2d 341 (10th Cir. 1947); Wallace v. Hunter, 
149 F.2d 59 (10th Cir. 1945); Casbeer v. Hudspeth, 121 F.2d 914, 916 (10th Cir. 
1941); Brodkowicz v. Swenson, 357 F. Supp. 178, 184 (W.D. Mo. 1973); Hughes v. 
State, 228 Ga. 593, 597, 187 S.E.2d 135, 138 (1972). See also authorities cited in 
Orfield, Subpoena in Federal Criminal Procedure, 13 ALA. L. REV. 1, 24 n.102 
(1960). 
222. See 8 J. WrGMORE., EVIDENCE. § 2192, at 69-70 (J. McNaughton rev. 1961). 
223. In a series of cases beginning with Powell v. Alabama, 297 U.S. 45 (1932), 
it has been held that defendants in criminal cases are entitled to sixth amendment 
protection despite their inability to pay. These cases have involved the right to 
counsel, Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), the right to a speedy trial, Smith 
v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 380 n.11 (1968), and the right to confront witnesses, United 
States v. Edwards, 469 P.2d 1362, 1369 (5th Cir. 1972). 
224. For a discussion of the Court's use of history in Washington, see Westen, 
supra note 4, at 113-15, 119-20. Similarly, the Court has held that the sixth 
amendment right to jury trial was intended to incorporate only the most basic 
principle of a trial by the community and not to freeze into constitutional form all the 
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Washington also repudiated Wigmore's second basic tenet-
namely, that even in areas where the clause presumptively applies, it 
merely extends to the defendant the benefits of process already availa-
ble to the prosecution and to civil parties under local law. As 
previously noted, Wigmore believed that the compulsory process 
clause has no bearing on the competence of the defendant's 
witnesses-that whether persons are "witnesses in his favor," within 
the latter part of the clause, is not a federal question at all, but rather 
a question governed entirely by local law.225 As we have seen, this 
view was explicitly rejected in Washing ton. 226 In addition, Wigmore 
believed that, in areas where it does apply, the clause merely oper-
ates to equalize for the defendant the benefits of process already ex-
tended to others under local law. Thus, in his view, whether the de-
fendant has a claim of "compulsory process" within the first part of 
the clause may initially be a federal question to be resolved by consti-
tutional standards, but, since the clause does not require anything 
more than "equality" of treatment, the standard is satisfied simply by 
showing that the defendant has received the same benefits as are 
routinely available to the prosecution and to parties in civil cases. 227 
Wigmore's conception of the compulsory process clause as a mere 
guarantee of equality was implicitly rejected in Washington. There 
the Court was presented with a local rule of evidence that prohibited 
the defendant from calling certain persons as witnesses in his favor, 
yet permitted the prosecution to call the very same persons as wit-
nesses against him. If equality were all that the sixth amendment re-
quired, the rule would have been invalid for its unequal treatment of 
the prosecution and the defense in the production of witnesses. In-
deed, in his separate opinion, Justice Harlan urged the Court to base 
its decision on a finding of "discrimination between the prosecution 
and the defense in the ability to call the same person as a witness,"228 
and to refrain from deciding whether such a rule would be invalid if 
extended to both the prosecution and the defense. 229 The Court 
rejected Justice Harlan's suggestion. If Harlan were right, and equal 
treatment were all the sixth amendment required, the defendant 
could be arbitrarily denied witnesses in his favor simply by showing 
particular aspects of the jury as it existed in 1791. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 
78, 92, 99-100 (1970). For a similar view of the seventh amendment right to jury 
trial, see Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 155-57 (1973); Galloway v. United States, 
319 U.S. 372, 392 (1943). 
225. See note 26 supra. 
226. See text at notes 17-19, 27-28 supra. 
227. See 8 J. WJGMORE, EVIDENCE§ 2191 (J. McNaughton rev. 1961). 
228. 388 U.S. at 24 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
229. 388 U.S. at 2S. 
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that the same arbitrary limitations also applied to the prosecution. 
Yet, as the Court recognized, the defect in the Texas rule was not 
that it was discriminatory but that it was arbitrary-that is, that it im-
posed an unnecessary burden on the defendant's right to produce 
witnesses in his favor. Thus, even if the Texas rule were extended 
to apply equally to the prosecution, it would still be invalid for arbi-
trarily denying the defendant the benefit of favorable witnesses. 230 
Thus, reasoning from Washington, whether an indigent defendant 
is entitled to compulsory process free of charge should depend neither 
on the scope of the common law of 1791, nor on the relative benefits 
of process enjoyed by the prosecution and civil parties. Rather, the 
issue should be resolved by focusing on the framers' intent that a 
defendant have the general means to produce witnesses in his favor 
regardless of how other parties might be treated under the laws of 
evidence as defined by Congress or fashioned by the federal courts. 231 
230. For further discussion of the implications of construing the defendant's right 
to produce witnesses as independent of the particular opportunities available to the 
prosecution, see Westen, supra note 4, at 177-82. This "independent" construction of 
the clause is consistent with historical evidence. The framers of the sixth amendment 
implicitly refrained from limiting the defendant's rights to the benefits available to the 
prosecution. The New Jersey Constitution of 1776 was formulated in such a fashion 
and guaranteed that "all criminals shall be admitted to the same privileges of 
witnesses and counsel, as their prosecutors are or shall be entitled to." N.J. CoNsl', 
art. XVI (1776), in 1 B. ScHwARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 
260 (1971) (emphasis added). This New Jersey provision, along with the other 
colonial bills of rights, was before James Madison when he drafted the sixth 
amendment. See J. GOEBEL, ANTEcE.DENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 427-28 
(1971), Vol. 1 of HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF nm UNITED STATES (The 
Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise, P. Freund ed.); R. RUTLAND, THE Bmm OF nm BILL 
OF Rimrrs 1776-1791, at 202 (1955); 2 B. ScHWARTZ, supra, at 1008. Indeed, the 
same Congress that adopted the Bill of Rights in 1789 later enacted a statute in 1790 
guaranteeing the accused "the like process of the court to compel his witnesses to 
appear at his trial, as is usually granted to compel witnesses to appear on behalf of 
the prosecution against him." Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 29, 1 Stat. 119, as 
amended, 18 U.S.C. § 3005 (1970) (emphasis added). Thus, the framers of the 
compulsory process clause certainly knew how to formulate the clause on a principle 
of equality and, presumably, would have done so if they had so desired. We can 
assume, therefore, that in refraining from doing so they intended that the defendant's 
right to produce witnesses in his favor be independent of the particular opportunities 
available to the prosecution in producing its witnesses. 
231. See note 230 supra. In constitutionalizing the defendant's right to produce 
witnesses, the framers intended to safeguard the defendant's interests against actions 
by the federal government-that is, against federal laws of evidence, fashioned by 
Congress and by the federal courts-that might abridge his interests, Cf. Barron v. 
Mayor & City Council, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (Bill of Rights applies only to 
actions by federal government, not to states or their subdivisions). Nevertheless, in 
the particular area of criminal evidence, it is not unfair to say that the framers of the 
Bill of Rights were also concerned about the effect of the states' "local" rules of 
evidence. For, shortly before Congress adopted the Bill of Rights in the fall of 1789, 
it enacted the Judiciary Act of 1789, Act of Sept. 24, 1789, 1 Stat. 73, which directed 
the federal courts in criminal cases to apply the Jaws of evidence of the various states 
where they presided. See United States v. Reid, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 361 (1851), 
Thus, by the time they adopted the sixth amendment, the framers in Congress 
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We can begin to define the ramifications of the defendant's 
general right to have the means to produce witnesses in his favor by 
examining the Supreme Court's treatment of indigent defendants in 
other areas of criminal procedure. The Court has long held that the 
sixth amendment right ,to counsel is so fundamental to a fair trial that 
a defendant who cannot afford counsel must be appointed counsel 
free of charge. 232 Furthermore, the Court has held that, although a 
defendant has no explicit right to an appeal, once appellate review 
becomes "an integral part of the . . . system for finally adjudicating 
the guilt or innocence of a defendant,"233 an indigent defendant is 
entitled to free counsel, a free trial triµiscript (or its equivalent), and 
a waiver of filing fees, whenever necessary to ensure "adequate and 
effective appellate review."284 
At ,the very least, these cases stand for the proposition that the 
criminal defendant cannot be denied a fair determination of guilt or 
innocence because he is too poor to pay for "the basic tools of an 
adequate defense."235 The Constitution does not guarantee indigents 
"absolute equality or precisely equal advantages,"236 but it does re-
quire "that indigents have_ an adequate opportunity to present their 
claims fairly within the adversarial system."237 Applying this stan-
dard to the trial stage of the criminal proceeding, the right to produce 
assumed that there would be no separate federal law of evidence. It is thus fair to 
say that the framers of the sixth amendment were genuinely concerned with the effect 
of state rules of evidence on the defendant's right to produce witnesses-at least until 
the federal government might begin to fashion independent rules of -evidence of its 
own. 
232. The Court first held in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), that the 
right to a fair trial under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment includes 
the right to appointed counsel in certain cases. It has since held that the sixth 
amendment right to counsel includes the right to appointed counsel for indigent 
defendants in all felony prosecutions, Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), and in 
all criminal proceedings resulting in imprisonment, Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 
25 (1972). 
233. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956) (opinion of Black, J.). 
234. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20 (1956). See Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 
189, 195 (1971) (free transcript or alternative to a transcript on appeal); Britt v. 
North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 230 (1971) (free transcript or some alternative 
"substantially equivalent to a transcript"); Long v. District Ct., 385 U.S. 192 (1966) 
(free transcript for post-conviction relief); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 ( 1963) (free 
transcript for appeal from denial of post-conviction relief); Douglas v. California, 
372 U.S. 353 ( 1963) (free counsel to assist in preparing a motion for leave to ap-
peal); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961) (waiver of filing fee for post-conviction 
relief); Bums v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959) (waiver of filing fee for second-level 
appeal); Eskridge v. Washington Prison Bd., 357 U.S. 214 (1958) (free transcript 
on appeal). 
235. Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227 (1971). 
236. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 612 (1974); quoting San Antonio Independent 
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 24 (1973). 
237. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 612 (1974). 
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witnesses would seem equally as fundamental to the presentation of 
the defendant's claims within the adversarial system as is the right to 
counsel. First, because the right to produce witnesses has its impact 
at the trial stage, the ability to exercise this right is "integral" to the 
determination of guilt or innocence: "The purpose of the trial stage 
from the State's point of view is to convert . . . a person presumed to 
be innocent to one found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."238 
Second, the right to produce witnesses and the right to counsel have 
generally been treated as equally essential in safeguarding the defend-
ant's ability to receive a fair trial: both are specifically enumerated in 
the sixth amendment, both apply to the states through the fourteenth 
amendment as "fundamental" elements of due process,230 and both 
apply in felony and misdemeanor proceedings alike. 240 In short, 
"[f]ew rights are more fundamental than that of an accused to 
present witnesses in his own defense."241 
Nevertheless, two arguments might be advanced to distinguish the 
right" to free counsel from the right to free subpoenas. First, it is 
arguable that, because the expense of producing witnesses is less than 
the cost of retaining counsel, it is not unfair for the state to place the 
cost of producing witnesses upon the defense. Second, it is also 
arguable that, because the danger of frivolous requests for witnesses is 
much greater than the danger of frivolous requests for counsel, the 
state can use the imposition of witness fees as a device for deterring 
vexatious requests. 
Neither of these arguments, however, can withstand analysis. The 
first argument is initially undercut by the fact that the cost of produc-
ing witnesses can be quite substantial. Although most jurisdictions 
238. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610 (1974). 
239. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 
U.S. 335, 341-44 (1963). 
240. In Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), the Court, in determining the 
extent of the right to counsel, assumed that the rights of compulsory process apply in 
aU criminal proceedings: 
The Sixth Amendment . . • provides specified standards for "all criminal 
prosecutions." 
One is the requirement of a "public trial." ... 
. . . And another, compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in one's 
favor. . . . We have never limited these rights to felonies or to lesser but 
serious offenses. 
. . . Respecting the right to . . . compulsory process for obtaining witnesses, 
it was recently stated, "It is simply not arguable, nor has any court ever held, 
. . . that [in] the trial of a petty offense . . . the defendant has no right to 
confront his accusers or to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own 
behalf." 
407 U.S. at 27-28. See also Bridwell v. Aderhold, 13 F. Supp. 253, 254 (N.D. Ga. 
1935 ), affd., 92 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1937), revd. on other grounds sub nom. Johnson 
v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). 
241. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973). 
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charge a rather small fee (if any at all) for issuing the subpoena 
itself, the cost of serving the subpoena and the expense of witness fees 
can be considerable. In the federal courts, for example, it costs $2 to 
serve a subpoena through the marshal's office, and 10¢ per mile and 
$20 per day to pay for a witness. 242 If a witness comes from out of 
state, the witness fees alone can amount to many hundreds of dol-
lars. 243 If a defendant wishes to produce an expert witness, more-
over, he may have to pay for the witness' time at prevailing profes-
sional rates. Hence the cost of producing witnesses can easily equal 
the cost of retaining counsel. 
Even if the cost of producing the witnesses were minor, however, 
that factor would not distinguish it from the other services to which 
an indigent defendant is constitutionally entitled. Appellate review, 
for example, cannot be conditioned on a filing fee of even $4 if the 
defendant is financially unable to pay. 244 The controlling factor is 
not the absolute cost of the particular service but the financial ability 
of the defendant in relation to the cost of the particular defense 
service.245 Thus, a defendant is riot necessarily indigent in all cir-
cumstances: If a defendant has sufficient funds to hire a lawyer, yet 
insufficient funds to subpoena witnesses, he may be required to retain 
counsel but not to pay for witnesses. Similarly, if a defendant has 
funds to subpoena only one witness, it would be consistent with the 
concept of indigency to require him to pay for one witness but not for 
any others he may wish to produce. 246 
242. 28 U.S.C. § 1921 (1970) ($2 for serving a witness); 28 U.S.C.A. § 1821 
(Supp. 1975) ($20 per day, plus 10¢ per mile for a witness, plus $16 for necessary 
overnights away from home). Some federal courts appear to charge from 25¢ to $1 
as a clerk's fee for issuance of the subpoena itself. See Tobin, The Foreign 
Subpoena: A Proposal for Improvement, 62 GEO. LJ. 1531, 1541-47 (1974). In 
Michigan, no fee is charged for issuing the subpoena, MICH. COMP. LAws § 767.32 
(1970); service of the subpoena through the constable costs 15¢ per witness plus 
15¢ per mile, MICH. COMP. LAws § 775.3 (1970); and the witness fee is $12 per 
day plus 10¢ per mile, MICH. COMP. LAws § 775.13 (1970). 
243. See, e.g., United States v. Hathcock, 441 F.2d 197, 198 (5th Cir. L971) 
($800 to produce a single witness from federal prison); Smiloff v. State, 439 P.2d 
772, 775 n.12 (Alas. 1968) ($2000 to produce five witnesses for the defense); State 
v. Blount, 200 Ore. 35, 40, 264 P.2d 419, 422 (1953) ($200 to produce an out-of-state 
witness). 
244. See Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961). See also Bums v. Ohio, 360 
U.S. 252 (1959) (appellate filing fee of $20 invalid as applied to an indigent who 
cannot pay). 
245. "Indigence 'must be conceived as a relative concept An impoverished 
accused is not necessarily one totally devoid of means.' . . . An accused must be 
deemed indigent when 'at any stage of the proceedings [his] lack of means . . • 
substantially inhibits or prevents the proper assertion of a [particular] right or a 
claim of right'" Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277, 289 n.7 -(1964) (Goldberg, 
J., concurring). 
246. See Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277 (1964) ("Indigence must be 
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The second argument-that the state can use witness fees as a 
device for screening frivolous requests for subpoenas-is also unsup-
portable. The Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the use of fees 
as a screening device in related contexts, such as the use of filing fees 
to deter frivolous election candidates, frivolous litigation, or frivolous 
appeals.247 The defect in using witness fees in this manner, as with 
other fees, is that they are "too crude": they have no deterrent effect 
on wealthy defendants who are able to purchase as many frivolous 
subpoenas as they wish, yet they totally preclude indigent defendants 
from producing even the most vital witnesses. 248 If the state wishes 
to screen frivolous subpoenas, therefore, it must use alternative means 
that have a less drastic impact on the defendant's right to produce 
witnesses, such as requirements that the witnesses be shown to be 
material,249 professional sanctions against the defendant's lawyer,2 G0 
recoupment provisions, 251 or "penalties for false . . . affidavits, and 
actions for ... abuse of process, to mention only a few."252 
To return now to our first problem, the defendant who is unable 
to pay costs and fees for producing witnesses surely has a constitu-
tional right, at least under some circumstances, to have them 
produced free of charge. The second problem, then, is to define the 
defined with reference to the particular right asserted. Thus, the fact that a 
defendant may be able to muster enough resources . . . to obtain bail does not in 
itself establish his nonindigence for the purpose of purchasing a complete trial 
transcript or retaining a lawyer"). Similarly, while a defendant who is able to pay 
for only a portion of a particular service cannot be required to pay for it all, he can 
be required to pay what he can afford. See the discussion of partial payment under 
the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3006A(c) (1967), as amended, (Supp. 
1975), in Oaks, The Criminal Justice Act in the Federal District Courts-A Summa-
ry and Postscript, 1 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 210, 213-14 (1969). 
247. See Lublin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 716-17 (1974) (election candidates); 
Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 145-46 (1972) (election candidates); Boddie v. 
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 381-82 (1971) (trial court filing fee); Lindsey v. Normet, 
405 U.S. 56, 78 (1972) (appellate court filing fee); Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 
487, 495 n.4 (1963) (appellate transcripts). 
248. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 78 (1972); Michelman, The Supreme 
Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right To Protect One's Rights-Part II, 1974 
DUKE LJ. 527, 559. 
249. See Blazo v. Superior Ct., - Mass. -, -, 315 N.E.2d 857, 860 (1974) 
(witness fees held unconstitutional, as unnecessary abridgement of defendant's right 
to produce witnesses, because state's interest in avoiding frivolous requests can be 
served by showing of materiality). For a discussion of the doctrine of less drastic 
means as applied to access fees, see Brickman, Of Arterial Passageways Through the 
Legal Process: The Right of Universal Access to Courts and Lawyering Services, 48 
N.Y.U. L. REv. 595,639 (1973). 
250. Chief Justice Burger has suggested, in connection with the provision of free 
transcripts on appeal, that the defense lawyer is responsible for ensuring that the 
appeal is not frivolous. Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 201 (1971) (concurring). 
251. See Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40 (1974). 
252. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S.371, 381-82 (1971). 
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constitutional standard that determines the circumstances in which 
this right can be exercised. Here again the lower courts are divided: 
some courts hold that an indigent defendant has an absolute right to 
subpoena any witness, free of charge, who is material to his de-
fense;253 other courts hold that the trial court has discretion to decide 
how many, if any, subpoenas to issue at the state's expense. 2114 
The use of the standard of discretion is no more justified here 
than it is in the area of continuances. 255 Courts probably tend to rely 
on discretion as the standard because they recognize that a request to 
have witnesses produced at no charge (like a request for a continu-
ance) should not be granted in every case, and because they realize 
(as in the case of continuances) that various factors enter into the 
decision to grant the defendant's request. However, those features do 
not justify making constitutional rights depend on a trial judge's 
unmeasured discretion, especially where the various factors entering 
into the proper exercise of discretion can be more precisely identified 
and weighed. 
It is possible to identify and evaluate the controlling elements of 
the decision to produce a defendant's witnesses free of charge. Ini-
tially, a defendant can be required to show that he is "unable to 
pay"2Go for the witnesses. 257 Unfortunately, because the Supreme 
253. See, e.g., Preston v. Blackledge, 332 F. Supp. (i81, 684 (E.D.N.C. 1971); 
People v. Watson, 36 Ill. 2d 228, 221 N.E.2d 645 (1966) (expert witness); Blazo v. 
Superior Ct., - Mass.-, 315 N.E.2d 857 (1974); State ex rel. Plummer v. Gideon, 
119 Mo. 94, 99, 24 S.W. 748, 749 (1893) (violation of state compulsory process 
rights to "let a few paltry dollars outweigh the life or liberty of the citizen"). Cf. 
Davis v. Coiner, 356 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. W. Va. 1973) (violation of equal protection 
and right to counsel to deny indigent defendant funds to permit his attorney to take 
deposition of out-of-state witness); Wells v. McCullock, 13 Ill. 606, 607 (1852) 
(violation of state right to compulsory process to require any acquitted defendant, 
rich or poor, to pay for witnesses in advance). Following similar reasoning, 
similar limitations on other sixth amendment rights have also been rejected. See 
Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 380 n.11 (1968) (defendant's right to speedy trial 
cannot be made to depend on expense of producing him for trial); United States v. 
Edwards, 469 F.2d 1362, 1369 (5th Cir. 1972) (defendant's right of confrontation 
cannot be made to depend on cost of producing adverse witnesses). 
254. See, e.g., United States v. Linn, 460 F.2d 1274, 1276 (10th Cir. 1972); 
Taylor v. United States, 329 F.2d 384, 386 (5th Cir. 1964); Feguer v. United States, 
320 F.2d 214, 241 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 872 (1962); Murdock v. United 
States 283 F.2d 585, 587 (10th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 953 (1961); 
Neufield v. United States, 118 F.2d 375, 385 (D.C. Cir. 1941); United States v. 
McGaha, 205 F. Supp. 949, 951 (E.D. Tenn. 1962). See generally text at notes 162-
201 supra. 
255. See generally text at notes l(i2-201 supra. 
256. "Surely no one would contend that either a State or the Federal Government 
could constitutionally provide that defendants unable to pay court costs in advance 
should be denied the right to plead not guilty or to defend themselves in court." 
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 (1956) (opinion of Black, J.) (emphasis added). 
257. See United States v. Spouse, 472 F.2d 1167 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 
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Court has never defined a constitutional test for indigency, 2118 the 
lower courts have reached no consensus about when a defendant is 
"unable to pay." Thus, some courts have required a defendant to 
show that he is completely destitute, while other courts have required 
a defendant to show that he cannot pay "without undue hardship."2110 
It seems likely, however, that in setting out a constitutional test for 
indigency the Supreme Court would not require a defendant to prove 
himself "wholly destitute"; rather, the test would probably be 
whether he could pay for the requested service "and still be able to 
provide himself and dependents with the necessities of life."200 If 
that, indeed, is the test, any stricter definition of indigency is uncon-
stitutional and cannot be applied to deny a defendant the opportunity 
to produce witnesses in his favor.261 
A defendant can also be required .to show that his request is 
nonfrivolous. Again, courts differ about the kind of showing re-
quired of a defendant: some courts require a defendant to show that 
his witnesses are necessary to his defense;262 others require him to 
show that he "cannot safely go to trial without the witness."208 Yet 
here, in contrast to indigency, we have an objective standard of 
comparison-namely, the kind of showing that a nonindigent defend-
ant is required to make in order to obtain a continuance or :to resist a 
motion to quash. In those cases, a nonindigent defendant is not 
required to show that his witnesses are "necessary"; it is sufficient for 
him to show that they are material to his defense-that is, that their 
testimony could reasonably affect the judgment of the jury.204 
In order to have his witnesses produced, the indigent defendant 
should not be required to make any greater showing of materiality 
970 (1973) (defendants have no right to demand free subpoenas unless they mako 
some showing of indigency); People v. Virella, 55 Ill. 2d 192,302 N.E.2d 327 (1973) 
(nonindigent defendants have no constitutional right to produce witnesses free of 
cost). 
258. See Duke, The Right to Appointed Counsel: Argersinger and Beyond, 12 
.AM. CRIM. L. REV. 601, 625 (1975); Comment, The Definition of Indigency: A 
Modern-Day Legal Jabberwocky, 4 Sr. MARY'S L.J. 34 (1972). 
259. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-22-2 (1953 ). 
260. Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948) 
(construing an earlier version of what is now 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1970) excusing 
persons from paying court costs who are "unable to pay"). See J. IsRABL & W. 
LAF'AVB, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN A NlITSHBLL 344-45 (1971). See also Duke, supra 
note 258, at 628-31. 
261. See, e.g., Anaya v. Baker, 427 F.2d 73, 75 (10th Cir. 1970) (reversing a 
state conviction on ground that, by requiring defendant to be a "pauper" to qualify for 
appointed counsel, state court had applied too rigid a standard). 
262. See authorities cited in note 217 supra. 
263. See authorities cited in note 219 supra. 
264. See text at notes 98-105 supra. 
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than -the nonindigent defendant. In Coppedge v. United States, 2M 
the Supreme Court was asked to decide what kind of showing an 
indigent must make in order to appeal in forma pauperis. The 
government argued that the defendant should be required to show 
that, if permitted to appeal, he would be "likely" to prevail on the 
merits. The Court rejected this argument and held (in what can be 
interpreted as a constitutionally based decision) that an indigent 
defendant cannot be required to make a pre-appeal showing of merit 
that would be more rigorous than the showing a nonindigent defend-
ant must make to avoid a summary dismissal. 266 Thus, the govern-
ment cannot deny an indigent defendant the right to proceed with the 
briefing of his appeal unless it is able to demonstrate that his appeal 
"is so lacking in merit that the court would dismiss the case on motion 
of the Government, if the case had been docketed and record been 
filed by an appellant able to afford the expense . . . ."267 
The same reasoning should apply to an indigent's right to produce 
witnesses. If a nonindigent defendant is permitted to subpoena and 
present witnesses by showing that their testimony could reasonably 
affect the judgment of the jury, an indigent defendant should not be 
required .to make any greater showing; rather, the same standard of 
materiality should govern both requests. Thus, unless the state can 
demonstrate that the prevailing standard of materiality entirely fails to 
screen frivolous requests for free witnesses, an indigent defendant is 
entitled to proceed under that standard; requiring him to meet a more 
rigorous standard would be invalid as an unnecessary burden upon 
his right to produce witnesses.268 
It has been suggested, however, that treating the requests for 
process of indigent and nonindigent defendants on an equal basis 
would obligate the court to produce witnesses at no charge upon :the 
mere demand of indigent defendants. The argument is that, as long 
265. 369 U.S. 438 (1962). 
266. The Court emphasized that its construction of the statute was impelled by 
the constitutional considerations underlying Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
See 369 U.S. at 446-47 & n.13. Since then, the Court has treated Coppedge as if it 
were a constitutional decision. See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 119 n.76 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Lindsey v. 
Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 77 (1973); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 388 (1971) 
(Brennan, J., concurring). 
267. 369 U.S. at 448 (footnote omitted). 
268. See text at notes 294-95 infra. Cf. Welsh v. United States, 404 F.2d 414, 
417 (5th Cir. 1968) (",[A]s between those financially able and those financially 
unable to pay the fees of witnesses, there should be no more discrimination than is 
necessary to protect against the abuse of process"); Greenwell v. United States, 317 
F.2d 108, 110 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (indigent cannot be required to make any 
showing of materiality more rigorous than "necessary" to serve state's interest in 
screening frivolous requests for witnesses). 
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as nonindigent defendants are issued subpoenas automatically upon 
demand (as is the case in federal court), an indigent defendant would 
also be entitled :to demand subpoenas without a prior showing of 
materiality."269 This suggestion is unsound for several reasons. To 
begin with, although some courts do issue subpoenas to nonindigent 
defendants upon request, a witness can always move to quash a 
subpoena in advance of trial by showing that his testimony is imma-
terial. 270 Moreover, even if a witness appears and :testifies, the 
prosecution can always move to strike his testimony from the 
record.271 In each case, in order to defeat the motion, the nonindi-
gent defendant must make precisely the same showing of materiality 
that :the indigent defendant would have been required to make in 
order to have the witness produced. 
Furthermore, as the courts have repeatedly held, the fact that a 
rich defendant is permitted to "waste his money on unnecessary and 
foolish trial steps . . . does not . . . give .the indigent the right to 
squantler government funds merely for the asking."272 As far as the 
compulsory process clause is concerned, every defendant, rich or 
poor, could be required to make a prior showing of materiality as a 
condition for obtaining subpoenas. 273 The fact that some defendants 
are permitted to waste their money on immaterial witnesses is irrele-
vant unless the indigent defendant can show that the difference in 
treatment places him at a constitutionally significant disadvantage. 
Yet, by definition, neither he nor any other defendant has a constitu-
tional interest in producing witnesses whose testimony could not 
reasonably affect the judgment of the jury.274 
269. See Greenwell v. United States, 317 F.2d 108, 110 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1963). 
But see Slawek v. United States, 413 F.2d 957, 960 (8th Cir. 1969). 
270. See, e.g., May v. United States, 175 F.2d 994, 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert. 
denied, 338 U.S. 830 (1949); United States v. Seeger, 180 F. Supp. 467 (S.D.N.Y. 
1960); Bacon v. State, 215 Tenn. 268, 385 S.W.2d 107 (1964). Cf. Whittlesey v. 
United States, 221 A.2d 86, 89-90 (D.C. App. 1966). 
271. See People v. Cavanaugh, 69 Cal. 2d 262, 267-70, 444 P.2d 110, 115, 70 Cal. 
Rptr. 438,443 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 981 (1969). 
272. Slawek v. United States, 413 F.2d 957, 960 (8th Cir. 1969). See also Blazo 
v. Superior Ct., - Mass.-, 315 N.E.2d 857, 860 (1974). Cf. Draper v. Washing-
ton, 372 U.S. 487, 496 (1963) ("[T]he fact that an appellant with funds may choose 
to waste his money by unnecessarily including in the record all of the transcript does 
not mean that the State must waste its funds by providing what is unnecessary for 
adequate appellate review"). · 
273. "Even where the defendant is not proceeding in forma pauperis, the court 
may refuse to permit the issuance of subpoenas which it appears may be an abuse of 
process, until it has been informed what may be expected of the prospective witness." 
United States v. Kinzer, 98 F. Supp. 6, 9 (D.D.C. 1951). See also Bacon v. State, 
215 Tenn. 268, 385 S.W.2d 107 (1964). 
274. It is a separate question whether an indigent defendant suffers constitutional 
prejudice by being forced to make the showing in the presence of the prosecutor or in 
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The third problem now falls into place. We have concluded that 
every indigent defendant has a constitutional right to produce wit-
nesses free of charge if he can show (1) that he is "unable to pay," 
within the meaning of the constitutional test, and (2) that his wit-
nesses could reasonably affect the judgment of the jury. If a defend-
ant makes this showing, he is entitled to obtain subpoenas not as a 
matter of discretion, but as a matter of right. Accordingly, once a 
defendant has demonstrated that he is constitutionally entitled to have 
his witnesses produced free of charge, any statute or rule of court that 
attempts further to restrict this right is unconstitutional as applied-
whether it denies the defendant free subpoenas altogether, limits him 
to a certain number of free subpoenas, permits the trial court to deny 
him subpoenas in its discretion, defines "indigency" more narrowly 
than the constitutional test, or requires the defendant to show that his 
witnesses were necessary or vital, rather than simply material, to his 
case. 
Of course it is impossible, and probably undesirable, to eliminate 
all discretio~ from decisions to produce witnesses free of charge or to 
grant continuances. The trial judge will always be called upon to 
make close judgments that ultimately depend upon such factors as a 
witness' demeanor or the probative value of conflicting evidence. In 
deciding whether a defendant is truly unable to pay, or whether he 
has been diligent in seeking absent witnesses, for example, the trial 
judge ultimately relies on his "professional competence, good sense, 
fairness, and courage";275 the appellate courts, in turn, will continue 
to defer to the trial court's unique perspective on such matters. What 
we have attempted here is to pinpoint the elements that should control 
the trial court's decision and to make appellate courts aware of their 
duty to exercise the kind of review that properly attends the resolution 
of constitutional issues. 
C. The Manner of Obtaining Subpoenas 
The defendant's right to compulsory process is the right to de-
mand that the government use its coercive powers to compel witnesses 
the form of a personal affidavit. See text at notes 289-96 infra. Assuming these 
problems do not exist, the defendant could only complain if he were required to 
describe the witness' testimony in greater detail than he could be expected to know in 
advance. A requirement of this kind would place the indigent defendant at a 
constitutional disadvantages vis-a-vis the wealthy defendant who could use the subpoe-
na power as a discovery device to produce witnesses without knowing precisely what 
they might say. As we shall see, however, no defendant (rich or poor) can be 
required to describe the testimony of his prospective witnesses in more detail than can 
be reasonably expected under the circumstances. See text at notes 304-23 infra. 
275. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 487-88 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring). 
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to appear and testify on his behalf. Although the government has the 
burden of confronting the defendant with the witnesses against him, 
and perhaps the obligation to advise him of his right to request 
witnesses in his favor, 276 it has no obligation to take the initiative in 
producing his witnesses.277 If the defendant fails to request the 
government to produce witnesses on his behalf, he forgoes the bene-
fits of compulsory process.278 
A defendant can also be required to support his request for the 
production of witnesses with some showing of particularized need. 
The right of compulsory process differs in that respect from other 
guarantees, such as the right to counsel, that are activated without a 
special showing of need. During the tenure of Betts v. Brady,210 an 
indigent defendant charged with a noncapital offense had no right to 
counsel in state court unless he could show that the lack of counsel 
placed him at a "serious disadvantage."280 Since the Court's decision 
in Gideon v. Wainwright,281 however, indigents have been granted 
counsel automatically, presumably on the assumption that the defend-
ant may be prevented from making a proper showing by lack of the 
276. For instance, the court may have an obligation to advise the defendant of his 
sixth amendment rights before accepting a guilty plea. Cf. Johnson v. Ohio, 419 U.S. 
924, 926 (1975) (Douglas, J., dissenting to a denial of certiorari); Aderhold v. 
Bridwell, 13 F. Supp. 253, 254-55 (N.D. Ga. 1935), affd., 92 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 
1937), revd. on other grounds sub nom. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). 
277. See United States v. Prieto-Olivas, 419 F.2d 149, 151 (1st Cir. 1969); 
United States v. Washington, 275 F.2d 687, 690 (5th Cir. 1960); Thomas v. United 
States, 158 F.2d 97, 99 (D.C. Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 822 (1947); Deaver 
v. United States, 155 F.2d 740, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 766 
(1946); Wolfson v. United States, 322 F. Supp. 798, 822 (D. Del. 1971), afld., 454 
F.2d 60 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 924 (1972). The prosecution, however, 
may have a nonconstitutional obligation under state law to produce all res gestae 
witnesses, regardless whether requested by the defendant. See People v. Crable, 33 
Mich. App. 254, 189 N.W.2d 740 (1971). But, as long as the government does not 
deliberately suppress favorable evidence, it satisfies its duty under the federal Consti-
tution by confronting the defendant with the witnesses necessary to prove its case. See 
Morton v. United States, 147 F.2d 28, 31 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 875 
(1945). 
278. See, e.g., McGuinn v. United States, 239 F.2d 449, 451 (D.C. Cir. 1956) 
(defendant waived his right of compulsory process by failing to request witnesses); 
Tompsett v. Ohio, 146 F.2d 95 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 869 (1944) 
(defendant waived his right of compulsory process by failing to request subpoenas for 
his witnesses); United States v. DiGregorio, 148 F. Supp. 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) 
(defendant waived his right of compulsory process by pleading guilty); State v. 
Horne, 215 Kan. 448, 524 P.2d 697 (1974) (defendant waived his right of compulso-
ry process for out-of-state witnesses by failing to comply with statute when requesting 
their production). 
279. 316 U.S. 445 (1942). 
280. 316 U.S. at 472. 
281. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Cf. Kamisar, The Right to Counsel a11d the Four-
teenth Amendment: A Dialogue on "The Most PervQ$ive Right" of a11 Accused, 30 l}, 
Cm. L. REv. 1, 53, 65 (1962), 
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very thing he seeks-the assistance of counsel. Some courts also 
provide free transcripts on appeal without a showing of particularized 
need; again, it seems likely that the courts that do this assume that a 
defendant cannot reasonably be expected to justify his need for the 
transcript until he has a copy of the transcript. 282 In each case, the 
courts presume that the defendant has a need for the service because 
of the obvious difficulty in proving specific prejudice from the lack of 
it.288 
In the case of the production of witnesses, however, a defendant is 
not necessarily placed at a disadvantage by the requirement that he 
demonstrate, in advance, some particularized need. The defendant is 
invariably advised before trial of the charges against him, and knows, 
in his own mind, the nature of his defense. He should have some 
idea, however general,· about what he expects or hopes his witness to 
say. Thus, he can be expected to support his requests for witnesses 
with some showing that they are important to his case. This showing 
is necessary to assist the trial court in passing on his requests and to 
give appellate courts a basis for reviewing lower-court decisions. 
Accordingly, courts commonly require that a defendant make an 
offer of proof before they allow him to appeal the denial of a 
witness, 284 to obtain a writ of attachment for a nonappearing wit-
ness, 285 to produce witnesses free of charge,286 to produce witnesses 
from out of state, 287 or to obtain a continuance for absent wit-
nesses. 288 
282. See MacCollum v. United States, 511 F.2d 1116, 1123 {9th Cir. 1974), cert. 
granted, 44 U.S.L.W. 3200 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1975) (No. 74-1487). But see Ellis v. 
Maine, 448 F.2d 1325, 1327 (1st Cir. 1971); Chavez v. Sigler, 438 F.2d 890 (8th Cir. 
1971). 
283. The same rationale explains why certain constitutional errors are deemed 
reversible per se without any showing of prejudice. See note 90 supra. 
284. See, e.g., Braswell v. Wainwright, 463 F.2d 1148, 1155 (5th Cir. 1972); 
Hoskins v. Wainwright, 440 F.2d 69, 71 (5th Cir. 1971); O'Rourke v. State, 166 Neb. 
866, 871, 90 N.W.2d 820, 823 (1958). 
285. See Hardin v. State, 471 S.W.2d 60, 62 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971); Brito v. 
State, 459 S.W.2d 834, 837-38 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970). 
286. See, e.g., United States v. Wyler, 487 F.2d 170, 173-74 (2d Cir. 1973); 
United States v. Kills Plenty, 466 F.2d 240, 243-44 (8th Cir. 1972); McCracken v. 
State, 521 P.2d 499, 507-08 (Alas. 1974); State v. Chavers, - La.-, -, 294 S.2d 
489, 493-94 (1974). 
287. See, e.g., State v. Horne, 215 Kan. 448, 448-49, 524 P.2d 697, 698 (1974); 
State v. Smith, 87 N.J. Super. 98, 103-05, 208 A.2d 171, 174-75 (App. Div. 1965); 
State v. Blount, 200 Ore. 35, 52-54, 264 P.2d 419, 427-28 (1953). 
288. See, e.g., McKinney v. Wainwright, 488 F.2d 28, 30 (5th Cir. 1974); State v. 
Patriarca, 112 R.I. 14, -, 308 A.2d 300, 314-15 (1973); State v. Brito, 459 S.W.2d 
834, 837-38 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970); GA. CoDE ANN. § 81-1410 (Supp. 1974); LA. 
CODE CruM. P. ANN. art. 709 (West 1966); TEx. CODE CRIM. P. ANN. art. 29.06 
(1966). 
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The requirement of a prior showing, nevertheless, presents two 
questions: first, whether, in order to have witnesses produced free of 
charge, indigent defendants can be required to make a showing in an 
adversary proceeding and under oath, if no such showing is required 
of nonindigent defendants; and, second, whether a defendant can be 
required to support his showing of need for a witness with a specific 
statement of what the witness will say. 
1. The Procedure for Indigents 
We have seen that no defendant has a constitutional interest in 
having immaterial witnesses produced,289 and that the cost-free pro-
duction of witnesses for indigent defendants can be conditioned upon 
a showing of the materiality of the witnesses to the defendant's 
case.290 The more serious problem concerns the procedure by which 
the showing is required to be made. Some jurisdictions require the 
indigent defendant to support his showing with a personal affidavit, 
thereby forcing him to make statements under oath that might later 
be used against him at trial;291 some jurisdictions further require the 
defendant to make his showing in the presence of the prosecutor, 
thereby forcing the defendant to disclose his witnesses in advance of 
trial.292 In each case, even if the required disclosure does not violate 
the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination, 293 it nevertheless 
places him at a disadvantage vis-a-vis wealthier defendants who are 
able to produce witnesses without disclosing their names and expected 
testimony to the prosecutor. 
289. See text at notes 71-73 supra. 
290. See text at note 274 supra. 
291. See, e.g., LA. CoDE CRIM. P. ANN. art. 739 (West 1966). See also Smith v. 
United States, 312 F.2d 867 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (defendant impeached at trial when he 
testified inconsistently with his proposed alibi as set forth in affidavit, filed as then 
required by FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(b), 18 U.S.C. app. (1964)). 
292. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 23-106 (1973), which was modeled after FED. R. 
CRIM. P. 17(b), but which specifically eliminated the feature of rule 17(b) that 
permits the defendant to make his showing ex parte. For a criticism of the statute, 
see 8 J. MooRE, supra note 199, § 17.05, at 17-14 n.2. 
293. It is now well established that disclosure requirements do not abridge the 
defendant's privilege against self-incrimination if their only effect is to force him to 
accelerate disclosures that he will make anyway during the course of trial. Williams 
v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 80-86 (1970). To that extent, it does not abridge the 
defendant's fifth amendment privilege to force him to list his witnesses or their 
expected testimony in advance of trial. See Chavers v. State, - La. -, -, 294 S.2d 
489, 493 (1974). The more serious question is whether it violates the defendant's 
fifth amendment privilege to require him (as a condition for producing witnesses in 
his favor) to make a personal statement under oath specifying his witnesses' testimo-
ny if the statement can be used to impeach him at trial for putting on an inconsistent 
defense. Compare United States v. Branker, 418 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1969), with 
Smith v. United States, 312 F.2d 867 (D.C. Cir. 1962). The defendant's argument is 
that the state cannot force him to choose between his sixth amendment right to 
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The practice of placing special disclosure requirements upon 
indigent defendants can be analyzed in two ways. First, it might be 
argued that this practice violates the principle of equal protection, 
both because it discriminates against defendants on the basis of 
wealth (a suspect classification), and because it restricts the defend-
ant's exercise of his right to produce witnesses (a fundamental right). 
The equal-protection approach, however, is not very useful here. 
Because economic status is no longer thought to be a suspect classifi-
cation, 294 the fact that defendants are treated differently on the basis 
of wealth is insufficient by itself to trigger strict judicial scrutiny. In 
addition, the.fundamental rights analysis should probably be reserved 
for constitutional interests (like the right to vote) that are not expli-
citly protected by the Constitution; it merely complicates matters to 
use the equal protection clause to reach fundamental rights (like the 
right of compulsory process) that are explicitly mentioned in the Bill 
of Rights. If the problem must be analyzed in terms of the "funda-
mental right" to produce witnesses, the best approach is to put aside 
the equal protection clause and to proceed directly under the author-
ity of the sixth amendment and the compulsory process clause. 
The defect in the requirements is not that they treat indigent and 
nonindigent defendants differently, but that they appear to impos~ an 
unreasonable burden on the defendant's right to have witnesses 
produced. If the requirements are necessary to further a legitimate 
interest in the production of witnesses, then they are valid and can be 
applied to any class of defendants. On the other hand, if the require-
ments are excessive, then they cannot validly be applied to any 
defendant, rich or poor, either as a condition for producing witnesses 
free of charge or as a condition for obtaining writs of attachment 
or continuances. The controlling factor, therefore, is not the 
economic class of defendants to whom the requirements apply, 
but the reasonableness of the requirements themselves. Thus, the 
produce witnesses and his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Com-
pare Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968), with McGautha v. 
California, 402 U.S. 183, 210-13 (1971). Since, generally, the state could permit 
counsel-instead of the defendant himself-to make the statement of intended 
testimony, it could satisfy its interests in screening the materiality of the defendant's 
witnesses, without forcing him to incriminate himself. Even if circumstances require 
the defendant to make the disclosure himself, the state could immunize him from 
having his statements used against him. See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 
263-64 (1960). The Supreme Court, for the present, has reserved the issues in this 
area. See United States v. Kahan, 415 U.S. 239, 243 (1974); Palmigiano v. Baxter, 
510 F.2d 534 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3641 (U.S. June 10, 1975) 
(No. 74-1187). 
294. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17-29 
(1973). 
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fact that the requirements are applied only to indigents is irrelevant, 
except in so far as it suggests that by permitting other defendants to 
make comparable requests without such disclosures the state has 
implicitly conceded that the requirements are not a necessary device 
for protecting the integrity of its processes. 
If the requirements are analyzed in terms of reasonableness, they 
appear to be invalid because they impose an unnecessary burden on 
the defendant's right to produce witnesses. 290 The state has a legiti-
mate interest in preserving public funds from frivolous requests for 
immaterial witnesses; in order to further that interest, it can legiti-
mately require the defendant to justify his request with some kind 
of showing of need. However, there is no necessary connection be-
tween the state's interest in having the defendant make a showing of 
need and the requirements that this showing be made in the pres-
ence of the prosecutor or by means of a personal affidavit. The 
showing of need for witnesses differs in this respect from other dis-
closures, such as notices of alibi, that are designed to help the prose-
cutor prepare his case and that must be revealed to the prosecutor 
to serve their purpose. 296 Because the showing of need for witnesses 
is designed to help the court, rather than the prosecutor, it need not 
be made public to serve its purpose. 
Indeed, if experience is any guide, such requirements are unneces-
sary. For several years, the federal courts required indigent defend-
ants to make a showing of need for witnesses by means of a personal 
affidavit given in an adversary context. 297 After considerable criti-
295. The disclosure requirement is unconstitutional unless explicitly justified, not 
as an offer of proof, but as part of a scheme of reciprocal discovery by which the 
prosecutor, in tum, discloses the names and expected testimony of his witnesses to the 
defense. See Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973). Unless it is part of a scheme 
of reciprocal discovery, the disclosure requirement is invalid if applied to any 
defendant, rich or poor, as an unnecessary burden on his right to produce witnesses, 
See Aikin v. State, 58 Ark. 544, 25 S.W. 840 (1894) (violation of state compulsory 
process clause to require any defendant to make a showing of materiality in the pres-
ence of the prosecutor); State ex rel. Plummer v. Gideon, 119 Mo. 94, 24 S.W. 748 
(1893) (same). 
The same analysis applies to the affidavit requirement: Unless the state can justify 
requiring the defendant, rather than his lawyer, to file the affidavit, the requirement 
should be declared invalid as an unnecessary burden on the defendant's right to 
produce witnesses. Even if circumstances require the defendant to file the affidavit 
himself, as when he proceeds pro se, he may be entitled to immunity from having his 
affidavit later used against him at trial. See note 293 supra. 
296. Cf. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (upholding a notice-of-alibi 
statute without discussing its impact on defendant's sixth amendment right to produce 
witnesses). 
297. Until amended in 1966, rule 17{b) provided in pertinent part as follows: 
Indigent Defendants. The court • . . may order . • • that a subpoena be 
issued upon motion or request of an indigent defendant. The motion or re-
quest shall be supported by affidavit in which the defendant shall state the 
name and address of each witness and the testimony which he is expected by 
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cism, the rule was amended in 1966 to permit the defendant to make 
the showing to the court ex parte, thus avoiding advance disclosure to 
the prosecutor of the defendant's witnesses and their expected testi-
mony. Furthermore, the amendments permit the showing to be made 
either by the defendant or by counsel. 298 The federal procedure ap-
pears to work well: if the trial court finds the defendant's representa-
tions "inherently incredible on their face,"299 it can deny the request 
outright; if the court finds the ex parte representations false, it can 
arrange for the witnesses to be investigated to its satisfaction before 
they appear;300 if the court concludes that defense counsel has made 
statements in bad faith, it can impose professional sanctions; as a last 
resort, the parties can be punished for abuse of process. 301 In short, 
neither the defendant's personal affidavit, nor the adversary hearing 
in the presence of the prosecutor, appear necessary to further the 
state's interest. 
2. The Specificity of the Showing 
The second problem presented by the requirement that the de-
fendant make a prior showing of need (whether as a condition to 
producing the witness free of charge, or to obtaining a continuance) 
the defendant to give if subpoenaed, and shall show that the evidence of the 
witness is material to the defense, [and] that the defendant cannot safely go to 
trial without the witness . . •. 
18 U.S.C. app. (1964). 
298. Rule 17 now permits an indigent defendant to obtain subpoenas "upon an ex 
parte application • . . upon a satisfactory showing that . . . the witness is necessary 
to an adequate defense." The Advisory Committee Notes explain the change: 
Criticism has been directed at the requirement that an indigent defendant dis-
close in advance the theory of his defense in order to obtain the issuance of a 
subpoena at government expense while the government and the defendants 
able to pay may have subpoenas issued in blank without any disclosure. . . • 
In one case it was held that the affidavit filed by an indigent defendant under 
this subdivision could be used by the government at his trial for purposes of 
impeachment. Smith v. United States, 312 F.2d 867 (D.C. Cir. 1962) .... 
The amendment makes several changes. . . • An ex parte application followed 
by a satisfactory showing is substituted for the requirement of a request or mo-
tion supported by affidavit. 
3 C. Wrumrr, supra note 199, 470-71. For a history of the rule, see United States v. 
Meriwether, 486 F.2d 498, 505-06 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 948 
(1974); Note, supra note 217. 
299. Greenwell v. United States, 317 F.2d 108, 110 (D.C. Cir. 1963). 
300. For instance, in United States v. Eskridge, 456 F.2d 1202, 1204 (9th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 408 U.S. 926 (1972), the judge ordered the FBI to secure state-
ments from the defendant's witnesses in advance of issuing subpoenas for them. 
If the trial judge orders such investigation, however, he should not disclose the 
results to the prosecutor, for that would undercut the purpose of the ex parte 
procedure. See 456 F.2d at 1204. See also Holden v. United States, 393 F.2d 276, 
277-78 (1st Cir. 1968). But see United States v. Sanders, 322 F. Supp. 947 (D.C. 
Pa. 1971), affd., 459 F.2d 86 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 860 (1972). 
301. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 381-82 (1971). Cf. ARK. STAT. 
ANN.§ 43-2002 (1964). 
272 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 74: 191 
is to determine the extent to which a defendant can be required to 
show the content of a prospective witness' testimony. The discussion 
here assumes that the defendant is neither required to make the 
showing by personal affidavit nor required to make the showing in 
the prosecutor's presence, 302 and focuses upon the amount of detail 
the defendant can be required to show about a prospective witness' 
testimony. The discussion also assumes that the validity of the 
requirement does not depend upon the economic class to which it is 
applied; thus, the showing, if valid, can be applied solely to indigents 
as a condition to the cost-free production of witnesses. 303 
Current practices vary among jurisdictions: some courts require a 
defendant to make a satisfactory showing that the witness' testimony 
is material and leave the sufficiency of the showing to the discretion 
of the trial court;304 other courts specifically require a defendant to set 
forth the facts to which the witness will testify. 305 In either case, it 
would probably be insufficient merely to allege that the witness will 
testify "for impeachment purposes,"306 or testify to "the whereabouts 
of the defendant at the time [the] crime was committed,"307 without 
describing the testimony in greater detail. The question, therefore, is 
how much more detail, if any, a defendant can be required to show in 
order to have his witness produced. 
The question here is analogous to the issue whether a defendant 
can be required to make any prior showing in order to obtain a 
constitutionally protected service. As we have seen, courts do not 
require a defendant to make a prior showing of particularized need to 
obtain counsel at trial or a transcript on appeal because they recog-
nize that, in order to make such a showing, he needs the benefit of 
302. See notes 289-301 supra and accompanying text. 
303. See text at notes 256-71 supra. 
304. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(b); United States v. Rigdon, 459 F.2d 379, 380 
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1116 (1972); Findley v. United States, 380 F.2d 
752, 754 (10th Cir. 1967). But cf. Welsh v. United States, 404 F.2d 414, 417 (5th 
Cir. 1968) ("The breadth of discretion to be exercised by the trial court .•• is 
considerably narrowed by two constitutional rights . . . ( 1) the Sixth Amendment 
right 'to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor'; and (2) the 
Fifth Amendment right to protection against unreasonable discrimination which 
means that, as between those financially .able and those financially unable to pay the 
fees of the witnesses, there should be no more discrimination than is necessary to 
protect against abuse of process" (footnotes omitted)). 
305. See, e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. P. ANN. art. 29.06 (1966) (to obtain a 
continuance). Cf. Brito v. State, 459 S.W.2d 834, 836 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970) 
(requiring defendant, as condition for granting a continuance, to attach witness' 
affidavit of his intended testimony). 
306. See United States v. Conder, 423 F.2d 904, 909 (6th Cir. 1970). 
307. United States v. Rigdon, 459 F.2d 379, 380 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 
1116 (1972). See also State v. Etheridge, 74 Wash. 2d 102, 112, 443 P.2d 536, 543 
(1968). 
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precisely the service he is seeking. 308 In contrast, a defendant can be 
required to justify the production of witnesses because he is expected 
to know something about their potential testimony and its relationship 
to the case. It follows that, if the validity of requiring any showing is 
based on what a defendant is expected to know about potential 
witnesses, then a defendant can be required to provide the court with 
only so much information about the witness' testimony as he reasona-
bly can be expected to know. 
This point can be illustrated by examining the trial of Aaron 
Burr.909 Burr had been charged with treason, largely on the basis of 
letters that a certain General Wilkinson had written President Jeffer-
son from New Orleans. To prepare for Wilkinson's expected testi-
mony at trial, Burr moved the court to subpoena the correspondence. 
The United States attorney opposed the request on the ground that, 
while Burr had stated that the correspondence "may be material" to 
his defense, he had not made a sufficient showing that the contents of 
the correspondence would be useful in impeaching Wilkinson's testi-
mony. s10 
Presiding Circuit Justice Marshall, basing the decision on his 
interpretation of the defendant's right to compulsory process, rejected 
the government's contention. He held that, although a defendant can 
be required to give the court "reasonable satisfaction of the probable 
materiality of the evidence asked for,"311 the precise nature of this 
showing "must depend on the nature of the case."312 In this case 
Burr could not be expected to describe letters he had not yet seen or 
relate them to testimony he had not yet heard: 
Now, if a paper be in the possession of the opposite party, what 
statement of its contents or applicability can be expected from the 
person who claims its production, he not precisely knowing its con-
tents? If the opposite party be required to produce his books on a 
particular subject, it is not necessary that the entries on those books 
308. See text at notes 281-83 supra. 
309. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 (No. 14,692d) (C.C.D. Va. 1807). See 
note 150 supra. 
310. 25 F. Cas. at 35. The question of materiality was argued twice: first on 
June 9-12, 1807, in connection with Burr's motion to subpoena President Jefferson to 
produce the correspondence, including Wilkinson's letter of Oct. 21, 1806, for use in 
the pending treason prosecution, 25 F. Cas. at 30-38; and later on Sept. 4, 1807, in 
connection with Burr's motion to postpone the misdemeanor prosecution until the 
United States attorney produced Wilkinson's letter of Nov. 12, 1806, 25 F. Cas. at 
190-93. For a complete and verbatim account of the arguments, see 1 D. ROBERTSON, 
REPORTS OF THE TRIALS OF COLONEL AARON BURR 112-75 (1808); 2 id. at 504-33. 
311. 25 F. Cas. at 191. 
312. 25 F. Cas. at 191. 
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should be stated in order to entitle the applicant to his motion. He 
cannot be expected to make such a statement. 313 
However, Marshall found that, although Burr could not be required 
to describe the evidence in detail, he could be required "to state its 
materiality to the case in some degree."314 Accordingly, in Burr's 
case it sufficed to show that the letters had been written by a principal 
witness for the prosecution and concerned the subject of the witness' 
future testimony. 
The analysis in Burr can be used to construct a general constitu-
tional standard: although a defendant has no right to subpoena 
witnesses "merely to discover whether they might have information 
helpful to him,"315 the extent to which he can be required to describe 
their testimony in advance depends on the nature of the case. Thus, 
if he has interviewed his witnesses, or otherwise knows what they will 
say, it is reasonable to require the defendant to describe their testi-
mony at length or provide an affidavit of their testimony. 310 On the 
other hand, if the defendant has been unable to interview witnesses, 
or if they have refused to cooperate with him, then it is entirely 
unreasonable to expect him to set forth their testimony precisely;317 
furthermore, under the Burr analysis, to require ,the defendant to 
make a precise showing under such circumstances would be to place 
313. 25 F. Cas. at 191. 
314. 25 F. Cas. at 191. 
315. Conte v. CardweJI, 475 F.2d 698, 700 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 
873 (1973). Accord, McKinney v. Wainwright, 488 F.2d 28, 29-30 (5th Cir. 1973), 
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 973 (1974) (insufficient to allege that "there may be witnesses 
who could aid in the defense of the case"). 
316. See State v. Rigsbee, 285 N.C. 708,711,208 S.E.2d 656,659 (1974). 
317. "An affidavit of materiality ... or an oral offer of proof with request for 
leave to file an affidavit of materiality later . . . are not the exclusive standards by 
which the application for . . . compulsory process may be judged. A party in a 
criminal cause believing what the testimony ought to be but unable to ascertain in 
advance what the witness will say, may find it necessary to risk forcing the witness to 
appear and give evidence. . ·. . No rule of criminal procedure can or ought to be 
construed or applied so as to abridge a fundamental constitutional right." State v. 
Edwards, 68 Wash. 2d 246, 257-58, 412 P.2d 747, 753 (1966). Accord, Braswell v. 
Wainwright, 463 F.2d 1148, 1155 (5th Cir. 1972) ("rr]he purpose of the proffer 
rule . . . is to provide the trial court with an adequate basis for the exercise of its 
discretion and the appeJiate court with a basis for reviewing that exercise. In our 
view the record before the . . . court provided such a basis. . . . The failure to 
make a formal proffer cannot be used to deprive Braswell of his sixth amendment 
right"); Murphy v. State, 132 Ga. App. 654, 655-56, 209 S.E.2d 101, 102 (1974) ("In 
the context of this case, where the doctor witness was totally unco-operative and 
uncommunicative, refusing to discuss the matter, to answer letters, to converse over 
the telephone or to come to court, it is our view that these requirements [of a formal 
offer of proof] are at war with the accused's constitutional guarantee of compulsory 
process to obtain the testimony of witnesses"); White v. State, 517 S.W.2d 543, 545-
46 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). Cf. United States v. Hathcock, 441 F.2d 197, 199-200 
(5th Cir. 1971) (defendant cannot constitutionally be required to state in advance 
that he will put subpoenaed witness on stand). 
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an unconstitutional burden upon his right to compulsory process.318 
Accordingly, in those situations in which it is unreasonable to expect 
the defendant to be able to relate the precise nature of a potential 
witness' testimony, it should suffice if he can show that there is "any 
reason for supposing that the testimony may be material."319 For 
example, it should be sufficient if the defendant can show that the 
witness was present at the scene of the crime, 320 participated in the 
crime, 321 or was one of the defendant's alleged accomplices. 322 To 
put it another way, if the most a diligent defendant can do is provide 
some factual basis to suppoi:t the belief that a witness may be material 
to his case, the right to compulsory process includes the opportunity 
to discover at trial precisely what the witness will say. 323 
In summary, the constitutional standard represents an accommo-
dation between the state's interest in avoiding the unnecessary ex-
penditure of time and expense involved in producing immaterial 
witnesses, and the defendant's interest in producing favorable wit-
nesses. The state has a legitimate interest in determining in advance 
if the defendant's witnesses are truly material-whether as a condi-
tion to producing them free of charge, or bringing them from out of 
state, or releasing them from confinement in order to testify, or post-
poning the trial because of their absence; furthermore, the state's in-
terest is best served by requiring the defendant to make a showing of 
need with a maximum degree of detail. The defendant, on the other 
hand, has an interest in having any witness produced who may influ-
318. See also Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184, 230 (5th Cir. 1975) (Bell, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that it is a violation of compulsory process rights to require the 
defendant to show the specific contents of a document he has never seen, where he is 
able to show that it contains the prior statements of witnesses who will testify against 
him at trial). 
319. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 38 (No. 14,692d) (C.C.D. Va. 1807). 
320. See, e.g., State v. Edwards, 68 Wash. 2d 246, 257-58, 412 P.2d 747, 753 
(1966). 
321. See, e.g., White v. State, 517 S.W.2d 543, 545-56 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). 
This is evidently also the rationale for automatically producing government informers 
merely upon a showing that they participated in the criminal act. Cf. Roviaro v. 
United States, 353 U.S. 53, 64 (1957). 
322. See, e.g., United States v. Wyler, 487 F.2d 170, 175 (2d Cir. 1973) (Oakes, 
J., dissenting) ("while perhaps the offer of proof was not explicit, the Government, 
having alleged that Nash was a coconspirator, should not be permitted to deny the 
relevance of his testimony as one of the alleged conspirators . . . [and] the burden 
should be on it to show the irrelevancy of Nash's testimony"); United States v. 
Hathcock, 441 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1971 ). 
323. See Orfield, supra note 221, at 29. See also State v. Humphrey, - Kan.-, 
-, 537 P.2d 155, 162-63 (1975) (defendant's right of compulsory process for 
witnesses in his favor includes right to discover content of their testimony). For a 
discussion of the usefulness of conceptualizing the compulsory process clause as a 
discovery device, see Westen, supra note 3, at 121-26. For the extent to which a 
defendant has a risht to pretrial discovery, see text at notes 161, 202-05 supra. 
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ence the jury in his favor; and while he invariably has some reason to 
believe the witness is material, his degree of knowledge prior to trial 
necessarily varies. Accordingly, while the state can require a defend-
ant to make some advance showing of need for a witness, it cannot 
require that a defendant provide greater detail than is reasonable un-
der the circumstances. 
III. THE ENFORCEMENT AND TERRITORIAL SCOPE 
OF COMPULSORY PROCESS 
The defendant's right to compulsory . process is the right to de-
mand that the government exercise its authority to produce witnesses 
in his favor. A central problem, therefore, is determining the amount 
of effort the government is required to expend in producing witnesses 
for the defense. Is it sufficient, for example, simply to issue subpoe-
nas, or must the state also attempt to enforce them by attachment and 
contempt? Is it sufficient to serve only those witnesses who can be 
readily found, or must the state also undertake a search for witnesses 
whose whereabouts are uncertain? Is it sufficient to produce witnesses 
who can be found within the territory of the jurisdiction, or must 
the state also attempt to produce witnesses from elsewhere? In short, 
if the state must do more than issue subpoenas for readily available 
witnesses, what is the extent of its obligation? 
The conventional wisdom provided a ready answer to these ques-
tions: Because the compulsory process clause guarantees the defend-
ant the benefit of only those practices that are enjoyed by the prosecu-
tion and by parties in civil cases, it has no independent force of its 
own; it operates entirely by reference to the existing local law. Thus, 
under the conventional wisdom, the scope of the state's obligation to 
produce the defendant's witnesses is ultimately defined by local 
law.a24 
The conventional wisdom is not only inconsistent with the fra-
mers' original understanding of the compulsory process clause, but 
was implicitly rejected by the Supreme Court in Washington v. 
Texas.325 The framers did not intend to commit the futile act of 
guaranteeing the defendant the issuance of subpoenas that could be 
324. Wigmore assumed that the defendant's right, if any, to have his subpoenas 
enforced depended on local law. See 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2191, at 69 (J. 
McNaughton rev. 1961). He also assumed that the state's constitutional obligation to 
produce witnesses does not extend beyond its territorial borders. See 5 J. WIGMORE, 
EVIDENCE § 1404, at 149 (3d ed. 1940) (discussing the defendant's sixth amendment 
right to confront witnesses). See also 8 J. WIGMOR.E, EVIDENCE § 2195a, at 89 (J, 
McNaughton rev. 1961). For the meaning of "local law," see note 231 supra. 
325. See text at note 6 supra. See also notes 225-30 supra and accompanying 
text. 
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rendered ineffective by arbitrary local standards of enforcement. The 
scope of the state's duty to make efforts to produce witnesses for the 
defense, like the scope of its duty to produce defense witnesses at no 
charge, is ultimately to be resolved by reference to federal constitu-
tional standards. The present task, therefore, is to define the federal 
standard and then to apply it to some of the more common limitations 
on the enforcement and territorial reach of compulsory process. 
A. The Enforcement of Subpoenas 
The questions that are most commonly raised about the enforce-
ment of subpoenas are, first, whether a defendant can demand that 
the state actively search for his witnesses in order to serve them with 
process; and, second, whether the state has a duty to enforce its 
process by initiating arrest and contempt proceedings for those wit-
nesses who have been served but have failed to appear. These two 
questions form part of the broader issue of the extent to which the 
state is obligated, if at all, to render its process effective. 
We can begin by examining the view-commonly expressed by 
some courts-that the state's constitutional obligation to produce 
witnesses includes only the duty to serve subpoenas on witnesses who 
can readily be found; under this view the state is neither obligated to 
search for elusive witnesses, 326 nor to initiate enforcement proceed-
ings against recalcitrant witnesses.327 The view deserves thoughtful 
examination, for although sometimes overstated, it reflects what ap-
pears to be a genuine dilemma. 
On the one hand, if narrowly stated, the view that the state need 
only serve readily available witnesses is obviously untenable. Sup-
pose, for example, that a defendant requests the state to produce a 
witness who lives in an undisclosed apartment in an extended housing 
complex. It seems inconceivable that the marshal could refuse to 
serve the subpoena on the ground that he had no duty to inquire into 
the witness' particular apartment number, to wait for the witness to 
return if he happened to be out, or to search for the witness' new 
apartment if he had moved. 328 Or, suppose a defendant requests the 
326. See also United States v. Upchurch, 286 F.2d 516, 518 (4th Cir. 1961) (no 
constitutional challenge made); Ferrari v. United States, 244 F.2d 132, 141 (9th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 873 (1957); United States v. Wolfson, 322 F. Supp. 798, 
819 (D. Del. 1971), affd., 454 F.2d 60 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 924 (1972); 
Lancaster v. Green, 175 Ohio St. 203, 205, 192 N.E.2d 776, 778 (1963) (state 
constitution). 
327. See State v. Stewart, 117 La. 476, 488-89, 41 S. 798, 802 (1906) (state 
constitution). 
328. Cf. United States v. Clarke, 220 F. Supp. 905, 908 (E.D. Pa. 1963) 
($ovemment does not satisfy its duty to find and produce government informer by 
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state to produce a witness who happens to be incarcerated in a state 
institution. Again, it seems inconceivable that the state could refuse 
to dispatch an officer to take custody of the prisoner on the ground 
that it had no duty to enforce its process. 320 In each of the above 
examples, allowing the state to refuse to make any real effort toward 
enforcing its process would, in effect, render meaningless the defend-
ant's right to compulsory process. Accordingly, the state's constitu-
tional duty to issue subpoenas must include at least some duty to 
render them effective. 
On the other hand, there must be limits on what the state can 
reasonably be expected to do. Suppose, for example, that a defend-
ant requests the state to produce a witness whose whereabouts are 
entirely unknown and who could be anywhere in the world. It seems 
inconceivable that the state could be required to demand of its 
investigative force that "every lead, no matter how nebulous, must be 
tracked to the ends of the earth . . . ."330 Or, suppose a defendant 
seeks a witness from a foreign country under a statute that authorizes 
extraterritorial subpoenas. It is scarcely conceivable that the state 
could be required to enforce the witness' failure to appear by making 
unconditional demands for his extradition or by threatening to use 
force unless the witness were produced. 331 
While it is thus clear that the state has at least some constitutional 
duty to render its subpoenas effective, the more difficult problem is to 
define the standard that governs the scope of this duty. It may be 
possible to formulate a general standard in this area by looking to the 
standard that governs the granting of continuances, for the two 
subjects share much in common. The state, in each case, has a 
legitimate interest in limiting the scope of its duty-in the case of 
continuances, to prosecute effectively; in the case of the enforcement 
of process, to utilize its police power effectively. Similarly, in each 
case the defendant's interest remains necessarily speculative because 
(in contrast to cases dealing with the suppression of evidence and 
evidentiary privileges) the court cannot accurately determine the true 
value, if any, of an absent witness' testimony. Despite the state's best 
making a few routine telephone calls while failing to search out informer at his own 
residence). 
329. See Roberts v. State, 72 Ga. 673, 676-77 (1884) (denial of defendant's state 
right of compulsory process to issue order to produce witness from prison without 
dispatching officer to enforce order). 
330. Poe v. Turner, 490 F.2d 329,331 (10th Cir. 1974). 
331. Cf. United States v. Lockwood, 386 F. Supp. 734, 738 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) 
(government has no obligation under sixth amendment "speedy trial" clause to make 
diplomatic demands for extradition or deportation of draft resisters from countries 
that would probably not cooperate). 
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efforts, the witness may never be produced; if produced, the witness 
may fail to possess material testimony in the defendant's favor. 
Hence, if the analogy is sound, we should be able to apply the 
standard governing the granting of continuances to the enforcement 
of process. A defendant, acting in good faith, is entitled to demand 
that the state postpone his trial for a reasonable period of time if he 
can show some likelihood that a witness he is entitled to subpoena 
will be produced by the time trial recommences. 332 Thus, a defend-
ant should be entitled to demand that the state make a reasonable, 
good-faith effort to serve and enforce his subpoenas if he can show 
some likelihood that the effort will be successful. 333 
This standard is entirely consistent with the state's responsibility 
to the defendant in related areas of procedure. Thus, when the 
government relies on information from an informer who has wit-
nessed the defendant's actions, "fundamental fairness" requires that 
the government attempt to identify and locate the informer so that the 
defendant may call him· as a witness at trial.334 Furthermore, in 
making this attempt, it is not enough to make routine telephone calls 
or casual inquiries; rather, the state must "undertake reasonable 
efforts in good faith to locate the informer,"335 and, if these efforts 
are unsuccessful, the state must "show that reasonable efforts to 
produce him were fruitless."336 
The "reasonable good-faith effort" standard also governs the 
scope of the state's sixth amendment duty to confront the defendant 
with the witnesses against him. Before the government can introduce 
prior recorded testimony of an unavailable witness, it is required to 
make "a good-faith effort to obtain his presence at trial."337 Again, 
it is insufficient simply to serve the witness with a subpoena and rely 
upon him to appear at trial. If the witness fails to appear, the state 
must try to enforce the subpoena by dispatching officers to arrest the 
witness, and, if these efforts are unsuccessful, the state "must demon-
332. See text at note 190 supra. 
333. The state must make a good faith effort not only to serve its subpoenas, see 
United States v. Bolden, 461 F.2d 998, 1000 (8th Cir. 1972); Hoskins v. Common-
wealth, 216 Ky. 358, 287 S.W. 924 (1926); State v. Hammler, - La.-,-, 312 S.2d 
306, 312 (1975), but also to ensure compliance with them, see Johnson v. Johnson, 
375 F. Supp. 872 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Moore v. Beto, 320 F. Supp. 469, 472 (S.D. 
Tex. 1970); Murphy v. State, 132 Ga. App. 654, 657, 209 S.E.2d 101, 103 (1974); 
Birto v. State, 459 S.W.2d 834, 837 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970). 
334. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957). 
335. Eleazer v. Superior Ct., 1 Cal. 3d 847, 853, 464 P.2d 42, 46, 83 Cal. Rptr. 
586, 590 (1970) (emphasis original). 
336. United States v. Clarke, 220 F. Supp. 905, 908 (E.D. Pa. 1963). See 
Velarde-Villarreal v. United States, 354 F.2d 9, 13 (9th Cir. 1965). 
337. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968). 
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strate that it has been unable to obtain the witness' presence through a 
search exercised both in good faith and with reasonable diligence and 
care."33s 
The government-informer and the confrontation cases both pro-
vide persuasive support for the proposition that the state must make 
reasonable efforts in good faith to produce witnesses for the defense. 
The analogy to the informer cases is particularly appropriate because 
some courts have recognized that the state's duty to produce inform-
ers is derived from the defendant's constitutional right to produce and 
present witnesses in his favor.339 The analogy to the confrontation 
cases is equally strong. The confrontation clause and the compulsory 
process clause are parallel provisions for securing the attendance of 
witnesses in criminal cases. Both require the state to exercise its 
authority on the defendant's behalf in order to produce witnesses at 
trial; both rely on the state to make a good-faith effort to render its 
authority effective. The major difference between the two clauses is 
in their allocation of initiative: the confrontation clause requires the 
state to take the initiative in producing the witnesses it will rely upon 
to prove its case against the defendant, while the compulsory process 
clause requires the defendant to take the initiative in requesting the 
production of witnesses he will rely upon to defeat the state's case. 340 
Once the state's duty to produce witnesses has been invoked, how-
ever, the constitutional scope of this duty should be governed by the 
same standard under both clauses. 
In conclusion, the defendant can demand not only that the state 
use its process to produce witnesses in his favor, but that it make 
reasonable efforts in good faith to render its process effective. It 
follows that the extent of the state's obligation will depend upon the 
nature of the case. If the defendant requests the state to serve or 
arrest a witness who might be anywhere, and if the defendant fails to 
provide any information about where the state should concentrate its 
search, then the state's duty may be minimal. :H 1 On the other hand, 
338. United States v. Lynch, 499 F.2d 1011, 1023 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
339. See United States v. Fernandez, 506 F.2d 1200, 1205 (2d Cir. 1974). See 
also Westen, supra note 4, at 165-66 nn.460-62. 
340. See Westen, supra note 4, at 183; note 65 supra. 
341. See United States v. Upchurch, 286 F.2d 511, 518 (4th Cir. 1961); State v. 
Smith, 87 N.J. Super. 98, 105, 208 A.2d 171, 175 (App. Div. 1965). 
In most cases, the whereabouts of the witness is not something peculiarly within 
the prosecutor's knowledge; in most cases, therefore, the government's principal 
problem is, not to find the witness in order to serve him with process (which is a 
responsibility the defendant can be expected to share), but to find the witness and 
enforce his appearance once he has been served. On the other hand, if the witness' 
whereabouts is within the particular knowledge of the prosecutor-as with govern-
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if the defendant can show that the witness is reasonably likely to be 
located in a particular area, the state may be required to undertake an 
intensive search342 that could include making inquiries in neighboring 
jurisdictions.343 Finally, the reasonableness of the state's efforts to 
produce a witness whom the defendant has requested can be ulti-
mately measured against the efforts it would undertake to produce a 
critical witness against the accused as part of the prosecution's 
case.s44 
B. The Territorial Reach of the Subpoena 
It was once assumed that the jurisdiction of a court was inherently 
limited to matters and persons within its territorial boundaries and, 
thus, that a court had no power to summon witnesses from beyond 
the territorial limits of its jurisdiction. Furthermore, proceeding 
from the premise that they had no power to subpoena foreign wit-
nesses, courts concluded that there could be no constitutional obliga-
tion to do so. For example, in Minder v. Georgia,345 decided in 1902, 
the defendant argued that the courts of Georgia had denied him a fair 
trial under the fourteenth amendment by failing to afford him process 
for securing the attendance of certain witnesses then residing in 
Alabama. The Supreme Court rejected the argument on the ground, 
among others, that the Georgia courts had no power to obtain the 
presence of foreign witnesses: • 
ment informers-then the state has a special responsibility to locate the witness, as 
well as enforce his appearance at trial. 
342. Compare People v. Beyea, 38 Cal. App. 3d 176, 191, 113 Cal. Rptr. 254, 
-263 (1974) (government satisfied its duty to produce adverse witness by making 
visits to his home, his former place of work, his parents' home, and making inquiries 
of his neighbors, his girl friend, his acquaintances, law enforcement agencies, public 
utilities, and post office), with State v. Pereda, 111 Ariz. 344, -, 529 P .2d 695, 697 
(1974) {government failed to satisfy its duty to produce adverse witness by relying on 
a few telephone calls without visiting witness' residence or place of business). See 
Johnson v. Walker, 199 F. Supp. 86, 95 (E.D. La. 1961), affd., 317 F.2d 418 (5th 
Cir. 1963) ("Certainly compulsory process was had by the petitioner inasmuch as the 
witness requested by him was subpoenaed and every effort [including the issuance of 
a statewide pickup order] was made to produce this witness in Court"); Common-
wealth v. Blair, - Pa.-,-, 331 A.2d 213, 214 (1975) (effort to produce adverse 
witness included visits to her residence, her parents' residence plus all-night vigil 
outside her residence). 
343. Compare Poe v. Turner, 490 F.2d 329, 331 (10th Cir. 1974) ("[W]e 
conclude • . . that the Utah authorities did make a good faith effort to locate [the 
adverse witnesses]. They did not stop at state boundaries, but went into Nevada, as 
they should have, in their efforts"), with Williams v. Maryland, 375 F. Supp. 745, 
155-56 (D. Md. 1974) (state failed to fulfill its duty to produce adverse witness by 
failing to pursue leads into neighboring jurisdiction). See also State v. Kim, 55 
Hawaii 346, 349-51, 519 P.2d 1240, 1244-45 (1974); State v. Green, - La.-, 296 
S.2d 290 (1974). 
344. See United States v. Lynch, 499 F.2d 1011, 1023 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
345. 183 U.S. 559 (1902). 
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The requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment are satisfied if the 
trial is had according to the settled course of judicial procedure 
obtaining in the particular State, and the laws . . . do not subject 
the individual to the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government. 
Because it is not within the power of the Georgia courts to compel 
the attendance of witnesses who are beyond the limits of the State 
. . . we cannot interfere with the administration of justice in that 
State on the ground of a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment in 
these particulars. 346 
This rigid territorial view of jurisdiction has since given way to a 
more expansive view. Courts now regulate the conduct of persons 
located beyond their territorial boundaries, 347 exercise extraterritorial 
subpoena power over foreign witnesses, 348 enforce reciprocity statutes 
for the mutual exchange of witnesses with other jurisdictions, 340 and 
cooperate in the exchange of witnesses on the basis of comity.300 
Nevertheless, with respect to the right of compulsory process, the 
territorial concept still underlies four common assumptions: (1) that, 
if a state has vested its courts with formal authority to produce foreign 
witnesses, this authority is discretionary and a defendant cannot 
complain if the court refuses to exercise it in his favor; (2) that, if a 
state has not adopted formal procedures to compel foreign witnesses 
346. 183 U.S. at 562. It is not entirely clear from the opinion of the Court 
whether the Court believed that the Georgia legislature lacked the power to adopt 
extraterritorial legislation or whether the Court was merely referring to the fact that 
the legislature had taken no steps to exercise its power. However, the Court recited 
at great length from the opinion of the court below, in which it was assumed that the 
legislature lacked the power. 183 U.S. at 562. 
347. See, e.g., Skiriotes v. Florida, 312 U.S. 69 (1941) (Florida may prohibit its 
residents from using diving equipment to harvest commercial sponges from seabeds 
outside its territorial waters); Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882 (5th Cir. 1967) 
(Congress has authority to punish aliens for conspiring in Canada to smuggle heroin 
into the United States); Rocha v. United States, 288 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1961) 
(Congress has authority to punish aliens who make false oaths in foreign countries in 
order to obtain United States citizenship); State v. Holden, 46 N.J. 361,217 A.2d 132 
(1966) (New Jersey may prosecute defendant for drunken driving on Pennsylvania 
side of bridge between Pennsylvania and New Jersey). See generally RESTATE.ME.NT 
(SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF TIJE UNITED STATES §§ 10-33 (1965); 
Empson, Tlze Application of Criminal Law to Acts Committed Outside tlze Jurisdic-
tion, 6 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 32 (1967); George, Extraterritorial Application of Penal 
Legislation, 64 MICH. L. REv. 609 (1966); [Harvard] Research in International Law, 
Introductory Comment, Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INTL. LAW 443 
(Supp. 1935); Sarkar, The Proper Law of Crime in lllternational Law, in lNTERNA• 
TIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 50-130 (G. Mueller & E. Wise ed. 1965); Note, Jurisdiction 
over Crimes-Constitutional Limitations on States' Power To Punish for Acts 
Committed Outside Its Territorial Limits, 1951 Wis. L. REv. 164, 172. 
348. See Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 436-41 (1932) (upholding 
validity of what is now 28 U.S.C. §§ 1783, 1784 (1970), authorizing federal courts to 
subpoena United States citizens and domiciliaries from anywhere in the world to 
appear and testify in court). 
349. See note 352 infra. 
350. See note 352 infra. 
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to appear, a defendant cannot complain if the state fails to make 
informal requests for the cooperation of foreign authorities; (3) that, 
if a state has not adopted formal procedures for producing foreign 
witnesses and if its informal requests go unanswered, a defendant 
cannot complain that the court has refused to extend its coercive sub-
poena power extraterritorially; and ( 4) that, if everything in the 
state's power has been done-both formally and informally-to com-
pel a foreign witness to appear, a defendant cannot complain if a 
foreign jurisdiction fails to cooperate. These four assumptions re-
quire analysis; some of them ·are clearly erroneous, and the rest are 
overstated. 
1. The Constitutional Obligation To Give the Defendant the Bene-
fit of Existing Authority for the Production of Foreign Witnesses 
Many jurisdictions have adopted statutes giving their courts au-
thority to produce foreign witnesses. The federal courts have the 
authority to subpoena persons from throughout the United States and 
to subpoena United States citizens from anywhere in the world.351 In 
addition, most states have adopted reciprocal statutes for the produc-
tion of witnesses: Forty-eight states have adopted the Uniform Act To 
Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without a State in Criminal 
Proceedings (Uniform Act To Secure Witnesses), 352 under which the 
adopting state agrees to compel local witnesses to appear in the courts 
of any requesting state that will honor a reciprocal request; nineteen 
states have adopted the Uniform Rendition of Prisoners as Witnesses 
in Criminal Proceedings Act (Uniform Rendition of Prisoners 
Act), 353 under which the adopting state agrees to compel local pris-
oners to appear as witnesses in the courts of any requesting state that 
will honor a reciprocal request. In addition, federal law provides for 
the arrest and extradition of witnesses who have been subpoenaed in 
one state and have subsequently fled to another state to avoid testify-
ing. 354 
351. See FED. R. CruM. P. 17(e). 
352. Section 2 of the Uniform Act To Secure Witnesses permits the rendering 
state to refuse to compel its witnesses to appear in the requesting state if it determines 
that their testimony is not material or that appearing would cause them undue 
hardship, or if the laws of the requesting state do not provide them with immunity 
from arrest and service of process in connection with matters proceeding from their 
appearance in the requesting state. Alabama and Georgia are the only states that 
have not yet adopted the Act. See 11 UNIFORM LAws ANN. 7 (Supp. 1975). 
353. See 11 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 541 (1974); id. at 25 (Supp. 1975). The Act 
closes a loophole in the Uniform Act To Secure Witnesses by specifically providing 
for the production of prisoners incarcerated in state prisons at the tinle of the request. 
See Commissioner's Prefatory Note, id. at 547 (1974). 
354. The Constitution provides for the interstate extradition of persons "charged 
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Despite the existence of these schemes for the production of 
witnesses, some courts steadfastly deny that a defendant has a consti-
tutional right to have them invoked on his behalf. Thus, in a typical 
case, a California defendant was denied the opportunity to subpoena 
witnesses from Massachusetts, notwithstanding that California and 
Massachusetts had both adopted the Uniform Act To Secure Wit-
nesses and that Massachusetts would have honored a request to pro-
duce the witnesses. The court rejected the defendant's compulsory 
process argument; it reasoned that because California had no consti-
tutional obligation to adopt the Act in the first place, it had no obliga-
tion to apply the Act on the defendant's behalf. 355 
The court's reasoning was faulty. Even if we assume that a state 
has no constitutional obligation to enact legislation authorizing its 
courts to issue subpoenas for witnesses located outside of its territorial 
boundaries, once it has done so, it cannot deny a defendant the 
benefit of its "process." If the states have a constitutional duty to 
make a reasonable good-faith effort to enforce their process on the 
defendant's behalf, it follows that they must use all formal instru-
ments at their disposal to produce witnesses in his favor, including 
instruments for the production of foreign witnesses. 
The propriety of applying the reasonable good-faith effort stand-
ard to the production of foreign witnesses finds support in the state's 
analogous sixth-amendment duty to confront a defendant with the 
witnesses against him. In Barber v. Page, 356 the prosecution, without 
making any effort to produce the witness in person, introduced the 
prior recorded testimony of a witness who was then confined in 
federal prison in another state. The state contended that it had no 
power and, therefore, no duty to produce the witness from a federal 
prison beyond its borders. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that 
the state had an obligation to make "a good faith effort"357 to use all 
formal instruments at its disposal to produce the witness, including 
in any state with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be 
found in another state". U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2. The Federal Extradition 
Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3182-95 (1970), implementing the constitutional provision, pro-
vides for the interstate extradition of persons who have committed a "crime" 
(presumably including contempt) in one state, and then have fled to another. The 
Act applies to witnesses who fail to comply with a lawful subpoena within the forum 
and then flee to another state. 
355. People v. Cavanaugh, 69 Cal. 2d 262, 266 & n.3, 444 P.2d 110, 112 & n.3, 70 
Cal. Rptr. 438, 440 & n.3 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 981 (1969). See also 
Commonwealth v. Dirring, 354 Mass. 523, 529, 238 N.E.2d 508, 512 (1968); State v. 
Smith, 87 N.J. Super. 98, 102, 208 A.2d 171, 174 (App. Div. 1965); People v. Carter, 
37 N.Y.2d 234, -, 333 N.E.2d 177, 181, 371 N.Y.S.2d 905, 910 (1975). 
356. 390 U.S. 719 (1968). 
357. 390 U.S. at 725. 
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state writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum (which it noted are 
routinely honored by the United States Bureau of Prisons) and, under 
appropriate circumstances, the Uniform Act To Secure Witnesses. 358 
The same standard must also govern the state's companion duty 
to produce witnesses in the defendant's favor, for the two clauses of 
the sixth amendment are complementary devices for producing wit-
nesses in criminal cases. 359 Thus, a defendant can demand that the 
state make a reasonable effort in good faith to invoke all the formal 
instruments at its disposal for producing witnesses in his favor, in-
cluding statutes providing for the issuance of extraterritorial subpoe-
nas, 369 the Uniform Act To Secure Witnesses,361 the Uniform Rendi-
tion of Prisoners Act,362 the Federal Extradition Act (for witnesses 
who flee after being subpoenaed within the forum), the Uniform 
Criminal Extradition Act (for witnesses who refuse to appear after 
being subpoenaed outside the forum), 363 and writs of habeas corpus 
ad testificandum. 364 
358. 390 U.S. at 723 n.4 (dictum). The Uniform Act To Secure Witnesses was 
not directly applicable in Barber because it has never been adopted by the federal 
government and has no effect on persons held in federal custody. Even if the witness 
had been held in sister-state custody, moreover, the Act would not have applied 
because it does not cover witnesses who are incarcerated. See note 326 supra. 
Nevertheless, lower courts have taken the Court's dictum to mean that the Uniform 
Act must be resorted to whenever applicable. See Gorum v. Craven, 465 F.2d 443, 
445 (9th Cir. 1972); State v. Kim, 55 Hawaii 346, 349-51, 519 P.2d 1240, 1244-45 
(1974). 
359. See note 65 supra. 
360. Cf. Virgin Islands v. Aquino, 378 F.2d 540, 551 (3d Cir. 1967) (dictum) 
(federal court has obligation to apply FED. R. CRIM. P. 17 [incorporating 28 U.S.C. § 
1783 (1970) by reference] to produce adverse witnesses in person from beyond its 
territorial boundaries). 
361. See, e.g., Preston v. Blackledge, 332 F. Supp. 681, 682-85 (E.D.N.C. 1971) 
(once state has adopted Uniform Act To Secure Witnesses it has obligation under 
compulsory process clause to apply it on defendant's behalf). Cf. Virgin Islands v. 
Aquino, 378 F.2d 540, 550-51 (3d Cir. 1967) (dictum) (state courts have constitu-
tional obligation to apply Uniform Act to produce adverse witnesses in person). 
362. See, e.g., People v. Moscatello, 114 Ill. App. 2d 16, -, 251 N.E.2d 532, 544 
(1969) (once state has adopted Uniform Rendition of Prisoners Act it has obligation 
under compulsory process clause to apply it on defendant's behalf). 
363. Section 6 of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act (adopted by 47 states) 
provides for the extradition of persons who violate the laws of the forum through acts 
committed outside the forum. See Commonwealth ex rel. Kelly v. Santo, 436 Pa. 
204, 259 A.2d 456 (1969) (co-conspirator may be extradited under Act for acts 
committed in asylum state constituting crime in forum). Accordingly, if the forum 
has authorized its courts to subpoena witnesses from other states and the witnesses 
refuse to comply, the forum may invoke the Act to extradite them for committing the 
crime of contempt against the laws of the forum. 
364. See, e.g., Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724 (1968) (dictum); Curran v. 
United States, 332 F. Supp. 259, 261 (D. Del. 1971) (defendant in state court seeking 
a witness held in federal custody should apply to state court for writ of habeas corpus 
ad testificandum, which will be honored "as a matter of policy" by federal officials); 
State v. Gann, 254 Ore. 549, 566-69, 463 P.2d 570, 577 (1969) (court has obligation 
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2. The Obligation, in the Absence of Formal Procedures, To Request 
the Voluntary Assistance of Foreign Authorities 
in Producing Witnesses 
The second common assumption linked to the territorial con-
ception of jurisdiction is that, if a state lacks a formal scheme for 
producing foreign witnesses, it has no obligation to request foreign 
authorities to assist in compelling witnesses to appear. Thus, in a 
state that had not adopted the Uniform Act To Secure Witnesses, it 
was held that "in the absence of an interstate compact," there was no 
constitutional obligation to produce a witness located in another 
state.365 The question presented by such decisions is whether the 
state's duty to make a reasonable good-faith effort to produce wit-
nesses includes the obligation to enlist the voluntary cooperation of 
foreign authorities. 
The answer lies in reconciling two apparently conflicting Supreme 
Court decisions on the scope of the state's duty to request foreign 
cooperation in producing adverse witnesses. In Barber v. Page,300 
the Court held that the state was obliged, not only to invoke formal 
statutory obligations on the defendant's behalf, but also to seek the 
voluntary assistance of foreign authorities. The defendant in Barbar 
sought to confront a witness who was in federal custody in another 
state. The Court held that the state's duty to make a "good-faith 
effort" to produce the witness included the duty both to request the 
United States Bureau of Prisons to release the prisoner for purposes of 
testifying, and to request the federal courts to produce the witness by 
means· of a federal writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum. Further-
more, the Court noted that, had the prisoner been held in sister-state 
custody, the state would have been required to request the courts of 
its sister state to produce the witness by state writ of habeas corpus. 307 
under state compulsory process clause to issue writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum 
to federal officials to produce state prisoner held in federal custody in another state). 
365. Powell v. State, 39 Ala. App. 246, 100 S.2d 38, 44 (1957). See also United 
States v. Greco, 298 F.2d 247, 251 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 820 (1962); 
United States v. Haim, 218 F. Supp. 922, 925-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); State v. Lupino, 
268 Minn. 344, 353, 129 N.W.2d 294, 301 (1964). 
366. 390 U.S. 719, 724 (1968). 
367. 390 U.S. at 723-25 & nn.4-5. Thus, the federal government can be expected 
to respond favorably to three kinds of state requests for federal prisoners: a request in 
the form of a state writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum directed to the United 
States Bureau of Prisons, a request to a federal court for a federal writ of habeas 
corpus ad testificandum under 28 U.S.C. § 224l(c)(5) (1970), or a request made 
directly to the Bureau. See Curran v. United States, 332 F. Supp. 2959 (D. Del. 
1971 ). Similarly, the states can be expected to respond favorably to two kinds of 
sister-state requests for prisoners: either a request under a reciprocal statute like the 
Uniform Rendition of Prisoners Act, or a request to the state court for a state writ 
of habeas corpus ad testificandum. 
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The possibility that the foreign authority might refuse to cooperate 
was considered an insufficient excuse for not making a request: " 'the 
possibility of a refusal is not the equivalent of asking and receiving a 
rebuff.' "368 
On the other hand, in Mancusi v. Stubbs,369 the Court found that 
the duty to make a reasonable good-faith effort to produce witnesses 
did not include the obligation to request the cooperation of foreign 
authorities in Sweden. The defendant, who had been sentenced as a 
second offender on the basis of a prior conviction in Tennessee, 
attacked the Tennessee conviction on the ground that the state had 
relied upon the prior recorded testimony of a witness, then residing in 
Sweden; without making a sufficient effort to produce the witness in 
person. Although he conceded that Tennessee had no formal proce-
dure for compelling the witness to appear, the defendant argued that 
Tennessee was obliged to request the Swedish authorities to produce 
the witness voluntarily. The Court rejected this argument and held 
that the state had no obligation to make such a request in the absence 
of "established procedures depending on the voluntary assistance of 
another govemment."370 
There is an apparent inconsistency between the holdings in Bar-
ber and Mancusi: the former decision required Texas authorities, in 
order to produce witnesses on the defendant's behalf, to request 
cooperation from both the federal government and (by implication) 
from sister states; the latter decision found no obligation on the part 
of Tennessee authorities to request such cooperation from authorities 
in Sweden. Indeed, this inconsistency led the dissenters in Mancusi 
to argue that the two cases were irreconcilable and that the Court was 
retreating from Barber.371 
Nevertheless, it is possible to reconcile the cases both with one 
another and with the rationale underlying the requirement that the 
state make a reasonable good-faith effort to produce the defendant's 
witnesses. The reasonable good-faith effort standard represents an 
accommodation between the state's interest in the effective enforce-
ment of its laws and the necessarily speculative interest of the defend-
ant in producing foreign witnesses. If the defendant seeks a witness 
located in a sister state or in the custody of the federal government 
(as in Barber), the forum can reasonably be expected to request 
foreign cooperation in producing the witness-the tradition of comity 
368. 390 U.S. at 724, quoting 381 F.2d 479, 481 (1st Cir. 1967) (Aldrich, J., 
dissenting). 
369. 408 U.S. 204 (1972). 
370. 408 U.S. at 212. 
371. 408 U.S. at 220 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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among the states and federal government is sufficiently established 
that the requesting state loses little by making the request and is 
reasonably likely to be accommodated. State and federal govern-
ments routinely exchange prisoners to provide testimony372 and to 
facilitate speedy trials;373 there is no reason to believe that the same 
tradition of cooperation would not support the exchange of unincar-
cerated witnesses. 
On the other hand, when a defendant seeks a witness from a 
foreign country (as in Martcusz), it is unreasonable to expect the 
forum to request extranational assistance, at least in the absence of 
established procedures for cooperation. Without a tradition of com-
ity or established practice, diplomatic requests of this type not 
only are likely to impose a burden upon the forum's international 
relations, but are not reasonably likely to be very fruitful. 874 
In conclusion, the divergent holdings in Barber and Mancusi were 
not due to an inconsistent approach to the basic problem of produc-
ing witnesses from other jurisdictions; rather, the divergence was a 
function of the difference between a case in which the forum could 
base its request for assistance on established procedures that ren-
dered it reasonably likely that the witness would be produced, and 
one in which no such likelihood existed. If international re-
lations ever reach a state of comity similar to that presently existing 
within our federal system, there may be no remaining difference 
between the forum's national and international obligation to request 
assistance in obtaining witnesses. In the meantime, a defendant will 
be able to produce his witnesses on the basis of national authority in 
the great majority of cases: If he is being tried in federal court, he can 
rely on the court's nationwide subpoena power, its national habeas-
corpus authority, and its authority to subpoena United States citizens 
from anywhere in the world;375 if tried in state court, he can expect 
372. The Court in Barber noted that many states would "quite probably" be 
willing to produce state prisoners by writ of habeas corpus and make them available 
"at the request of prosecutorial authorities of a sister state upon a showing that 
adequate safeguards to keep the prisoner in custody would be maintained." 390 U.S. 
at 723-24 n.4. 
373. For a discussion of interstate exchange of prisoners for speedy-trial purposes, 
see Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1070-71 (4th 
ed. 1974). 
374. Cf. United States v. Lockwood, 386 F. Supp. 734, 737 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) 
(federal government has no obligation under speedy-trial clause of sixth amendment 
to request foreign governments to extradite draft resisters for purposes of trial if it is 
unlikely that request would be honored). 
375. The federal courts have authority under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5) (1971) to 
issue writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum anywhere in the United States, Clark v. 
Hendrix, 395 F. Supp. 947, 970-73 (N.D. Ga. 1975), to all prisoners, state and 
federal, see Ex parte Dorr, 44 U.S. 103 (1845); In re Thaw, 172 F. 288 (W.D. P'1, 
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the state to request the federal courts to place their nationwide and 
international subpoena power and national habeas corpus authority at 
its disposal, and to request sister states to produce witnesses from 
within their borders. 376 
3. The Obligation To Adopt Legislation Authorizing the Produc-
tion of Foreign Witnesses 
A third common assumption linked to the territorial conception 
of jurisdiction is that, although a state may have a duty to exercise 
existing authority to produce a defendant's foreign witnesses, it has no 
obligation to enact legislation providing for the production of foreign 
witnesses. Thus, it has been said that, regardless of whether the 
states must invoke the Uniform Act To Secure Witnesses once they 
have adopted it, they have no obligation to adopt it in the first 
instance. 37T 
The validity of this assumption must be re-examined in light of 
modem developments in the analysis of jurisdictional limitation. In 
contrast to the territorial view espoused in Minder v. Georgia,318 it is 
now understood that the forum can regulate the conduct of persons 
located beyond its boundaries and can require that such persons 
1908). Cf. McDonald v. Ciccone, 409 F.2d 28 (8th Cir. 1969) (federal courts have 
authority under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5) to issue writs of habeas corpus ad 
prosequendum anywhere in the United States to both state and federal prisoners 
alike). 
376. Sections (a) and (e) of FED. R. CRIM. P. 17, which authorize the federal 
courts to issue subpoenas to persons anywhere in the United States commanding them 
"to attend and give testimony at the time and place specified therein," appear broad 
enough to permit the federal courts to subpoena persons to appear in state court. 
Similarly, rule 17(e)(l) and 28 U.S.C. § 1783 (1966), which permit the federal court 
to subpoena United States citizens from anywhere in the world to appear "before it, 
or before a person or body designated by it," are presumably broad enough to permit 
the federal courts to subpoena persons to appear in state court. See Mancusi v. 
Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 212 n.2 (majority opinion), 222 (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(1972). 
If a state can request a federal court to issue a writ of habeas corpus under 28 
U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5) (1970) to compel a federal prisoner to appear in state court, it 
should be able to request a federal court to issue subpoenas under federal rule 17 to 
compel persons to appear and testify in state court. Cf. Curran v. United States, 332 
F. Supp. 2959 (D. Del. 1971). By the same token, if a state may request a sister 
state to issue a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum to compel a prisoner to appear 
and testify in the requesting state, it should be able to request the sister state to issue 
subpoenas for the same purpose. Even if the fact that the two states have not 
adopted the Uniform Act To Secure Witnesses or the Uniform Rendition of Prisoners 
Act excuses the sister state from complying with the request (but see text at not!!s 
390-405 infra), it does not excuse the forum state from asking. See Barber v. Page, 
390 U.S. 719 (1968), at 723-24 & n.4. 
377. See State v. Blount, 200 Ore. 35, 50, 264 P.2d 419, 426 (1953), cert. denied, 
347 U.S. 962 (1954). ("Neither the requirements of compulsory process nor of the 
Fourteenth Amendment ... demand that the state enact such legislation"). 
378. 183 U.S. 559 (1902). 
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travel to the forum to testify as witnesses. In Blackmer v. United 
States, 378 for example, the Supreme Court upheld a statute authoriz-
ing the federal courts to subpoena United States citizens from foreign 
countries and to punish nonappearance as contempt. Similarly, 
courts have upheld the authority of the forum to regulate the extrater-
ritorial conduct of nonresidents when their conduct might reasonably 
be expected to affect the forum's interest. 380 In deciding whether 
extraterritorial regulation violates standards of substantive due 
process, the courts have weighed the forum's interests in extraterrito-
rial regulation against the unfairness of subjecting the regulated 
person to penal sanction for failing to comply. 
Under this balancing analysis, the forum should not be prohibited 
either from issuing subpoenas to secure the testimony of persons 
located anywhere in the world or from making nonappearance a 
criminal offense, as long as it relieves subpoenaed persons of the 
incidental burdens associated with rendering an appearance. The 
forum has an obvious interest in ensuring that its criminal judgments 
are based on all available testimony.381 Moreover, the forum's inter-
est can be served only by compelling foreign witnesses to appear at 
the forum; unlike civil proceedings, in which the plaintiff with a 
transient cause of action can often litigate wherever the witnesses are 
located, criminal proceedings are local actions that can only be liti-
gated at the forum. 382 
With respect to the interests on the other side, the burden upon 
the witness of appearing at the forum to testify will often be minimal; 
in fact, in most cases, the witness will be testifying only to events he 
observed while within the forum's territorial boundaries. The re-
quirement that the witness respond to a subpoena is neither complex 
nor continuing, nor is it likely to subject him to conflicting duties. 
The witness cannot be required to appear without prior notice, and 
379. 284 U.S. 421 (1932). 
380. See authorities cited in note 347 supra. 
381. We have elected to employ an adversary system of criminal justice in 
which the parties contest the issues before a court of law. . . . The very in-
tegrity of the judicial system and public confidence in the system depend on full 
disclosure of all the facts . . . . To ensure that justice is done, it is imperative 
to the function of courts that compulsory process be available for the production 
of evidence needed either by the prosecution or by the defense. 
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974) (emphasis added). 
382. The federal Constitution guarantees all federal defendants the right to be 
tried "in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed." U.S. CONST. 
art. III, § 2, cl. 3. In addition, the sixth amendment guarantees all federal defendants 
a right to a jury drawn from "the State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed." The sixth amendment's implicit requirement of a jury drawn from the 
"vicinage" has been held applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. 
See People v. Jones, 9 Cal. 2d 546, 510 P.2d 705, 108 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1973). 
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his appearance need not cause him to incur either financial or legal 
liability as long as the forum compensates him for his time and travel 
expenses and renders him immune from civil and criminal process in 
connection with his appearance.383 Thus, in order to implement the 
defendant's right to compulsory process, both Congress and the states 
should have the authority to enact legislation empowering the courts, 
in criminal proceedings, to issue process to secure the presence of 
witnesses located anywhere in the world; furthermore, as long as such 
legislation is properly drafted, the due process clause would not 
appear to prohibit the issuance of such extraterritorial subpoenas. 
If the state has the constitutional authority to issue extraterritorial 
process, the next question is whether the state is obligated to exercise 
such authority on a defendant's behalf. The problem can be illumi-
nated by the following hypothetical. Suppose that a state adopts a 
statute limiting its subpoena power to witnesses who can be served 
within ten miles of the courthouse or to witnesses not confined in state 
institutions. It seems apparent that no court should hesitate in 
finding such a statute invalid as an arbitrary abridgment of the 
defendant's right to have witnesses produced. 384 If this is true, is it 
then possible to distinguish our hypothetical statute from statutes that 
limit the subpoena power to the territorial boundaries of the state? 
The distinguishing factor may be found in the varying ability of 
the state to enforce its authority. In the case of domestic subpoenas, 
the state can effectively enforce its process by arresting or attaching 
the nonappearing witness and prosecuting him for contempt. Thus, 
because statewide subpoenas are reasonably likely to be effective in 
producing witnesses, it is reasonable to expect the state to provide 
such subpoenas. In the case of foreign subpoenas, however, the 
forum cannot rely upon its own enforcement processes; it cannot 
dispatch officers to arrest and return the witness from a foreign state, 
nor can it prosecute the witness for contempt as long as he is 
physically absent. 385 Even if the state could prosecute the witness in 
383. As sections 17 and 18 of the Uniform Act To Secure Witnesses suggest, it is 
clearly within a state's power to provide immunity from arrest and service of process, 
both civil and criminal, to witnesses who appear under compulsion from outside its 
territory and to compensate them for their expenses. 
384. Cf. State ex rel. Rudolph v. Ryan, 327 Mo. 728, 731-32, 38 S.W.2d 717, 718 
(1931) ( statute exempting witnesses in prisons within state from appearing and 
testifying in court violated state compulsory process clause); State ex rel. Gladden v. 
Lonergan, 201 Ore. 161, 191-92, 269 P.2d 491, 505 (1954) (same). 
385. The defendant has a sixth amendment right to be present at all stages of 
criminal proceedings against him unless he can be shown to have intelligently and 
knowingly waived it. Compare Faretta v. California, 43 U.S.L.W. 5004, 5008 n.15 
(U.S. June 30, 1975), with Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970). It is-unlikely that 
a defendant would be deemed to have waived his right to be present simply for failing 
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absentia, the resulting penal judgment (unlike a civil judgment) 
would not be enforced by other jurisdictions.386 Accordingly, the 
most the state con do is to request the foreign authorities to arrest and 
extradite the witness for criminal proceedings in the forum. 
If this distinction is valid, and thus there is no obligation to issue a 
subpoena that the forum cannot reasonably expect to have enforced, 
then we must distinguish between national and international practice. 
· As between foreign nations, extradition is still sufficiently limited to 
make it reasonable for the states and the federal government to limit 
the reach of their subpoenas to persons found within their borders. 
Extradition between nations is based on individually negotiated trea-
ties and is usually limited to enumerated offenses that do not include 
contempt. 387 Hence, until relations between nations reach the point 
where extradition becomes routine for offenses like contempt, the 
states and federal government cannot be required to authorize the 
issuance of international subpoenas. 
As between the various states, on the other hand, extradition has 
become routine. Various sources of authority provide for interstate 
extradition: The Federal Extradition Act provides for the extradition 
of persons who commit criminal acts within the forum and then flee 
to a sister state; the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act provides for 
the extradition of persons who violate the laws of the forum through 
acts that have been committed outside the forum.388 The Uniform 
to appear within the jurisdiction, especially where he is being prosecuted precisely for 
the offense of failing to appear within the jurisdiction. In Blackmer v. United States, 
284 U.S. 421, 440-41 (1932), the Supreme Court held that a defendant could be tried 
for contempt in absentia, because contempt was not a criminal proceeding within the 
meaning of the sixth amendment. The Court, however, has cast doubt on the 
continued vitality of Blackmer by rejecting its premise and applying the sixth 
amendment to contempt proceedings for other purposes. See Codispoti v. Pennsyl-
vania, 418 U.S. 506 (1974). Furthermore, since the sanction in Blackmer was a fine 
rather than imprisonment, its holding may not apply to contempt proceedings 
resulting in sentences of imprisonment. Cf. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 
(1972). 
386. See Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892). 
387. All the bilateral extradition treaties to which the United States is a party 
contain a list of extraditable offenses. M. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL Ex"rnADITION 
AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 315 (1974). Contempt is not listed as an extraditable 
offense in any of these bilateral treaties. See Letter from K. E. Malmborg, Assistant 
Legal Adviser, United States Department of State, to Peter Westen, Sept. S, 1975, on 
file with the Michigan Law Review. The only multilateral extradition agreement to 
which the United States is a party, the Pan American Convention on Extradition, 
Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 2111, T.S. No. 882, is in effect with eleven other countries 
and provides for extradition for offenses "punishable under the laws of the demanding 
and surrendering States with a minimum of penalty of imprisonment of one year." See 
M. BAssrouNr, supra, at 315. Because contempt is punishable under federal Jaw by a 
maximum of six months imprisonment, see 18 U.S.C. § 402 (1970), it is not covered 
by the Convention. 
388. See note 363 supra. 
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Criminal Extradition Act provides for the interstate extradition of 
witnesses who place themselves in contempt by disregarding extrater-
ritorial subpoenas; having now been adopted in forty-seven states, it 
should be as effective in enforcing nationwide subpoenas as -are local 
provisions for enforcing domestic subpoenas. Hence, because it is 
now reasonably likely that nationwide subpoenas would be effec-
tively enforced, the states either should be required to authorize such 
subpoenas (or to adopt some reasonable. alternative such as the 
Uniform Act To Secure Witnesses), or should suffer the conse-
quences that follow from the failure to make a reasonable effort to 
produce witnesses in the defendant's favor.389 
4. The Obligation To Dismiss the Prosecution if a Sister State Fails 
To Cooperate in Producing the Witness 
The final assumption based on the concept of territoriality is that, 
once a state has done everything within its power to produce a witness 
requested by the defendant, the defendant has no cause to complain if 
foreign authorities fail to cooperate in producing the witness. For 
example, it has been held that the state has no obligation to grant a 
defendant a continuance for a material witness in federal custody if 
the state has made reasonable but unsuccessful efforts to persuade 
federal authorities to release the witness.300 
This view, while valid with respect to witnesses located in foreign 
nations, is questionable with respect to witnesses located in sister 
states or within the jurisdiction of the federal courts. The forum can 
be expected to make certain efforts to produce witnesses located in 
foreign nations: for example, issuing such witnesses extraterritorial 
subpoenas (if United States citizens),391 using established procedures 
389. Because the Uniform Act To Secure Witnesses operates only when enacted 
by both states involved, the forum's decision to adopt it would not be equivalent to 
authorizing national subpoenas if the Act were enacted in only a few states. Since 
the Act has now been adopted by all but a few states, however, the forum's decision 
to adopt it now is practically equivalent to authorizing national subpoenas. Thus, 
while it may still be misleading to say that the states have a constitutional obligation 
to adopt the Uniform Act-as opposed to some other national subpoena authority-
it is not inaccurate to say that, if they do not adopt the Uniform Act, they must 
adopt something very much like it. 
With respect to the remedy, the compulsory process clause itself does not 
authorize a court to issue national subpoenas in the face of contrary domestic 
legislation; to that extent, it is not "self-enforcing." However, it does authorize a 
court to protect a defendant from the legislature's failure to adopt such legislation by 
dismissing the charges against him. See note 144 supra. 
390. See Commonwealth v. Swenor, 323 N.E.2d 742, 744 (Mass. App. 1975). 
Cf. People v. South, 122 Cal. App. 505, 508-09, 10 P.2d 109, 111 (1932) (defendant 
not denied a speedy trial in state court if state endeavors to produce him .for trial but 
federal officials refuse to release him from custody for that purpose). 
391. See text at note 351 supra. 
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to request the foreign nation to extradite, expel, or compel the wit-
nesses to appear, 392 trying to induce the witnesses to appear voluntar-
ily, 393 and giving the defendant an opportunity to persuade the wit-
nesses to appear voluntarily. 394 If those devices fail, however, the 
witnesses must be deemed unavailable, just as if they had died, 
disappeared, or lost their memory.39 i; If this were not the case, the 
forum's authority to prosecute would depend upon the actions of 
foreign nations-nations that have no constitutional connection with 
the forum and owe no constitutional duty to the accused. 
A different situation exists, however, with respect to the govern-
ments that constitute our federal system. Unlike foreign nations, 
they do not interact as independent sovereignties. The states and the 
federal government are united by a constitutional scheme that renders 
them interdependent for many purposes. Under this scheme, they 
are constitutionally prohibited from denying a defendant the right "to 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor." Although 
there has yet to be developed a conceptual framework for a nation-
wide solution of constitutional problems, the courts have given sup-
port to the view that, if the constituent governments alone cannot 
abridge a defendant's constitutional rights, they cannot do so by 
acting in combination. In this respect, the sixth amendment can be 
interpreted to prohibit the states and federal government from deny-
ing a defendant witnesses in his favor, either by acting individually or 
by acting in concert with sister governments. 
Support for this "national" view of constitutional rights can be 
drawn from both fourth and fifth amendment cases. Thus, in Mur-
392. See text at notes 371-76 supra. 
393. See, e.g., Virgin Islands v. Aquino, 378 F.2d 540, 550, 552 (3d Cir. 1967) 
(government's constitutional obligation to produce adverse witnesses in person in-
cludes duty to try to persuade them to return voluntarily by paying their expenses) : 
Gillars v. United States, 182 F.2d 962, 978 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (government, which 
lacked power to compel witnesses to come from Germany to testify on defendant's 
behalf, satisfied his compulsory process rights by persuading witnesses to come 
voluntarily at government expense). 
394. See, e.g., United States v. Sanchez-Rodriguez, 475 F.2d 61, 64 (9th Cir. 
1973) (court, which lacked power to compel defendant's witness to come from 
Mexico to testify on his behalf, satisfied his right of compulsory process by permitting 
him to send investigator to try to persuade witness to come voluntarily): Johnson v. 
Johnson, 375 F. Supp. 872, 876 (W.D. Mich. 1974) (violation of compulsory process 
to deny defendant a continuance for purpose of allowing him to persuade witness to 
appear on his behalf). 
395. See Virgin Islands v. Aquino, 378 F.2d 540, 550 (3d Cir. 1967) ("[A] 
witness who is beyond the jurisdiction is as unavailable to the party who wishes to 
call him as if he were dead"); United States v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916, 941 (2d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 940 (1963) (an adverse witness is unavailable for sixth 
amendment purposes if he lies beyond reach of forum's subpoena power and refuses to 
appear voluntarily). See also authorities cited in notes 126-27 supra. 
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phy v. Waterfront Commission, 396 the Supreme Court held that, in 
determining whether a person is being compelled to be a witness 
against himself in violation of the fifth amendment, a court must look 
not only to the isolated actions of any single state, but -also to the 
combined effect the actions of the state and federal governments may 
have upon the defendant. The defendant in Murphy relied upon his 
fifth amendment privilege to refuse to answer questions before a bi-
state commission, even after being granted immunity from prosecu-
tion in both of the states, New York and New Jersey. Murphy 
argued that, even if his incriminating statements could not be used 
against him in New York and New Jersey, they might be used against 
him in a subsequent prosecution by the federal government or another 
state. The commission and the state appellate courts responded 
that the fifth amendment protects a person only from being first 
compelled to speak in one state and then prosecuted by the same 
sovereign, and provides no protection from being compelled to speak 
in one state and then prosecuted in another. The Court re-
jected this argument and held that, for the purpose of the priv-
ilege against incrimination, the state and federal governments should 
be viewed as a single sovereignty; otherwise, the Court noted, 
the defendant could be " 'whipsawed into incriminating himself un-
der both state and federal law even though' the constitutional privi-
lege against self-incrimination is applicable to each."397 
In Elkins v. United States,398 the Court faced a similar problem 
involving the use of evidence seized in violation of the fourth amend-
396. 378 U.S. 52 (1964). 
397. 378 U.S. at 54-56, 77-80. Murphy involved a witness who faced the 
combination of interrogation by a state and potential prosecution by the federal 
government The Court squarely held on the facts that a witness cannot be 
compelled to testify by a state unless also granted immunity from prosecution by the 
federal government To this author's knowledge, the Court has never passed on a 
case involving a witness who faced the combination of interrogation in one state and 
potential prosecution in a sister state. Nevertheless, given the rationale of Murphy, 
the same conclusion should follow-namely, that a witness cannot be compelled to 
testify by a state unless also granted immunity from prosecution by sister states. See 
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441,456 (1972); Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 
273, 276 (1968). 
Congress has provided for grants of immunity that protect federal witnesses from 
prosecution by federal and state governments alike. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 6002 (Supp. 
1975); Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 435-36 (1956). In exercise of its 
supervisory powers, the Supreme Court has further stated that the federal courts may 
not use statements obtained from state witnesses under state grants of immunity. See 
Murphy v. Waterfront Commn., 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964). Absent an act of Congress, 
however, it does not appear that individual states have the authority to grant witnesses 
immunity from prosecution by sister states; until such authority is established, state 
witnesses would be advised to remain silent, even following state grants of immunity, 
for fear that they may be prosecuted by sister states on the basis of their statements. 
398. 364 U.S. 206 (1960). 
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ment. In Elkins, evidence that had been illegally seized from the 
defendant by state officials in Oregon was used against the defendant 
in the course of a federal prosecution. The federal government 
argued that the fourth amendment protects persons only from being 
illegally searched and prosecuted by the same sovereign and provides 
no protection from being illegally searched in one jurisdiction and 
then prosecuted in another jurisdiction on the basis of the illegally 
seized evidence. The Court rejected the government's argument and 
held that the defendant's right to be free from unreasonable searches 
and seizures should not be made to depend upon the actions of a 
single jurisdiction viewed in isolation; rather, the Court indicated that 
it would look to the actions of the jurisdictions involved viewed in 
combination with one another. The decision, while explicitly based 
on the Court's supervisory jurisdiction, is widely viewed as an implicit 
construction of the fourth amendment. 399 
The rationale underlying both Elkins and Murphy can be applied 
to the defendant's right to compulsory process in cases in which either 
a sister state or the federal government fails to cooperate in producing 
defense witnesses. If two states (or a state and the federal govern-
ment) cannot act in combination to deprive a person of his privilege 
against self-incrimination or his fourth amendment rights, they can-
not act in combination to deprive him of his sixth amendment right to 
produce witnesses. If the forum alone cannot prosecute the accused 
while simultaneously suppressing a material witness in his favor, it 
cannot prosecute the accused while a sister state or the federal govern-
399. The Supreme Court in Elkins did not have to decide whether the federal 
courts were constitutionally prohibited from admitting the evidence illegally seized by 
state officials because the Court was able to order the exclusion on the basis of its 
supervisory jurisdiction over the administration of justice in the lower federal courts. 
364 U.S. at 216. Moreover, the Court was not in a position to decide whether state 
courts were constitutionally precluded from admitting evidence illega]]y seized by 
federal officials because the exclusionary rule was not held applicable to the states 
until Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). It is now assumed, however, that the 
exclusion is constitutionally compelled, regardless whether the issue arises in state or 
federal court. See United States v. Schnell, 50 C.M.R. 483, 484, 23 U.S.C.M.A. 464, 
465 (1915) ("Elkins rejected the r'silver platter''] doctrine as constitutionally 
invalid"); People v. Superior Ct., 275 Cal. App. 2d 489, 493, 79 Cal. Rptr. 904, 907 
(1969) ("Mapp clearly indicates that evidence unconstitutionally seized by federal 
agents is inadmissible in a state criminal trial" ( emphasis original)); Rinderknecht v. 
Maricopa County Employees Merit Sys,, 21 Ariz. App. 419, -, 520 P.2d 332, 334 
(1974) ("It is clearly established that in a criminal trial evidences seized in violation 
of a defendant's rights . . . under the Fourteenth Amendment . • • will be excluded, 
whether that trial be in a state or federal court and whether the evidence was seized 
by federal or state officials"). Conversely, it is also assumed that state and federal 
courts are not required to exclude evidence seized without probable cause by officials 
of nations to which the fourth amendment does not apply, even if the seizure was 
illegal there as well. See Stonehill v. United States, 405 F.2d 738, 743 (9th Cir. 
1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 960 (1969). 
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ment operates to suppress a material witness in the defendant's favor. 
Thus, even though the forum has done everything within its power to 
produce the witness, it should not be permitted to proceed with the 
prosecution if the witness is unavailable because of the unjustified 
actions of a sister state or the federal govemment.400 
The principal difficulty with this analysis is the continuing exist-
ence of authority for the proposition that the states and federal 
government are separate sovereignties for purposes of the double 
jeopardy clause.401 Indeed, in some ways, the double jeopardy cases 
may provide a closer analogy to the problems of producing absent 
witnesses than either the fourth or fifth amendment cases. In the 
latter cases, by making use of evidence produced by an illegal search 
or by coercive interrogation, the forum may be deemed to have 
indirectly participated in the unconstitutional conduct by having en-
couraged the sister state to act. In contrast, when the forum requests 
the assistance of a sister state (or the federal government) in produc-
ing defense witnesses, it cannot be accused of aiding in the suppres-
sion of evidence; on the contrary, the forum has done everything 
within its power to produce the evidence. In this respect, the ques-
tion whether the forum can prosecute the defendant in good faith 
after a sister jurisdiction has "suppressed" his witnesses may be more 
analogous to the question whether the forum can prosecute the de-
fendant in good faith after he has been once held in jeopardy by 
a sister jurisdiction for the same offense. 
The most one can say about the double jeopardy problem, how-
ever, is that it remains unresolved. Twenty years ago, in Abbate v. 
United States,402 the Supreme Court held that, although the federal 
government itself could not hold the defendant twice in jeopardy for 
the s~e offense, this same result could be accomplished when the 
federal government and the states, acting as "separate sovereignties," 
400. Cf. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 203 (1959) (Black, J., dissent-
ing) ("I am also not convinced that a State and the Nation can be considered two 
wholly separate sovereignties for the purpose of allowing ·them to do together what, 
generally, neither can do separately"). 
The same analysis should also apply to other sixth amendment violations, such as 
the refusal of a sister state to produce a defendant for a speedy trial at the forum, or 
its refusal to produce an adverse witness for face-to-face confrontation at the forum. 
Thus, it has been suggested that the defendant is denied a speedy trial within the 
meaning of the sixth amendment if, despite the best efforts of the forum, the federal 
government or a sister state refuses to cooperate in making him available for trial in 
the forum. See Note, Effective Guaranty of a Speedy Trial for Convicts in Other 
Jurisdictions, 77 YALE L.J. 767, 778-79 (1968). 
401. See Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 
U.S. 121 (1959); United States v. Hayles, 492 F.2d 125 (5th Cir.), vacated and 
remanded, 419 U.S. 892 (1974). 
402. 359 U.S. 187 (1959). 
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each prosecuted the defendant for the same offense. In the interven-
ing years, however, the Court has weakened the underpinnings of 
Abbate by holding that the double jeopardy clause applies to the 
states as well as the federal government403 and by rejecting the 
"separate sovereignties" concept for other fifth amendment pur-
poses. 404 Consequently, though the Court has yet to overrule Ab-
bate, several commentators and courts have suggested that the doc-
trine has lost its vitality and that two sister jurisdictions cannot act 
in combination to impose forms of jeopardy that neither could im-
pose acting alone. 405 
Even if Abbate is still a viable precedent, however, the issues that 
it dealt with can be distinguished from the compulsory process prob-
lem under analysis. Whenever a double jeopardy issue arises, it is 
likely that each of the two jurisdictions has a legitimate interest in 
prosecuting the defendant for criminal acts in violation of its laws, 
notwithstanding any prior prosecution in the other jurisdiction; in-
deed, if the two jurisdictions are deemed a single sovereignty for 
double jeopardy purposes, each will be induced to frustrate the other's 
prosecution by being the first to rush to judgment. On the other 
hand, for compulsory process purposes, the jurisdiction in which the 
witness is located is presumed to have no legitimate interest in refus-
ing to make him available;406 in this respect, the compulsory process 
case is similar to the situation in Murphy and Elkins, in which the 
conduct of the sister jurisdiction is presumed to serve no legitimate 
federal purpose. Accordingly, treating the two jurisdictions as a 
single sovereignty for compulsory process purposes would encourage 
the free exchange of witnesses based on comity, rather than frustrate 
federal relationships between the two jurisdictions. 
403. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 793, 796 (1969), 
404. See Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970) (rejecting the "separate sover-
eignties" concept for double jeopardy purposes with respect to multiple prosecutions 
by a state and its own subdivisions); Murphy v. Waterfront Commn., 378 U.S. 52 
(1964) (rejecting the "separate sovereignties" concept for purposes of the privilege 
against self-incrimination). 
405. See United States v. Knight, 509 F.2d 354, 360 nn.13-14 (D.C. Cir. 1974) 
(questioning the continued vitality of Bartkus); Note, Double Jeopardy a11d Dual 
Sovereignty: Tlze Impact of Benton v. Maryland on Successive Prosecutions for tlze 
Same Offense by State and Federal Governments, 46 IND. L.J. 413 (1971); Comment, 
Successive State and Federal Prosecutions for tlze Same Offense: Bartkus v. Illinois 
Revisited, 62 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 29 (1971); Note, Successive Prosecutions by Two 
Sovereigns After Benton v. Maryland, 66 Nw. U. L. R.Bv. 248 (1971). 
406. If the sister jurisdiction has a legitimate interest in holding the witness (for 
example, if the witness is suffering from a serious illness) then the witness' absence 
is excused just as if he were being withheld by the forum itself. See notes 114-17 
supra. The fact that there are two jurisdictions involved, rather than one, should 
have no bearing on the validity of a refusal to produce a witness. 
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IV. THE USE OF SUBSTITUTE EVIDENCE IN 
PLACE OF LIVE TESTIMONY 
299 
The discussion, so far, has focused upon the defendant's right to 
obtain the personal attendance of witnesses possessing direct testi-
mony in his favor. Yet a defendant occasionally learns that a witness 
cannot be produced in person, perhaps because the witness is tempor-
arily unavailable, perhaps because of administrative difficulties in 
securing his attendance, or perhaps because he has become totally 
unavailable. The two questions that most commonly arise in such 
situations are whether the defendant can be forced over his objection 
to accept some evidentiary substitute in place of the witness' live 
testimony, and, conversely, whether the defendant has a right to use 
an evidentiary substitute in lieu of live testimony. 
A. The Defendant's Right to Refuse a Substitute Form of 
Evidence in Place of Live Testimony 
A defendant is often required to accept something less than the 
live testimony of an available witness. Thus, to spare certain witnesses 
the inconvenience of a personal appearance, some states require the 
defendant to record their testimony and introduce it in the form of 
written depositions.407 Similarly, instead of granting the defendant a 
continuance for an absent witness (to which he would otherwise be 
entitled), many courts require the defendant to proceed on the basis 
of a written statement of the testimony the witness was expected to 
give. 408 In each case, if the truth of the absent witness' testimony is 
not conceded, the defendant is forced to use the exculpatory testi-
mony in substitute form and the prosecutor is permitted to contradict 
and impeach the absent witness as if he were present.409 
The question raised by such procedures is whether compelling a 
defendant to use a substitute form of evidence in place of live 
407. See, e.g., ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 45, § 226 (1958) (testimony of physician or 
superintendent at hospital for the insane must be taken and presented in deposition 
form); ORE. REV. STAT. § 136.080 (1974) ("When an application is made for the 
postponement of a trial, the court may in its discretion require as a condition 
precedent to granting the same that the party applying therefor consent that the 
deposition of a witness may be taken and read on the trial of the case"). 
408. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 21-8-11 (1970) ("If the application for 
continuance is • • . held sufficient, the cause shall be continued, unless the opposite 
party will admit that the witness, if present, would testify to the facts therein stated, 
in which event the cause shall not be continued, but the party may read as evidence of 
such witness the facts held by the court to be properly stated"). See also authorities 
cited in Annot., 9 A.L.R.3d 1180, 1187-200 (1966). 
409. See Orfield, supra note 202, at 27 n.118; Annot., 9 A.L.R.3d 1180, 1249-65 
(1966). 
300 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 74:191 
testimony violates his right to produce witnesses. Again, the answer 
depends on the constitutional approach taken to the problem. Wig-
more's sharp comments on the use of stipulations to avoid a continu-
ance reflect the conventional wisdom. As previously noted, some 
jurisdictions will deny a defendant a continuance if the prosecutor 
stipulates that the witness, if present, would testify in accord with the 
offer of proof; other jurisdictions, in contrast, will not deny a defend-
ant the witness' live testimony unless the prosecutor fully protects the 
defendant by conceding the truth of the absent witness' testimony.410 
Wigmore made no secret of his views. He not only believed, as a 
matter of policy, that the latter practice "serve[s] to add a powerful 
weapon of chicanery to the armory of unscrupulous counsel defend-
ing hardened villains," but, as a constitutional matter, he rejected the 
criticism of substitute forms of testimony as "totally devoid of 
grounds":411 "Whether the one or the other kind of admission should 
be required may depend on the circumstances of each community and 
each case; but it is impossible to regard the constitutional clause as 
being in any way involved."412 
Wigmore's views are consistent with his basic assumption that the 
compulsory process clause merely extends to a defendant the benefits 
of process enjoyed by the prosecutor under local law and thus has no 
effect on questions of the competence, admissibility, or weight of 
evidence. The Supreme Court, in Washington v. Texas, rejected that 
assumption and construed the compulsory process clause in a manner 
that constitutionalizes the presentation of defense testimony in crimi-
nal cases.413 Consequently, whether stipulated testimony or deposi-
tion testimony is a proper substitute for live testimony is a question 
that must be resolved in accord with federal constitutional standards. 
The federal standard of materiality is clear: A defendant has a 
constitutional right to present all evidence in his favor that could 
reasonably affect the judgment of the jury.414 The effect of a substi-
410. See Annot., 9 A.L.R. 3d 1180, 1225-36 (1966). It is difficult to see how a 
defendant can complain about the exclusion of a witness if the government stipulates 
to the truth of the facts underlying the witness' testimony. See Hallman v. State, 36 
Ala. App. 592, 594, 61 S.2d 857, 859 (1952); State v. Belcher, 83 N.M. 75, 488 P.2d 
125 (Ct. App. 1971); Orfield, supra note 221, at 26 n.116. 
411. 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE§ 2595, at 605 nn.8 & 9 (3d ed. 1940). 
412. Id. § 2595, at 606. See also authorities cited in Annot., 9 A.L.R.3d 1180, 
1211-19 (1966). Cf. Pierce v. State, 52 Ala. App. 422, 426, 293 S.2d 483, 485-86 
(1973) (no compulsory process problem with statute that requires defendant to use 
deposition testimony in place of otherwise available live testimony). 
413. See text at notes 11-14 supra. Cf. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 176 
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("ff]he confrontation guarantee may be thought, 
along with the right to compulsory process, ••• to constitutionalize the right to a 
defense as we know it ... "). For Wigmore's views, see note 26 supra. 
414. See text at notes 98-105 supra. 
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tute form of testimony is to deny a defendant the opportunity to 
present evidence of his witness' demeanor and credibility; however, 
whether such evidence is material will depend upon the nature of the 
case. In the rare case in which the weight of evidence depends 
entirely on its content, the loss of demeanor evidence may be imma-
terial in that it could not reasonably affect the judgment of the jury. 
In the great majority of cases, however, the weight of evidence 
depends in part on the jury's evaluation of the witness' credibility. In 
most cases, therefore, it violates the defendant's sixth amendment 
right to compulsory process to force him to use a substitute form of 
testimony in place of an otherwise available witness-whether the 
substitute is in the form of a transcript of previous trials, 415 deposition 
testimony,410 or a stipulated statement of facts417 -just as it would 
violate his sixth amendment right of confrontation to force him to 
accept adverse testimony in a substitute form where the adverse 
witness is available to testify in person.418 
415. See United States v. Edwards, 469 F.2d 1362, 1370 (5th Cir. 1972). ("This 
test [of federal rule 17(b)] should not be resolved solely upon the ground that the 
testimony of the same witnesses, as recorded at a previous trial, is available. 
Whenever a credibility choice is crucial to the resolution of an issue of fact, the 
defendant is entitled to have the same jury then charged with guilt determination 
weigh credibility on the basis of their personal observations of the appearance and de-
meanor of the defendant's witnesses"); Preston v. Blackledge, 332 F. Supp. 681, 684 
(E.D.N.C. 1971) ("While the recorded testimony of the previous trials gave the jury 
an adequate version of the substance of their testimony, it could in no way give the 
jury any idea of the witness' demeanor or credibility by which they could weigh the 
substantive nature of the testimony. The presence of these witnesses under the 
circumstances of this case was vital to the petitioners' right to receive a fair trial"). 
416. See State ex rel. Rudolph v. Ryan, 327 Mo. 728, 38 S.W.2d 717 (1931); 
State ex rel. Gladden v. Lonergan, 201 Ore. 161, 269 P.2d 491 (1954). 
417. See, e.g., Graham v. State, 50 Ark. 161, 6 S.W. 721 (1887); People v. Fong 
Chung, 5 Cal. App. 587, 91 P. 105 (1907); State v. Owens, 167 La. 1016, 120 S. 631 
(1929); State v. Hickman, 75 Mo. 416 (1882); State v. Wilcox, 21 S.D. 532, 114 
N.W. 687 (1907); State v. Baker, 81 Tenn. (13 Lea) 326 (1884); Medford v. State, 
89 Tex. Crim. 1, 229 S.W. 504 (1921) (all involving challenges under state 
constitutions). 
418. The confrontation clause, like the compulsory process clause, requires the 
government to make a good faith effort to produce witnesses in person to enable the 
trier of fact to consider the credibility of their testimony in light of their demeanor on 
the witness stand. See generally Phillips, The Confrontation Clause and the Scope of 
the Unavailability Requirement, 6 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 327 (1973). See also Virgin 
Islands v. Aquino, 378 F.2d 540, 548 (3d Cir. 1967). Thus, the government may not 
introduce the prior recorded testimony of an adverse witness-even if the testimony 
was taken under oath and subjected to cross-examination-if the witness is presently 
available to testify in person. Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 210-13 (1972); 
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 172-83 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); Barber v. 
Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725-26 (1968). Indeed, the only distinction between the two 
clauses of the sixth amendment in that respect is that the confrontation clause requires 
the government to produce in person all witnesses against the accused, while the 
compulsory process clause requires the government to produce in person all witnesses 
in his favor. See note 65 supra. 
It remains to be seen whether videotaped depositions taken under oath and 
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To be sure, a defendant can only object to the use of a substitute 
form of testimony if he would otherwise be entitled to have the 
witness produced in person. Thus, if a defendant has no right to a 
continuance (because, for example, he has acted in bad faith or has 
failed to be diligent), then he cannot complain about the use of 
stipulated facts.419 Similarly, if he has no right to have the witness 
produced in person (because, for example, the witness is seriously ill 
or dead), then he cannot complain if he is required to use the witness' 
prior recorded testimony. By the same token, however, if a defend-
ant is otherwise entitled to have the witness produced in person, he 
cannot be denied this opportunity by being forced to accept a less 
probative form of the witness' testimony. 
B. The Defendant's Right To Introduce a Substitute Form of Evi-
dence in Place of Live Testimony 
The more important and more difficult problem is whether a 
defendant has a constitutional right, over the prosecutor's objection, 
to introduce testimony in the form of a deposition or other hearsay 
statement in place of live testimony. The issue commonly arises 
when a defendant desires to introduce the prior statements of a 
witness who is unavailable because he has died, 420 or because he lies 
beyond the effective reach of the court's subpoena power.421 If the 
jurisdiction's evidentiary rules allow depositions or other hearsay 
evidence to be used in the event a witness is unavailable, the constitu-
tional question will not arise; but if the jurisdiction renders such 
evidence inadmissible, the court must decide whether the defendant 
recorded in advance of trial can, constitutionally, be substituted for the production of 
available witnesses. For an illustration of the context in which the compulsory 
process issues may arise, see Judge Thomas MacBride's decision to order President 
Ford to submit to a videotaped deposition for the trial of Lynette Fromme in lieu of 
subpoenaing him to testify at trial. N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1975, at 12, col. 4 (city 
ed.); id., Nov. 2, 1975, § 1, at 22, col. 3; id., Nov. 15, 1975, at 1, col. 2. For a 
discussion of this issue in the context of the defendant's right of confrontation, see 
Short, Florence & Marsh, An Assessment of Videotape in the Criminal Courts, in 
Symposium: The Use of Videotape in the Courtroom, 1915 BRIGHAM YOUNG L. REV, 
423, 455; Barber & Bates, Videotape in Criminal Proceedings, 25 HAST. L.J. 
1017, 1030-36 (1974); Comment, Video-Tape Trials: A Practical Evaluation and a 
Legal Analysis, 26 STAN. L. REV. 619, 639-42 (1974). With respect to the right of 
compulsory process, the answer depends on whether the difference between viewing 
the witness' demeanor in person and viewing it on videotape is a difference that could 
reasonably affect the judgment of the jury. 
419. See Mcconney v. United States, 421 F.2d 248, 250 (9th Cir. 1970). See 
also authorities cited in Annot., 9 A.L.R.3d 1180, 1219-25 (1966). 
420. See, e.g., Braswell v. Wainwright, 463 F.2d 1148, 1157 (5th Cir. 1972). 
421. Cf., e.g., Burgman v. United States, 188 F.2d 637, 639 (D.C. Cir.), cert. 
denied, 342 US. 838 (1951). 
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has a prevailing constitutional right to produce and present the evi-
dence. 
The question divides into two related issues: whether the defend-
ant's right to the production of witnesses in his favor includes the 
right to the production of evidence in documentary form, and, if so, 
whether his right to the production of such evidence includes the right 
to present it to the trier of fact, notwithstanding that it is considered 
inadmissible under the jurisdiction's prevailing rules of evidence. 
The first issue was directly presented and resolved in the trial of 
Aaron Burr.422 Burr claimed that, under the compulsory process 
clause, he was entitled to a subpoena duces tecum to President 
Jefferson to produce the Wilkinson correspondence. The govern-
ment opposed the motion on the ground that the sixth amendment 
entitled the defendant to process only for "witnesses" in his favor, and 
not for papers or other documentary evidence. 423 Marshall, compar-
ing the purposes and effects of ordinary subpoenas and subpoenas 
duces tecum, rejected the constitutional distinction proposed by the 
government as "too attenuated to be countenanced in the tribunals of 
a just and humane nation": 
A subpoena duces tecum varies from an ordinary subpoena only in 
this; that a witness is summoned foF the purpose of bringing with 
him a paper in his custody .... It has been truly observed that the 
[witness] can, regularly, take no more interest in the awarding [of] 
a subpoena duces tecum than in the awarding [of] an ordinary sub-
poena. . . . This court would certainly be very unwilling to say that 
upon fair construction the constitutional and legal right to obtain 
its process, to compel the attendance of witnesses, does not extend 
to their bringing with them such papers as may be material in the 
defence.424 
Marshall's constitutional judgment that the defendant's right to 
compulsory process includes the right to produce evidence in docu-
mentary form has never been questioned. 425 The more difficult 
issue, therefore, is whether the right to have documentary evidence 
produced includes the right to present it to the trier of fact, notwith-
422. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 35 (No. 14,692d) (C.C.D. Va. 1807). 
See generally notes 7, 150, 281-86 supra and accompanying text. 
423. For a verbatim account of the argument on the motion, see 1 T. CARPENTER, 
THE TRIAL OF COLONEL AARON BURR 60-124 (1807) (3 vols.); 1 D. ROBERTSON, 
supra note 310, at 112-75. 
424. 25 F. Cas. at 35. 
425. See United States v. McGrady, 508 F.2d 13, 18 n.5 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. 
denied, 420 U.S. 979 (1975); Riser v. Teets, 253 F.2d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 1958) 
(Pope, J., dissenting); United States v. Schneiderman, 106 F. Supp. 731, 735 (S.D. 
Cal. 1952), affd. sub 110m. Yates v. United States, 225 F.2d 146 (9th Cir. 1955), 
revd. 011 other grounds, 354 U.S. 298 (1957). Cf. Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 
361, 372 (1911 ). 
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standing that such evidence would be inadmissible under local prac-
tice. According to the conventional wisdom, the compulsory process 
clause is relevant only to issues concerning the physical production of 
witnesses and has no bearing on questions of testimonial compe-
tence. 426 As we have seen, however, the Court rejected that view in 
Washington v. Texas and held instead that the competence of wit-
nesses is itself a federal question to be resolved by federal stand-
ards.421 
The applicable federal standard can again be found in Washing-
ton. The Court there held that the defendant has a constitutional 
right to present a witness whose ability to give reliable evidence is 
something about which reasonable people can differ, notwithstanding 
local rules that would render the witness' testimony incompetent. 4211 
The same standard should apply to the presentation of documentary 
evidence. There is no constitutional difference between a rule of 
competence that arbitrarily bars a witness from taking the stand and 
a rule of evidence that arbitrarily excludes documentary evidence 
from the record. The question in each case is whether a properly 
instructed trier of fact could reasonably consider the offer as evidence 
in the defendant's favor. The defendant in each case has a constitu-
tional right to offer the evidence unless the court concludes that the 
evidence is so inherently unreliable that reasonable people, properly 
cautioned, could not rationally rely on it.420 
To be sure, a defendant cannot insist on presenting the testimony 
of a witness in a substitute form if the witness is available to testify in 
person. The state has a legitimate interest in requiring the parties to 
present evidence, wherever possible, in its most reliable form; further-
more, a defendant cannot justifiably complain of reasonable rules of 
evidence that attempt to further this interest. 430 On the other hand, if 
exculpatory testimony would otherwise be unavailable (whether this 
is due to the fact that the witness cannot be produced or because he 
fails to corroborate his earlier statements), the defendant has a consti-
tutional right to introduce the evidence in its next most reliable 
form-whether the substitute comes in the form of a deposition, 431 or 
426. See, e.g., United States v. Maloney, 241 F. Supp. 49, 50 (W.D. Pa. 1965). 
See also note 16 supra. 
421. See text at notes 17-19 supra. 
428. See text at notes 25-39 supra. 
429. See text at notes 43-70 supra. 
430. See Westen, supra note 4, at 157-58. Cf. Russell v. Commonwealth, 405 
S.W.2d 683, 684 (Ky. App. 1966) (no error to refuse to permit defendant to 
introduce his own affidavit of absent witness, where he failed to exercise diligence in 
obtaining her testimony in the more reliable form of a deposition). 
431. "When personal appearance of witnesses on behalf of the accused is unavail-
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an out-of-court statement.432 The state, in tum, cannot exclude such 
"next best" evidence unless it can demonstrate that the evidence is so 
inherently untrustworthy that a properly instructed jury could not 
reasonably rely on it. 433 
V. CONCLUSION 
Two separate and distinct bodies of law on the production of 
witnesses in criminal proceedings have developed in this country. The 
first derives from the common law and has been developed largely by 
state courts to govern the production of witnesses generally-whether 
called by the plaintiff or the defendant, whether sought in civil 
proceedings or criminal proceedings. The second derives from the 
sixth amendment and has been developed largely by the federal courts 
during the past decade as a construction of the defendant's right to 
"compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor" in criminal 
proceedings. Despite their differing sources of authority, these two 
bodies of law represent attempts to strike a balance between essen-
tially the same conflicting forces: the defendant's interest in present-
ing evidence in his favor, the witness' interest in avoiding the bur-
dens of testifying, the public's interest in the accurate determination 
of guilt or innocence, the trial court's interest in resolving matters 
of proof with finality, the appellate court's interest in ensuring that 
able, his rights [to compulsory process] are not violated when the testimony can be 
received by deposition." State v. Dehler, 257 Minn. 549, 559-60, 102 N.W.2d 696, 
704 (1960). Accord, Burgman v. United States, 188 F.2d 637, 639 (D.C. Cir.), 
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 838 (1951). See also United States v. Powell, 156 F. Supp. 
526 (N.D. Cal. 1957) (defendant's right of compulsory process includes right to be 
issued a passport to People's Republic of China to try to obtain deposition testimony 
of witnesses who cannot be produced in person); United States v. Hofmann, 24 F. 
Supp. 847 (S.D.N.Y. 1938) (defendant's right of compulsory process includes right to 
take deposition of foreign witnesses who cannot be compelled to appear in person). 
But see 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2191, at 70 (J. McNaughton rev. 1961) 
(defendant has no constitutional right to take deposition testimony of witnesses unless 
that opportunity has already been granted to prosecutor under local law). 
432. In Braswell v. Wainwright, 463 F.2d 1148, 1157 (5th Cir. 1972), after 
concluding that the defendant was entitled to a new trial because the state court had 
wrongfully excluded an alibi witness, the court held that, since the witness had died in 
the meantime and could not testify in person, the defendant had a constitutional right 
(presumably under the compulsory process clause) to introduce a hearsay statement 
of what the witness would have said. For a discussion of the defendant's constitu-
tional right to introduce hearsay testimony in his favor, see Westen, supra note 4, at 
149-59. 
433. Compare Wisconsin v. Gagnon, 497 F.2d 1126, 1129-30 (7th Cir. 1974) 
(defendant has constitutional right to introduce uncross-examined testimony taken in 
open court under oath), with United States v. Figueroa, 298 F. Supp. 1215 (S.D.N.Y. 
1969) (defendant has no right to take deposition, upon written interrogatories, of 
foreign witness whose credibility is dubious, who cannot be effectively cross-exam-
ined, and who cannot be deterred by the threat of prosecution for false testimony). 
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the law is correctly and uniformly applied, and the judiciary's interest 
in the speedy and inexpensive resolution of criminal proceedings. 
The conflict between these procedural forces is persistent and, 
ultimately, irreducible. Thus, while one can strike a partial balance 
between the defendant's interest in producing the complaining witness 
and the witness' interest in avoiding the burdens of testifying, •this 
balance never eliminates the conflict completely; it simply furthers 
one interest at the expense of the other. Indeed, in most cases, the 
balance represents a mutual sacrifice. For example, in striking a 
balance between the defendant's interest in securing a continuance for 
an absent witness and the court's interest in expediting the proceed-
ings, some courts grant the defendant a continuance for a "reasona-
ble" period of time, thus both furthering and sacrificing each interest 
to some extent. 
The two bodies of law on the production of witnesses strike very 
different balances between these procedural forces. The common 
law, which received much of its shape in state courts in the nine-
teenth century, tends both to give less weight to the defendant's in-
terest in producing witnesses than to the other procedural interests 
and to rely on the "discretion" of the trial judge to reach proper judg-
ments. The constitutional doctrine, on the other hand, which has re-
ceived most of its shape in federal courts in the past ten years, tends 
to give the defendant's interests nearly absolute weight whenever ex-
culpatory evidence is readily available and considerable weight 
whenever the evidence is potentially available; furthermore, the con-
stitutional doctrine vests substantial authority in appellate courts to 
review lower court judgments. 
This fundamental difference in approach did not ,take final shape 
until Washington v. Texas; before Washington, it was generally as-
sumed that the sixth amendment had no bearing on the law of 
evidence and simply incorporated local standards for the issuance of 
subpoenas. The great significance of Washing ton is not only that it 
directed the federal courts to fashion an independent constitutional 
standard to govern the presentation of defense witnesses in criminal 
cases, but also it set an example by striking a balance of procedural 
forces that greatly favored the accused. The federal courts, now 
freed from the baggage of the common law and directed to the spe-
cific interests of the accused, have further developed the new bal-
ance of forces and have proceeded to impose it everywhere as the 
law of the land. 
